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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a deep political science insight into the functioning of the EU 
new multilevel administrative system governing the micro-prudential supervision of 
credit institutions operating in the Single Market. It aims to explain the conditions 
affecting the formal top-bottom compliance expectation within this multilevel 
system. In doing so, it engages in the institutional analysis of the organisational and 
operational design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).  
The SSM is the first pillar of the European Banking Union and is composed by the 
ECB and National Competent Authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States. It 
consists of two specific supervisory (sub) systems: (i) SSM Direct Supervision, 
applicable to the micro-prudential supervision of large and systemic (“significant”) 
banks established within the jurisdiction of  Member States; and (ii) SSM Indirect 
Supervision, applicable to the micro-prudential supervision of smaller and medium-
sized (“less significant”) banks established within the jurisdiction of Member States.  
Both supervisory subsystems are considered to be of a multilevel nature, consisting 
of independently organized supervisory apparatus residing at the higher 
(supranational) and lower (national) levels, whose mutual administrative 
interactions are embedded in a certain structural (institutional) context. The formal 
legal and administrative framework in which they operate needs to provide the 
necessary conditions to promote the systemic top-down compliance required in 
order ensure the smooth and robust functioning of the SSM as a whole. To explain 
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under which structural conditions the expected top-bottom compliance within the 
SSM is likely to reach higher levels, this study rests on a calibrated analytical 
framework that applies the Principal-Agent theory in the context of EU multilevel 
administration.  
More specifically, this dissertation argues that two specific structural conditions 
(namely, the operational and the organisational designs of the respective SSM 
supervisory subsystems) are likely to influence the expected compliance of the NCA 
lower-level supervisory apparatus (the agent) with the preferences and objectives of 
the ECB higher-level supervisory apparatus (the principal) relating to the Union’s 
policies on prudential banking supervision. To prove this argument, this dissertation 
constructs two hypotheses (the “Enforcement” and the “Management” hypotheses) 
based on the main tenants of two traditional schools that have sought to explain 
compliance within international regimes: the enforcement school and the 
management school. In brief, the “Enforcement” hypothesis relates the formal-top-
down compliance expectation to the capacity of control within the SSM. The 
“Management” hypothesis links the formal-top-down compliance expectation to the 
capacity of cooperation within the SSM.  
These hypotheses are tested by the application of two dimensions of the Principal-
Agent framework: (i) the “traditional” Principal-Agent perspective, used to test the 
“Enforcement” hypothesis, and (ii) the “liberal” Principal-Agent perspective, used to 
test the “Management” hypothesis. The test of the Enforcement hypothesis is 
conducted in two phases. In the first phase, the systemic position of the higher level 
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actor (the principal) in the respective SSM supervisory system is assessed by looking 
at its organisational design. In the second phase, the operational design of the 
respective SSM supervisory system is analyzed by gauging the higher level actor’s 
(the principal’s) control capacity over the lower level actor’s (the agent) within that 
system. The test of the “Management” hypothesis follows the same two-step 
approach. In the first phase, the higher level actor’s (the principal’s) “shadow of 
hierarchy” cast upon the lower level actor (the agent) is assessed by looking at its 
organisational design. In the second phase, the operational designs of the respective 
SSM supervisory systems are analyzed by ascertaining the cooperation capacity 
between the higher and lower level actors (the principal and the agent) within each 
system. 
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PART I. 
SETTING THE SCENE  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction to the study 
On 4 November 2014, the Council Regulation No. 1024/2013 establishing the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (the “SSM Regulation”) became applicable. It delegated to 
the European Central Bank (“ECB”) exclusive competences to carry out a number of 
specific supervisory tasks related to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
in the newly created Banking Union (“BU”). The SSM Regulation is the founding act 
of the first and key pillar of the Banking Union – the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(“the SSM”) - which is a common framework for the micro prudential supervision of 
banks headquartered in euroarea Member States.  
The institutional design of the SSM is unique in the EU constitutional and 
administrative framework. It is a “system of financial supervision consisting of the 
ECB and the National Competent Authorities (“NCAs”) of the participating Member 
States.”1 It is clear that neither is the SSM an EU institution/agency, nor does it 
possess legal personality. The fact that the SSM is essentially composed of different 
and autonomous elements, located both at supranational and national level, entails 
far-reaching implications from the legal and political science perspective. Both 
components of the system are embedded in a specific legal and institutional 
structure which necessarily shapes their behavioural motivations and chosen courses 
                                                          
1
 See Article 2(9) of the SSM Regulation. 
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of action when performing their respective supervisory tasks. This specific structure 
also raises delicate questions concerning the interactions between different levels of 
administration, and the ways that the actors situated at different levels cooperate to 
pursue common tasks and policy objectives. In particular, one of the greatest 
challenges that the multilevel design of the SSM is likely to face concerns the way of 
ensuring a higher compliance of the lower (national) level supervisory 
administration with the policy preferences and objectives of the higher 
(supranational) level supervisory administration. In this context, a growing number 
of accounts indicate that disruptions in interactions between national and 
supranational levels within a multi-level setting appear to be common in the EU 
context.2 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation identifies and analyses two main conditions 
which are formally expected to positively influence the NCA supervisory 
administrations’ compliance with the policy preferences and objectives of the ECB 
supervisory administration operating in the framework of the multi-level SSM (top-
down compliance). Following the understanding of the institutional design of a 
multi-level regime as a set of “rules of the game”3 which “prescribe, proscribe and 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Andrew Jordan, ‘The implementation of EU environmental policy; a policy problem without a 
political solution?’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 17, no. 1 (1999): pp. 69–90; Christoph 
Knill, ‘Implementing European policies: the impact of national administrative traditions’ (1997); Maria 
Mendrinou, ‘Non‐compliance and the European commission's role in integration’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 3, no. 1 (1996): pp. 1–22; Esther Versluis, ‘Even rules, uneven practices: Opening the ‘black box’of EU law in 
action’, West European Politics 30, no. 1 (2007): pp. 50–67. 
3
 See Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (2009), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, page 40. 
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permit behavior”4 to the actors operating therein, this dissertation argues that two 
variables influence the most essential “rules of the game” affecting formal top-down 
compliance expectation within the SSM multi-level supervisory administration: (i) 
the specific organisational design of the SSM and (ii) the specific operational design 
of the SSM.  
The first condition is deemed to shape the formal position of the higher and lower 
level actors operating therein, including their respective hierarchies (i.a. their 
competences, tasks, or roles). The “organisational” rules are encapsulated within the 
legal and regulatory framework underpinning the functioning of the SSM’s 
supervisory machinery. Different models of EU multi-level administration can be 
distinguished by resorting to the theoretical accounts of federal theory. The second 
condition captures internal mechanisms which are put in place to address 
potentially conflicting preferences and objectives of the actors pertaining to the 
multi-level regime. The “operational” rules are deemed to be reflected in the control 
and cooperation capacity of the ECB over/with the NCAs. Control and cooperation 
capacities can be estimated by the application of an analytical toolkit developed 
under the Principal-Agent approach to the relations between the ECB and the NCA 
supervisory administrations within the SSM.  
The study of the organisational and operational “rules of the game” governing the 
SSM offered by this dissertation can be regarded a clear example of how the analyses 
                                                          
4
 See Elinor Ostrom, ‘An agenda for the study of institutions’ (1986), Public choice, 48(1), pp. 3-25. 
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of both the legal and the political dimension of EU administrative realities mutually 
complement each other and reinforce the quality of academic research in the field.  
By analyzing the institutional design of the SSM through the theory of federalism 
and the Principal-Agent framework, this dissertation firstly aims to provide a 
meaningful contribution to the study on compliance within multi-level regimes, 
since top-down relationships between the EU and its Member States’ 
administrations have not yet been extensively addressed in the existing literature. 
Second, by accepting theoretical insights from federalism in order to reconstruct the 
SSM’s organisational “rules of the game”, this dissertation aims to significantly add 
to the research on the post-crisis transformations of bureaucratic interactions in the 
EU. As noted by Michael Bauer and Jarle Trondal, “the administrative reality of the 
EU (…) remains under-studied even though it has received increased academic 
attention in recent years”. 5 Third, by looking at the SSM’s operational “rules of the 
game” through the Principal-Agent framework, this dissertation intends to 
                                                          
5
 With the notable exception of research on administrative realities concerning the European Commission as the 
main EU executive actor, see Jarle Trondal and Michael W. Bauer, ‘Conceptualizing the European multilevel 
administrative order: capturing variation in the European administrative system’, European Political Science 
Review (2015): pp. 1–22.  
In this regard, see indicatively the following contributions by Bauer, Ellinas, Egeberg, Kassim, Peterson, Trondal 
and Wille: Jarle Trondal, An emergent European executive order (Oxford University Press, 2010); Morten Egeberg 
and Jarle Trondal, ‘National agencies in the European administrative space: government driven, commission 
driven or networked?’, Public Administration 87, no. 4 (2009): pp. 779–790; Antonis Ellinas and Ezra Suleiman, 
‘Reforming the Commission: between modernization and bureaucratization’, Journal of European Public Policy 15, 
no. 5 (2008): pp. 708–725; Antonis A. Ellinas and Ezra N. Suleiman, ‘Supranationalism in a transnational 
bureaucracy: The case of the European Commission’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 5 (2011): 
pp. 923–947; Antonis A. Ellinas and Ezra Suleiman, The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy: 
Europe's Custodians (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Hussein Kassim, ‘The secretariat general of the European 
commission’, The European Commission. London: John Harper Publishing (2006): pp. 75–102; Hussein Kassim, 
John Peterson, Michael W. Bauer et al., The European Commission of the twenty-first century (OUP Oxford, 2013); 
Wille, including: Anchrit Wille, The normalization of the European Commission: Politics and bureaucracy in the 
EU executive (OUP Oxford, 2013). 
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contribute the rational choice literature pioneered by Jonas Tallberg, which explains 
the “post-decisional stage” of European integration.  
The choice to rely on the Principal-Agent framework, which has been championed 
by the rational choice institutionalism in political science scholarship, is a strategic 
decision which is primarily informed by the following considerations.  
In the author’s view, the application of the rational choice approach to the 
institutional analysis of the SSM offers a convincing deductive explanation of actors’ 
behavior that is based on a set of universal claims about rationality. It focuses on 
identifying the interests and motivations behind actors’ behavior which are assumed 
to be largely unchanged over time. The underlying logic of rational choice 
institutionalism is that the behavior of actors responds to predefined “rules of the 
game” pertaining to the institutional structure6 in which those actors operate. 
Therefore, it is well-suited to address the issues of compliance within multi-level 
regimes, such as the SSM, which are predominantly based on formal rules and 
policies.7  
Given its deductive nature, rational choice institutionalism is not only very helpful 
for capturing the range of reasons why actors would take any given action within a 
given institutional incentive structure, but it can also be useful for bringing out 
particularities or actions that would not be unexpected under normal 
                                                          
6
 See B. Guy Peters, ‘Institutional theory: Problems and prospects’ (2000). 
7
 On more specific reasons why the Principal-Agent approach is a suitable analytical framework for this 
dissertation, see in particular its sections II.5.2 and III. 7.2. 
19 
 
circumstances.8 However, rational choice institutionalism may not be the best 
analytical choice when it comes to explaining these particularities, especially where 
they are not a result of an interest-motivated action. In those cases, it is possible that 
they might better be explained in historical, sociological institutionalist, or 
constructivist terms. 
Therefore, one of the potential analytical alternatives to the rational choice approach 
could be historical institutionalism. The institutionalist approach is particularly 
insightful when explaining the origins and development of institutional structures 
and processes over time, as it focuses on continuity and path dependence, and tends 
to highlight sequences in development, timing of events, and phases of political 
change. It also considers the interests of the actors as more context-driven rather 
than being universally defined.9 However, historical institutionalism might not be 
the best analytical choice to study compliance within the newly created SSM, since it 
is better suited to explaining the persistence of policies or structures rather than 
explaining their change.10  
Another alternative to the choice of rational choice institutionalism could be 
sociological institutionalism. This institutionalist approach puts emphasis on the 
shared understandings and norms that frame actions, shape identities and influence 
interests. As sociological institutional explanations are obtained in an inductive 
                                                          
8
 See Vivien A. Schmidt, George Tsebelis, Thomas Risse et al., ‘Approaches to the study of European politics’, 
ECSA review 12, no. 2 (1999): p. 15. 
9
 See John Zysman, ‘How institutions create historically rooted trajectories of growth’, Industrial and corporate 
change 3, no. 1 (1994): pp. 243–283; Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’, Annual 
Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): pp. 369–404. 
10
 See Peters, ‘Institutional theory: Problems and prospects’ (above, n. 6). 
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(bottom-up) rather than deductive (top-bottom) manner, sociological 
institutionalism can shed more light on individuals’ reasons for action in ways that 
rational choice institutionalism cannot. However, obtaining sociological 
institutionalist explanations is not without challenges. Notably, defining the 
dependent variable and the rules of the game could be challenging from the 
sociological institutionalist perspective. This is due to the comprehensive notion of 
institutions, which are considered to include not only formal rules and policies, but 
also  symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates.11 Given that complexity, 
it appears that rational choice institutional may wield more power than its 
sociological counterpart when explaining compliance issues within the SSM at the 
phase of its development.  
Finally, one could also apply constructivist approaches to the study of the SSM; these 
approaches tend to highlight the importance of long lasting shared ideas in 
explaining political phenomena. They typically survey changing context 
developments over decades, and therefore offer an analytical perspective on the 
action undertaken by the actors in the longer term. However, as the SSM is a 
relatively new EU politico-administrative phenomenon, it is debatable whether at 
the current juncture the application of a constructivist framework could provide 
more satisfactory explanations than the rational choice framework. In this context, it 
has been convincingly argued that the rational choice approaches (for example, the 
                                                          
11
 See W. Richard Scott, ‘Institutions and Organizations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis’ in W. Richard Scott, 
John W. Meyer et al., Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism 
(Thousand Oaks CA, Sage, 1994), pp. 55–80. 
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Principal-Agent analytical framework) have proven to be better designed for the 
analysis of short- and medium-term action, when actors’ preferences and interests 
remain fixed.12 Furthermore, the application of the constructivist approach would 
necessarily require conducting a significant number of formal interviews, which are 
not easy to obtain as ECB and NCA supervisors are very reluctant to discuss their 
supervisory practices in public. Therefore, in the author’s view rational choice 
institutionalism, in the form of the Principal-Agent framework, can be regarded as 
the most suitable analytical framework to answer the specific research question 
posed by this dissertation.  
This dissertation is composed of four parts. Part one sets the research scene. It 
introduces the dissertation’s design, which sets out the research problem, the 
research question, the hypotheses to be tested, the methodology and its limitations, 
as well as the material and sources used for the analysis (I.2). It also walks the reader 
through the nature of EU administration and its general development, including the 
field of banking supervision (II.3). 
Part two introduces the analytical framework used to approach the research 
question that this dissertation poses. This framework provides analytical tools to 
carry out the assessment of the formal top-down compliance expectations in the 
SSM. The tools to assess the first structural condition – the organisational design of 
an EU multilevel administration – are described in chapter four (II.4). Based on the 
                                                          
12
 See David Howarth and Tal Sadeh, ‘In the vanguard of globalization: The OECD and international capital 
liberalization’, Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 5 (2011): pp. 622–645 
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concept of multilevel administration, this chapter builds three organisational models 
that can be used to capture the systemic position of the higher level actor vis-à-vis 
the lower level in a multilevel regime. The analytical tools to evaluate the second 
structural condition – namely, the operational design of an EU multilevel 
administration – are presented in chapter five (II.5). Based on the agency theory, this 
chapter develops two Principal-Agent approaches. The first is geared to assess the 
credibility of the principal’s control capacity as required by the enforcement 
approach to compliance, whereas the second aims to assess the credibility of the 
cooperation capacity between the principal and the agent as required by the 
management approach to compliance (II.5.2). This chapter also reviews the relevant 
applications of the Principal-Agent framework to the studies of inter-institutional 
contexts (II.5.3).  
Part three consists of chapters six and seven, which apply the analytical tools 
developed in chapters three and four to the SSM multilevel supervisory subsystems. 
Accordingly, chapter five analyses the two supervisory systems of the SSM in 
accordance with the criteria provided in chapter three (III.6.2-6.5), classifies them as 
one of the organisational models identified there and discusses the implications 
thereof (III.6.6). This exercise concludes the first phase of the testing of the 
“Enforcement” and “Management” hypotheses. Subsequently, chapter six inspects 
the operational design of the systems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision 
through the analytical lens the developed in chapter five (two dimensions of the 
Principal-Agent framework) (II.5.2).  
23 
 
More specifically, this part assesses the credibility of the principal (ECB supervisory 
apparatus)’s capacity of control over its agents (NCA supervisory apparatus) with a 
view to finalising the test of the “Enforcement” hypothesis (III.7.3). It also looks at 
the credibility of the cooperation capacity between the principal and the agent in 
order to finalize the test of the “Management” hypothesis (III.7.4). This exercise 
concludes the second phase of the testing of the “Enforcement” and “Management” 
hypotheses, which is summarized in the last section of this chapter (III.7.5). 
Part four consists of the concluding chapter eight, in which the results of testing the 
“Enforcement” and “Management” hypotheses are summarized (IV.8). It presents the 
findings regarding the capacity for compliance in the SSM analyzed through the lens 
of  the enforcement and management schools of thought. It also uses the findings of 
this study to offer a more critical perspective of the overall functioning of the SSM, 
perceived as an EU multilevel administrative system governing micro-prudential 
supervision. Finally, a number of recommendations are offered. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Research design 
2.1 Research scope and limitations 
This study will limit the formal-institutional analysis of the EU’s post-crisis 
administrative architecture governing banking supervision exclusively to the 
administrative arrangements pertaining to the SSM. This implies that another of the 
most prominent administrative arrangements of the EU post-crisis, the “banking 
arm” of the European System of Financial Supervision, remains beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. There are two reasons for this limitation. First, the word limit of 
the dissertation, combined with the objective of a detailed insightful analysis, 
necessarily requires a delimitation of the scope of the research. Second, the future of 
the “banking arm” of the ESFS remains uncertain due to the loss of its institutional 
prominence in the face of the upcoming departure of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union. At the time of finalizing this dissertation (December 2017), the 
Commission has presented a proposal for the EFSF reform which may considerably 
change the set-up of this arrangement in the months and years to come. It is 
therefore impossible for this dissertation to reflect on the new set-up of the ESFS.  
Furthermore, this study engages in the institutional analysis of the SSM’s 
administrative arrangements governing the micro-prudential dimension of the 
supervision over credit institutions (also referred to as “entities”). This implies that 
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the administrative framework governing the macro-prudential supervision in the 
SSM, which remains shared between the ECB and the NDAs, is not the subject of the 
analysis in this study.  
This dissertation considers the SSM as a complex system of micro-prudential 
supervision. Depending on the significance status of a supervised institution, two 
multilevel supervisory subsystems can be identified. The first SSM administrative 
arrangement, referred to as the SSM Direct Supervision subsystem, governs the 
supervision of significant institutions. Within this subsystem, the exercise of micro-
prudential tasks conferred upon the ECB by the SSM Regulation is carried out by 
Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs), which are special, inter-institutional and remote 
administrative structures consisting of ECB and NCA-based supervisory 
apparatuses.13 The second SSM administrative arrangement, referred to as the SSM 
Indirect Supervision subsystem, governs the supervision of less significant 
institutions. Within this subsystem, the exercise of micro-prudential tasks conferred 
upon the ECB by the SSM Regulation is operationally carried out by organisationally 
distinguished NCA internal structures consisting of national supervisors who have 
                                                          
13
 In fact, JSTs are comprised to a large degree (75% on average) by staff members of the national supervisors, but 
are always managed by an ECB staff member (JST coordinator). See Ignazio Angeloni, Exchange of views on 
supervisory issues with the Finance and Treasury Committee of the Senate of the Republic of Italy (Rome, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150623.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. As specifically explained by the ECB, the ratio of 25 % ECB staff and 75 % NCA staff was a widely  
agreed benchmark when the SSM was established and not a formalised target. See European Court of Auditors, 
Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed, Special Report No. 29/2016, p.127. 
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not been assigned to the JSTs, and under the ECB’s multi-dimensional oversight.14 
Importantly, the functional border between both administrative supervisory 
arrangements is not fixed and can be modified on the basis of the annual 
significance assessments or an ECB decision to “directly exercise all relevant powers” 
over less significant institutions.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Case study table 
                                                          
14
 With the exception of supervisory responsibilities related to common procedures which are reserved to the 
ECB exclusive competence regardless of the SSM supervisory subsystem. See Article 4(1)(a) and (c) of the SSM 
Regulation. 
15
 See Article 6 (5)(c) of the SSM Regulation. 
Case study 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
SSM Direct Supervision 
subsystem 
SSM Indirect 
Supervision subsystem 
Applicability 
Supervision of 
significant institutions  
Supervision of less 
significant institutions 
Higher level actor  
ECB (supervisory 
apparatus assigned to 
the supervision of 
significant institutions ) 
 ECB (supervisory 
apparatus assigned to 
the supervision of less 
significant institutions ) 
Lower level actor 
 NCA JST supervisory 
apparatus assigned to 
the supervision of 
significant institutions 
 NCA non-JST 
supervisory apparatus 
assigned to the 
supervision of less 
significant institutions  
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Both SSM supervisory subsystems are classified as administrative arrangements 
comprising supervisory apparatuses residing at different political levels – 
supranational and national. In this setting, the higher level supervisory apparatus 
based at the ECB is considered to be the bureaucratic principal, whereas the lower 
level supervisory apparatus based at the NCAs is considered to be the bureaucratic 
agent. In an optimal multilevel administrative setting, one would assume that the 
bureaucratic actors located at the lower levels would automatically follow the 
preferences and objectives formulated by their higher level counterparts so that such 
multilevel administrative machinery is able to function in a smooth and robust way. 
However, this is not the case in the real world because any socio-political, including 
administrative, interactions are always embedded in a certain institutional context 
which can be structured by a number of conditions. By virtue of being an 
administrative order, the SSM is necessarily organized and constrained by a 
collection of rules, procedures and organized practices which may affect the 
behaviour of the actors operating within it,16 and which may create structural 
challenges as regards its efficient functioning.  
2.2. Research problem 
Following the main tenants of the “Westphalian model” of state, for around three 
centuries domestic public administration was in charge of producing public goods 
                                                          
16
 See James March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: 
Free Press, 1989); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic governance (Free Press, 1995); Douglass C. 
North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass 
C. North, ‘Institutions and credible commitment’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): pp. 11–23. 
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inside the nation state. This however is not the case in the twenty-first century. Since 
the increasing globalization has brought more interconnectedness and 
interdependence between individual states, the positive or negative effects of a 
number of national public policies, programs and services has started to extend 
beyond national boundaries.17  
These structural transformations have made the pursuit of public policies for the 
provisioning of public goods a much more complex process than before, involving 
multilateral cooperation between different public actors located at the national, 
international or supranational level. Financial stability is often regarded as such a 
public good, the delivery of which within individual state jurisdictions is heavily 
influenced by international and global conditions. In the EU, the SSM consists of 
higher level administration (the ECB) and lower level administration (the NCAs) and 
has a crucial and legally recognized role in the provision of financial stability across 
the Member States.18 The fact that the SSM is essentially characterized by 
multilevelness entails far-reaching consequences from the viewpoint of legal and 
political science analysis.  
Multilevel systems are expected to calibrate supranational integration with Member 
State discretion in order to adopt common solutions to shared policy problems, 
                                                          
17
 On this phenomenon, see – for example - Joseph E. Stiglitz, The theory of international public goods and the 
architecture of international organizations (Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy 
Analysis, United Nations, 1995); Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, ‘Defining global public goods’, 
Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century (1999): pp. 2–19; I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. A. 
Stern, ‘Conceicao, P.-le Goulven, K.-Mendoza, RU (Eds)(2003)’, Providing Global Public Goods. Managing 
Globalization. 
18
 See Article 1 of the SSM Regulation, which obliges the ECB to carry out its supervisory tasks “with a view to 
contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the 
Union and each Member State (…)”. 
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tailor-made to specific local contexts.19 In particular, seamless cooperation between 
those actors is necessary to ensure systemic compliance within such multilevel 
administrative systems. However, the occurrence of automatic compliance within 
multilevel systems cannot be taken for granted. The participants to a multi-lateral or 
a multilevel regime are always embedded in certain structural conditions which may 
influence their behavioural motivations and chosen course of action when 
performing their tasks and pursuing their policy objectives.  
Since the EU does not possess fully-fledged “state capacities”, it has to rely essentially 
on its Member States’ administrative structures when applying and enforcing its laws 
and policies in local jurisdictions. This particular institutional set-up causes that the 
European Union, as a polity, is increasingly confronted with growing compliance 
problems.20 They are reflected in an inherent dilemma of national level actors 
regarding the extent to which the preferences and objectives formulated by the 
supranational actors should be followed. With respect to the SSM, concerns have 
already been expressed as to whether the new mechanism can deliver the objectives 
it promised given its institutional complexity. 21  
                                                          
19
 See, for example, Helga Pülzl and Oliver Treib, ‘Implementing public policy’, edited by Frank Fischer and 
Gerald J. Miller, in Handbook of public policy analysis: theory, politics, and methods (crc Press, 2006), pp. 89–107. 
20
 See, notably, Esther Versluis, ‘Compliance Problems in the EU What potential role for agencies in securing 
compliance?’ (2005); Ellen Mastenbroek, ‘EU compliance: Still a ‘black hole’?’, Journal of European Public Policy 
12, no. 6 (2005): pp. 1103–1120; Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European 
Union’, International Organization 56, no. 03 (2002): pp. 609–643. 
21
 Skepticism has come from different perspectives and disciplines, see in particular, Rishi Goyal, Petya Koeva 
Brooks, Mahmood Pradhan et al., A Banking Union for the Euro Area, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/13/01; 
Tobias H. Tröger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary 
Assessment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’, European 
Business Organization Law Review 15, no. 04 (2014): pp. 449–497; Eilis Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: 
imperfect, but it can work’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, no. 30 (2014); Eilis Ferran, 
‘European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated Integration, or 
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An ideal compliance situation can be defined as “a state of conformity between the 
actor’s behaviour and a specified rule”.22 In studies on international regulatory 
regimes, the contemporary debate on compliance in international cooperation is 
dominated by two main analytical approaches: the enforcement and the 
management schools.23 Both approaches are inspired by rationalism when 
formulating expectations about compliance within a given regime.24  
Although the enforcement and management schools share the same rational choice 
foundations, they nevertheless have developed two different strategies hfor 
achieving higher compliance levels. Whereas the enforcement strategy emphasizes 
“hard” mechanisms (“sticks”), such as hierarchical control, deterrence and 
sanctioning as means of producing compliance within a regime, the management 
strategy rejects coercion and assigns more importance to “softer” tools (“carrots”), 
such as cooperation and collective management of non-compliance via assistance, 
analysis and negotiations to achieve the same purpose.25  
Despite the analytical dominance of the enforcement and management perspectives 
on compliance within various strands of literature on regulatory regimes, emerging 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Disintegration?’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, no. 29 (2014); Iain Begg, ed., Banking 
union: inevitable, but profoundly challenging? (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Ifo), 2012). 
22
 See Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International law, international relations and compliance’ (2002); 
Roger Fisher, Improving compliance with international law (Univ of Virginia Pr, 1981); Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Regime 
design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance’, International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): pp. 
425–458.  
23
 See Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union’ (above, n. 20); Lisa 
Conant, ‘Compliance and what EU member states make of it’, Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (2012): 
pp. 1–30. 
24
 Ibid., p. 6. 
25
 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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alternative approaches to the issues of compliance (and non-compliance) should also 
be acknowledged. There are researchers who develop analytical frameworks which 
are more focused on normative, ideas-based aspects of compliance, such as mutual 
persuasion and socialization.26 Other authors offer a more detailed analytical toolbox 
to analyze compliance and can be grouped into as many as seven specific schools.27 
Altogether, research has identified a broad number of factors motivating actors’s 
decisions on the extent of their own compliance. These factors include self-interest, 
enforcement and inducements, pressure from society, a sense of obligation, or 
habit.28  
Since the objective of this study is to rely exclusively on the rational-choice 
approaches to compliance, the following subsections will introduce the main tenants 
of the enforcement and management strategies of compliance that will be applied to 
a further analysis. This choice follows the guidance offered by Karen Alter who 
considers a combination of both the enforcement and management strategies to 
explain compliance as a “simply sound policy”.29 
                                                          
26
 See inter alia; Raustiala and Slaughter, ‘International law, international relations and compliance’ (above, n. 22) 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Sovereignty and power in a networked world order’, Stan. J. Int'l L. 40 (2004): p. 283; 
Eleni Tsingou, ‘Transnational governance networks in the regulation of finance’, Business and Global Governance 
(2010): pp. 138–156. 
27
 The ‘seven’ layered classification was formulated by George Downs and Andrea Trento who distinguished 
realism, Kantian liberalism, democratic process, strategic, managerial, transformationalist and transnationalism 
among possible approaches to cope with non-compliance. See George W. Downs and Andrea W. Trento, 
‘Conceptual Issues Surrounding the Compliance Gap’, International Law and Organization, New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield (2004): pp. 19–40. 
28
 See Oran R. Young, International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment 
(Cornell University Press, 1989) (chapter two). 
29
 Karen J. Alter, ‘Do international courts enhance compliance with international law?’, Review of Asian and 
Pacific Studies, No. 25 (2003), p. 56. 
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2.2.1. Enforcement strategy of compliance 
The enforcement school, pioneered by the works of George Downs, David Rocke and 
Michael Jones30, attributes a capital importance to strategic cost-benefit calculations 
of the actors concerned when facing the compliance dilemma.31 Actors might have a 
number of underlying interests when carrying out a cost-benefit analysis. An actor 
which is a unit of public administration (technocratic actor) is primarily expected to 
behave so as to promote its strategic interests of maximizing its resources and 
power,32 implementing applicable laws and policies,33 and aiming at problem solving 
or innovation (“bureau shaping”).34 As noted by Max Rheinstein, for modern 
bureaucracy, the element of “calculability of its rules” has been of great significance 
when deciding on whether or not to comply with authoritative rules and 
regulations.35  
Consequently, where a range of options is available, rational actors will choose the 
one which would serve the fulfillment of their objectives the best.36 They are also 
deemed to be utility maximizers acting on the basis of the “logic of calculus”. This 
                                                          
30
 See George W. Downs, ‘Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation’, Mich. J. Int'l L. 19 (1997): p. 319; George 
W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, ‘Reputation, compliance, and international law’, The Journal of Legal Studies 31, 
S1 (2002): pp. S95-S114; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, ‘Is the good news about 
compliance good news about cooperation?’, International Organization 50, no. 03 (1996): pp. 379–406. 
31
 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, International Organization 
55, no. 03 (2001): pp. 553–588, p. 556; Downs and Jones, ‘Reputation, compliance, and international law’ (above, n. 
126). 
32
 See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and representative government (Transaction Publishers, 1971). 
33
 See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Mohr Siebeck, 2002), pp. 
124-127. 
34
 See Patrick Dunleavy, ‘Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice’, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf (1992). 
35
 See Max Weber, ‘Law in Economy and Society, ed. Max Rheinstein’, Trans, by, Edward Shils and Max 
Rhinestein, New York, Simon and Schuster (1954): p. 350. 
36
 See P. Green Donald and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of rational choice theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994), p. 4. 
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does not however imply that the range of their options is unlimited. On the contrary, 
the formal rules shaping the structural setting in which they operate are relevant 
since they constrain the actors’ self-interested behaviour.37 In this context, their 
decisions whether to increase or decrease compliance will be informed by a 
particular system of incentives pertaining to the structure which provides benefits 
for compliant behavior and sanctions for non-compliant behaviour. A choice to 
decrease compliance may be preferred in case the costs of increasing compliance 
outweigh its benefits.38 An additional incentive to decrease compliance is provided 
when multiple actors operate in a cooperative context since they may reap more 
benefits without contributing their share (the “free-riding” problem).39 
To promote compliance, the representatives of the enforcement school would 
highlight the strategic dimensions of cooperation within a regime and the nature of 
the actors’ commitments within the regime, specifically their depth.40 Deeper 
(binding) agreements require harsher punishments to deter non-compliance such as 
monitoring and sanctioning instruments,41 which necessarily implies that 
compliance is likely to be increased when strong leadership is provided within the 
                                                          
37
 See Jack Knight, Institutions and social conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
38
 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance theory: an overview (Earthscan London, 1996): p. 11. 
39
 See, for example, Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Situation Structure and Regime Implementation Strategies’, Unpublished 
manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif (1999); Oran R. Young, Governance in world affairs (Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
40
 See Raustiala and Slaughter, ‘International law, international relations and compliance’ (above, n. 22). 
41
 See, for example, Mancur Olson, ‘The logic of collective action Cambridge’, Mass.: Harvard 1971 (1965); Robert 
Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions’, World 
Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations (1985): pp. 226–254; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, 
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regime42 - namely leadership grounded on legal (and financial) authority.43 The 
leader is expected to establish control and sanctioning processes and procedures to 
deter defections and promote compliance of the actors participating in the regime.44 
These tools are likely to raise the costs of non-compliance and make it a less 
attractive choice.45 When there is no effective system to detect and respond to 
violations or infringements of the agreed commitments, actors participating in the 
regime are not likely to increase their compliance.46 Therefore, it is imperative that 
(reluctant) actors are convinced that any substantial decrease in their compliance 
will be detected and sanctioned in a manner that exceeds the costs of increasing 
compliance.47 It follows that an enforcement strategy tends to assign the primary 
role to effective control and sanctioning matched by strong leadership to ensure 
compliance within the regime.48  
2.2.2. Management strategy of compliance 
Similarly to the enforcement school, its managerial equivalent also relies on 
rationalist arguments when explaining actors’ choice whether to increase or decrease 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. (Underdal), p. 9. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 See Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union’ (above, n. 20), p. 612; 
Ulf Sverdrup and John Erik Fossum, Compliance and styles of conflict management in Europe, ARENA, pp. 19-20. 
45
 See Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union’ (above, n. 20). 
46
 See Esther Versluis, ‘Compliance Problems in the EU What potential role for agencies in securing compliance?’ 
(2005), p. 7. 
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 See Mitchell, Compliance theory: an overview (above, n. 38), p. 14. 
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 See Michael Zürn and Jürgen Neyer, ‘Compliance in comparative perspective: The EU and other international 
institutions’ (2001) 8. 
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their compliance with certain norms, policies or preferences.49 The main difference 
between those two schools lies however in the actors’ motivations. Scholars of 
management school do not see “the logic of calculus” as the sole determinant of 
actors’ compliance choices as the enforcement theorists would advocate for. As 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes – the founders of the school – claim, the 
actors’ decisions are not only influenced by their strategic interests. In principle, 
they assume that there is a general propensity of actors (states, bureaucracy) to 
follow their obligations since they have interest in compliance because, especially in 
complex environments, explicit calculation of costs and benefits for every decision is 
itself costly.50 Efficiency implies considerable policy continuity,51 which is of 
particular relevance to actors operating in bureaucratic contexts.52 Decreasing 
compliance may not only be the outcome of cost-benefit analysis, but also the result 
of inadvertence.53 As Jonas Tallberg points out, inadvertent non-compliance may 
result from the uncertainty involved in choosing the policy strategies required to 
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 As noted by Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, the Chayesian managerial school ultimately also relies on 
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meet a certain policy target.54 Furthermore, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
rules and policies governing the functioning of the regime can produce decreasing 
levels of compliance55 since they allow different (possibly even equally plausible) 
interpretations of the actors’ commitments.56 
In order to promote compliance, the management strategy would emphasize the use 
of a problem solving approach which would aim to establish non-coercive and 
participatory procedures and processes to communicate, interpret and clarify 
commitments of actors pertaining to the regime and rules governing it. This 
problem-solving approach can take the form of developing non-binding best 
practices, guidelines and methodologies to improve the actors’ technical capacities 
to meet their binding commitments.57 The processes and procedures established for 
rule communication, clarification and interpretation need not be formalized.58 
However, some scholars have expressed doubts whether such “soft” processes can be 
effective unless there is a strong “shadow of hierarchy” within the regime.59  
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 See Tallberg, ‘Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union’ (above, n. 20), p. 613. 
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In the managerialist understanding, a decrease in compliance may not necessarily be 
a result of deliberate choice, but may stem from rule misinterpretation or capacity 
limitations of the parties pertaining to the regime.60 Therefore, the application of 
sanctions is not likely to increase compliance since “sanctioning authority is rarely 
granted by treaty, rarely used when granted and likely to be ineffective when used”.61 
Instead, promoting compliance requires proper management through the use of 
“carrot” strategies. In this context, managerialism is the most explicit in providing 
solutions to the compliance puzzle: establishment of problem-solving and 
collaborative processes for rule elaboration and application which will ultimately 
establish a community of practice.62 It follows that the management strategy tends 
to assign the primary role to effective and non-coercive cooperation processes, 
designed to clarify obligations and reduce uncertainty, in ensuring compliance 
within the regime. 
2.3. Research question 
This study presents the SSM as an EU multilevel administrative system mandated to 
promote banking stability across participating Member States. It is assumed that this 
system faces inherent difficulties related to ensuring the highest levels of compliance 
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of the supervisory apparatus residing at the lower (NCA) level with the preferences 
and objectives of the supervisory apparatus residing at the higher (ECB) level when 
they interact within the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. Against 
this backdrop, the research question of this dissertation is the following:  
Under which structural conditions can the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) be expected 
to comply with the policy preferences and objectives of the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) when operating in a given multilevel context (the sub-subsystem of SSM 
Direct/Indirect Supervision)? 
The dependent variable of this dissertation is the formal “top-down compliance 
expectation” within the SSM that is understood here as the NCAs’ (supervisory 
apparatus) formal likelihood of complying with the preferences and objectives of the 
ECB (supervisory apparatus) concerning the Union’s policies on prudential 
supervision of credit institutions. This dissertation asserts that two structural 
(institutional) conditions63 are likely to affect the formal top-down compliance 
expectation within EU multilevel administration: (i) the specific organisational 
design of a given administrative arrangement (the regime) which determines the 
formal position of the higher and lower level actor therein; and (ii) the specific 
operational design of a given administrative arrangement (the regime) which 
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provides for formal internal mechanisms to address possibly conflicting preferences 
and objectives of the actors pertaining to the regime.  
The choice of the independent variables follows the core premises of the 
institutionalist approach, which attributes the leading role to the institutional 
environment in which the actors operate and which shapes their behaviour. 
According to this approach, a particular institutional structure may exert an 
independent (or intervening) influence on policy choices and strategies made by the 
actors operating within it (“institutions matter”).64 In this context, the institutional 
analysis conducted in this study will uncover specific configurations OF the two 
abovementioned structural conditions within two SSM multilevel supervisory 
subsystems. By addressing those issues, this dissertation is expected to provide 
valuable insights from the institutional perspective on whether the formal design of 
the SSM ensures the smooth and robust operation of the EU administrative 
machinery mandated to supply financial stability across the EU.  
                                                          
64
 See Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 7. 
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Figure 2 Determinants of the top-down compliance expectation in the SSM 
2.4. Hypotheses on the formal top-down compliance expectation 
In accordance with the main assumptions of the abovementioned strategies of 
compliance presented in section two of the present chapter, this dissertation 
formulates two hypotheses concerning the formal top-down compliance 
expectations derived from the “Enforcement” and the “Management” approaches. 
Both hypotheses aim to explain the NCAs’ (supervisory apparatus)65 formal top-
down compliance  within the multilevel SSM with the preferences and objectives of 
the ECB (supervisory apparatus)66 on the Union’s policies on prudential supervision 
of credit institutions. The two hypotheses differ as to the leading causal factors 
                                                          
65
 For the purposes of testing both hypotheses, the NCA (supervisory apparatus) is referred to as the lower level 
actor in respect of the organisational design analysis, and as the bureaucratic agent in respect of the operational 
design analysis. 
66
 For the purposes of testing of both hypotheses, the ECB (supervisory apparatus) is referred to as the higher 
level actor in respect of the organisational design analysis and as the bureaucratic principal in respect of the 
operational design analysis. 
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shaping formal compliance expectations, in respect of both the organisational and 
operational design of the SSM. 
2.4.1. The “Enforcement” hypothesis 
The Enforcement hypothesis (“EH”), as the name suggests, is informed by the 
insights derived from the enforcement school67 which in the context of the 
multilevel SSM would assume that  
The formal compliance by the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) with the preferences and 
objectives of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) in a multilevel SSM supervisory 
(sub)system is likely to be higher where the ECB’s control capacity is credible and 
backed by its strong systemic position within this (sub)system .  
In determining the formal top-down compliance expectation, the Enforcement 
approach would focus on (i) the systemic position of the higher level actor – the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) – within a given SSM supervisory subsystem, and (ii) 
internal control-based mechanisms over the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) available 
to the ECB (supervisory apparatus) in a given SSM supervisory subsystem. 
Accordingly, the EH will be tested in two respective phases.  
The first phase of the EH testing will analyze the organisational design of two SSM 
multilevel supervisory subsystems in order to gauge the systemic position of the ECB 
(considered a higher level actor) and the NCAs (considered a lower level actor) 
                                                          
67
 The main assumptions of the enforcement strategy of compliance have been presented in subsection 2.2.1. 
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therein. To this end, chapter three elaborates on three models of EU multilevel 
administration that are applied to classify the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision in chapter five. These models reflect different configurations of power 
between the higher and lower level actors pertaining to a multilevel administrative 
arrangement. They are distinguished on the basis of four formal characteristics that 
are inherent parts of the institutional design of a multilevel administrative 
arrangement: its constitutional foundations, the internal allocation of administrative 
responsibilities between higher and lower level actors, the nature of administrative 
interaction between higher and lower level actors, and the scope of its territorial 
applicability.  
The second phase of the EH testing will investigate the operational design of two 
SSM multilevel supervisory subsystems in order to measure the capacity of internal 
control-based mechanisms that the bureaucratic principal – the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) – has over the bureaucratic agent – the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) – 
within the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. To this end, this 
dissertation will employ an analytical toolbox developed by traditional and 
conservative accounts of Principal-Agent research, which are presented in chapter 
four.68 These accounts assume that the agent tends to minimize the effort it exerts 
on its principal’s behalf and pursues its particular preferences which may differ from 
those of its principal. Therefore, the principal is expected to install and activate so-
called ex ante and ex post control mechanisms to monitor its agents’ actions.  
                                                          
68
 More specifically, by more traditional and conservative accounts of the Principal-Agent studies. 
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To assess the ECB’s (supervisory apparatus) capacity to exert formal control over the 
NCAs (supervisory apparatus), the following elements will be taken into account: the 
range (the forward-looking/backward-looking dimension) of established control 
mechanisms, their intrusiveness (the direct/indirect dimension), their origin 
(embedded in the rules of law/practice), and whether they have been actually 
activated.  
 
Figure 3 “Enforcement” hypothesis test 
2.4.2. The “Management” hypothesis 
The Management hypothesis (“MH”), as the name suggests, is informed by insights 
derived from the management school of compliance theory69 which would assume 
that  
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 The main assumptions of the management school of compliance theory have been presented in subsection 
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The of formal compliance by the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) with the preferences 
and objectives of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) in a multilevel SSM supervisory 
(sub)system is likely to be higher where there exists a credible cooperation capacity 
between both actors that allows for the clarification of obligations and the reduction of 
uncertainty, while being backed by a strong shadow of the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) hierarchy within that (subsystem).  
In determining the formal top-down compliance expectation, the Management 
approach would concentrate on (i) the shadow of hierarchy of the higher level actor 
- the ECB (supervisory apparatus) - within a given SSM supervisory subsystem, and 
(ii) internal cooperation-based mechanisms between the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) and NCAs (supervisory apparatus) in a given SSM supervisory subsystem. 
Accordingly, the MH will be tested in two phases.  
The first phase of the MH testing will analyze the organisational design of two SSM 
multilevel supervisory subsystems in order to ascertain the shadow of hierarchy the 
higher level actor - the ECB (supervisory apparatus) therein. Determining the 
shadow of hierarchy supports the management strategy of ensuring compliance 
since it is suggested that compliance can be best achieved when the leader of the 
regime has established a strong systemic position which would allow him to make 
recourse to enforcement mechanisms to transmit its preference in case an informal 
cooperation fails (“managerial authority”).70 For the purposes of this exercise, it 
                                                          
70
 See Günter Frankenberg, Political technology and the erosion of the rule of law: normalizing the state of 
exception (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), p. 8. 
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would be assumed that a long shadow of hierarchy is correlated to a strong systemic 
position of a higher level actor therein. Therefore, this phase will rely on the 
outcomes of the assessment of the ECB’s systemic position conducted in the first 
phase of the EH testing in accordance with the framework developed in chapter 
three. 
The second phase of the MH testing will scrutinize the operational design of the two 
SSM multilevel supervisory subsystems in order to measure the capacity of internal 
cooperation-based mechanisms between the bureaucratic principal – the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) – and the bureaucratic agent – the NCAs (supervisory 
apparatus) – within the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. To this 
end, this dissertation will employ the analytical tools developed by more recent and 
liberal accounts of the Principal-Agent research, which continue to construct 
Principal-Agent relations between politico-administrative actors operating in a 
dense web of many cooperative, egalitarian and reciprocal relations.71 They assume 
that the agent tends to display general propensity to comply with the policy 
preferences and objectives of its principal, and that the lower levels of compliance 
would not stem from the agents’ deliberate choice, but rather from the ambiguity of 
the principal’s expectations under their inherently incomplete agency contract. 
Therefore, the principal is expected to establish informal, cooperative and reciprocal 
processes and procedures with its agent, which would allow the reduction of the 
                                                          
71
 The most recent example of the analytical applications of those more “liberal” Principal-Agents perspectives 
can be found in Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen, ‘The Principal Agent Model and the European Union’, 
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (2017). 
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ambiguities of the agency contract and the clarification of the principal’s contractual 
expectations.  
To assess the capacity for formal cooperation between the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) and the NCAs (supervisory apparatus), the following two elements will be 
taken into account: (i) whether any informal structures for cooperation between ECB 
and NCAs supervisory apparatus have been established, and (ii) whether there are 
any tangible outcomes of that cooperation aiming, on the one hand, at reducing the 
ambiguities of the agency contract between the ECB and NCAs (supervisory 
apparatuses) and, other other hand, at clarifying contractual expectations of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus), such as system-wide policy stances, guides and 
methodologies on certain aspects of the Union’s policies on prudential supervision of 
credit institutions.  
 
Figure 4 “Management” hypothesis test 
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By applying the Principal-Agent approach to support the measurement of the formal 
top-down compliance expectation in the SSM, the aim of this study is (i) to present a 
(first ever) comprehensive institutional analysis of the organization and operation of 
the EU’s multilevel system governing banking supervision post-crisis, and (ii) to 
contribute to the Principal-Agent research explaining the “post-decisional stage” of 
European integration in banking supervision (the modalities of the exercise of 
powers transferred from the Member States to the Union). As the Principal-Agent 
framework still appears to operate under the assumption of a hierarchical rather 
than non-hierarchical setting, this study tends to ascribe more explanatory power to 
the application of its traditional and conservative dimension, rather than to that of 
its more recent and liberal dimension, when analyzing the politico-administrative 
phenomenon of the SSM.  
2.5. Methodology 
The data collection for this study has been primarily conducted through the 
documentary analysis of two categories of data. The first and most relevant type 
(both in qualitative and quantitative terms) of data is the primary material in the 
form of European supervisory legislation. This includes Regulations, Directives and 
other legally binding instruments adopted by the EU institutions as well as, where 
applicable, national laws of EU Member States that set rules governing the 
functioning of the SSM. The core of this category consists of binding SSM 
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supervisory law (including  the SSM Regulation72, the SSM Framework Regulation,73 
and other supplementary legal instruments74 adopted by the ECB) and substantive 
legislation, the so-called Single Rulebook, governing the conduct of banking 
supervisory tasks in the EU (notably, but not only including the Capital 
Requirements Regulation75 (CRR), the Capital Requirements Directive IV76 (CRDIV) 
and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).77  
The second type of data comprises the official documentation produced by EU 
institutions, agencies and bodies as well as national organs of public administrations, 
including official reports, policy notes, studies, media coverage of these officials and 
officials’ statements related to EU financial and banking supervision. This category 
                                                          
72
 See ‘Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions: SSM Regulation’, in OJ L 
287 29.10.2013, pp. 63–89. 
73
 See ‘Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the ECB of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and 
with national designated authorities (ECB/2014/17): SSM Framework Regulation’, in OJ L 141, 14.5.2014. 
74
 Including such supplementing legal acts as, inter alia, ‘Decision of the ECB of 2 July 2014 on the provision to 
the European Central Bank of supervisory data reported to the national competent authorities by the supervised 
entities pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 (ECB/2014/29)’, in OJ L 214, 
19.7.2014; ‘Regulation (EU) 2015/534 of the ECB of 17 March 2015 on reporting of supervisory financial information 
(ECB/2015/13)’, in OJ L 86, 31.3.2015; ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the ECB of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of 
options and discretions available in Union law (ECB/2016/4)’, in OJ L 78, 24.3.2016; ‘Decision (EU) 2017/933 of the 
ECB of 16 November 2016 on a general framework for delegating decision-making powers for legal instruments 
related to supervisory tasks (ECB/2016/40)’, in OJ L 141, 1.6.2017; ‘Decision of the ECB of 31 January 2014 on the 
close cooperation with the national competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not 
the euro (ECB/2014/5)’, in OJ L 198, 5.7.2014; ‘Guideline (EU) 2017/697 of the ECB of 4 April 2017 on the exercise of 
options and discretions available in Union law by national competent authorities in relation to less significant 
institutions (ECB/2017/9)’, in OJ L 101, 13.4.2017. 
75
 See ‘Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012: (CRR)’, in 
OJ L 176, 27.6.2013. 
76
 See ‘Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC: (CRDIV)’, in OJ L 176, 
27.6.2013. 
77
 See ‘Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 
82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012: (BRRD)’, in OJ L 173, 
12.6.2014. 
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also consists of any non-binding instruments issued by European and national 
administrations which may influence supervisory practice within the SSM (for 
example: recommendations, opinions, guides, guidance, Q&As, stock-stakes, or 
policy stances).  
Finally, the above-mentioned categories of data are accompanied by 14 informal 
interviews held with a number of supranational and national supervisors between 
August 2015 and March 2017. They were intended to serve as an additional data 
collection tool and to supplement the first and second type of data. The main 
objective of the interviews was to get information about the SSM which had not been 
publicly reported. Furthermore, they were meant to develop an initial understanding 
of the points of view of actors located at different levels of the multi-level SSM and to 
share their early experience of working at the SSM, especially with respect to 
informal governance and cooperation within the SSM. 
The reason for the choice of such an informal interviewing technique is the fact that 
interviewees were too reluctant to discuss — in the context of formal interviews — a 
number of sensitive matters about which little information was available publicly. 
However, they were more willing to discuss these matters and share their experience 
when it was explained that the interviews were informal and that they would neither 
be referenced as formal interviews in the thesis nor be used in such a manner as to 
divulge the identity of the interviewee. In addition, the choice of such an 
interviewing technique could also avoid the necessity of going through lengthy and 
multi-level pre- and post- authorization processes necessary for formal interviews, 
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which would not guarantee that the reported information would be ultimately 
shared with the interviewer.  
However, those informal interviews were treated cautiously and exclusively as a 
supplementary data collection tool since it has been widely recognized that 
“interviews alone are an insufficient form of data to study social life.”78 As noted by 
Geoffrey Walford, “what people say in an interview will indeed be shaped, to some 
degree, by the questions they are asked; the conventions about what can be spoken 
about; (…) by what time they think the interviewer wants; by what they believe 
he/she would approve or disapprove of”.79 Therefore, these limitations needed to be 
duly taken into account given the prominently formal-institutional focus of the 
present dissertation and the enhanced professional secrecy requirements under 
which the recently established SSM has operated. 
For the sake of academic rigour, it needs to be reported that the informal interviews 
included a sample of both junior and senior European and national supervisory 
officials. Each interview referenced in the text indicates the origin of an interviewee, 
and the date when an interview took place, but the identities of interviewees remain 
undisclosed.80 
  
                                                          
78
 See Geoffrey Walford, ‘Classification and framing of interviews in ethnographic interviewing’, Ethnography and 
Education, 2(2): p. 147. 
79
 See Martyn Hammersley, Roger Gomm, ‘Assessing the radical critiques of interviews’, edited by Martyn 
Hammersley, in Questioning Qualitative Inquiry: Critical Essays (Sage London, 2008), pp. 89-100. 
80
 In addition, executive summaries of 14 informal interviews with the identity of interviewees are attached to this 
dissertation in the form of an Annex.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EU multi-level administration 
“Administration is the most obvious part of government; it is 
government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible 
side of government, and is of course as old as government itself” 
(Woodrow Wilson)81 
3.1. The nature of EU administration 
It has been widely recognized that the development of human well-being requires, 
by means of a social contract, the creation of a superior authority which would 
ensure the establishment of order in public life and would act to preserve common 
interests of a community. Such an authority would be expected to “actually do 
things”,82 that is, to administer public policies with a view to provide public goods 
needed by people. From the very beginning, the advancements in the production of 
public welfare have been connected to territorial development of public 
administration, firstly at the local and state levels and subsequently at the 
international and supranational levels. States as territorially organized welfare 
producers appeared in history when their sovereigns managed to establish 
centralized administrative structures. Over years and decades, the range of public 
                                                          
81
 See Woodrow Wilson, ‘The study of administration’, Political science quarterly 2, no. 2 (1887): pp. 197–222. 
82
 See Francis Fukuyama, Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of 
democracy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014): p. 52. 
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goods provided by state public administration at different levels has gradually 
increased which can be associated with the human, scientific and technological 
progress. In the modern era, the role and scope of public administration has become 
ever expanding and all-encompassing, seeking to include activities “valued by the 
public”,83 and constitutes an attempt to adapt state action to the complex realities of 
the increasingly globalized and, thus, interconnected world.84 This trend is well 
captured by the rise of independent and specialized non-majoritarian agencies, 
sometimes branded as the “fourth branch of government”,85 vested with a plethora of 
various competences — supervisory, regulatory and executive.86 Although they form 
parts of state administration, these administrative units are effectively “de-coupled” 
from their respective ministerial departments reporting to elected members of 
governments.87 They are considered to operate as: 
“[…] structurally disaggregated from their parent ministries, are said to face 
less hierarchical and political influence on their daily operations and have more 
managerial freedom in terms of finances and personnel, compared to ordinary 
ministries or departments [...].”88 
                                                          
83
 See Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe: Problems and Perspectives, Jahrbuch zur Staats–und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft (Baden Baden, 1989). 
84
 See Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz, and Philip Cerny, Internalizing globalization: the rise of neoliberalism 
and the decline of national varieties of capitalism (Springer, 2005): p. 70. 
85
 See Michelle Everson, ‘Independent agencies: hierarchy beaters?’, European Law Journal 1, no. 2 (1995): pp. 180–
204. 
86
 See Matej Avbelj, ‘Constitutional and Administrative Pluralism in the EU System of Banking Supervision’, 
German LJ 17 (2016): pp. 779–798. 
87
 See Morten Egeberg, ‘EU Administration: Centre Formation and Multilevelness’, Revue française 
d’administration publique, no. 1 (2010): pp. 17–26. 
88
 See Koen Verhoest, Sandra van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert et al., Government agencies: practices and lessons from 
30 countries (Springer, 2016): p. 3. 
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Studies on phenomena of public administration have been traditionally locked in 
“national laboratories” concentrating on rather unified administrative structures 
falling under traditional command-control chains within the realm of national 
sovereignty.89 Their analytical point of departure used to be the nation state 
considered as the supreme incarnation of administrative territorial organization.90 
Thus, these studies may not necessarily be the best placed to wield sufficient 
explanatory power to capture the singularities of supranational administrative 
structures that transcend the jurisdictional borders of single nation states, such as 
the administrative order of the European Union (EU).  
As a result of slowly decreasing capacities of nation state administrations to produce 
enough welfare in certain areas (e.g. clean environment, security, international free 
trade, financial stability), the supply of these public goods across multiple state 
jurisdictions has become an increasingly important task of such supranational 
polities as, for example, the EU and its administration.91 In this sense, the 
advancement of European integration is directly related to “the matter of defining 
                                                          
89
 See Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, The Ashgate research companion to new public management (Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd, 2011); Koen Verhoest, Sandra van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert et al., Government agencies: practices 
and lessons from 30 countries (Springer, 2016); Eva G. Heidbreder, ‘Multilevel policy enforcement: innovations in 
how to administer liberalized global markets’, Public Administration 93, no. 4 (2015): pp. 940–955; Diane Stone 
and Stella Ladi, ‘Global public policy and transnational administration’, Public Administration 93, no. 4 (2015): pp. 
839–855. 
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 For instance, for Thomas Hobbes – one of the most radical philosophers of the state - the idea of the existence 
of independent administrative structures within a single territory (imperium in imperio) was inconceivable. See 
Olivier Beaud, ‘The Allocation of Competences in a Federation—A General Introduction’, edited by Loïc Azoulai, 
in The question of competence in the European Union (OUP Oxford, 2014), pp. 1–18.  
91
 See Christoph Knill, Steffen Eckhard, and Stephan Grohs, ‘Administrative styles in the European Commission 
and the OSCE Secretariat: striking similarities despite different organizational settings’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 23, no. 7 (2016): pp. 1057–1076. 
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spheres of competences and power relationships”92 between the EU and its Member 
States administration related to the production of public welfare. At the same time, 
the provisioning of specific public goods through the Union’s (common) policies 
across the Member States has become increasingly sophisticated. 
Whereas national administration is of a unified nature and operates under the 
ultimate sovereignty of the state, EU administration is organized in a pluralistic 
manner. In order to function, EU administration needs to rely upon national 
administrative structures, even when explicitly empowered to directly apply and 
enforce laws and policies across the Member States’ jurisdictions. Instead of relying 
on rather weak command-and-control chains, EU administration often uses 
cooperative and persuasive patterns rather than exerting control over Member 
States’ administrations.93 In doing so, it tends to weigh and balance general and 
particular interests, which in the EU context often turns into balancing  Union and 
national interests.  
Therefore, the choices and decisions made by Union-level administrative actors 
seem ultimately to be of a more political dimension in comparison to their national 
counterparts who act within one jurisdiction and one administrative, stated-founded 
structure. Indeed, actions of Union-level administrative actors may directly affect 
                                                          
92
 See Pierre Pescatore, Droit de L'intégration (Kluwer Law International, 1974): p. 26. 
93
 See Arthur Benz, ‘Differentiating Multi-Level Administration: Patterns of Administrative Co-Ordination in the 
European Union’ (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795429. 
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national ways of life and the redistributive choices of European societies which may 
raise concerns from the perspective of democratic principles.94  
Furthermore, the pluralistic nature of EU administration requires cooperation 
between multiple levels of administration, which takes place through complex 
arrangements and processes. Since the Union lacks the administrative basis 
traditionally referred to as “state capacities”,95 the implementation (i.e. application 
and enforcement) of the choices and decisions made by EU administration remains 
in the hands of the Member States and their administrative structures.  
Although, over time, the Member States have conferred more and more tasks upon 
the Union, they have never been willing to renounce their “administrative 
sovereignty”96 considered instrumental in “the capacity of the state to effectively 
achieve the chosen policy outcomes”97 and safeguarding state sovereignty.98 Such an 
institutional setting considerably limits the scope of Union independent 
administrative action directed to individuals under the jurisdiction of a given 
Member State without having recourse to the national administrative apparatus. 
This, in turn, may create centrifugal challenges and dilemmas at lower levels 
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 See Jürgen Habermas, The crisis of the European Union: A response (Polity, 2012). 
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 See Daniel R. Kelemen, P. Genschel, and M. Jachtenfuchs, ‘Building the New European State? Federalism, Core 
State Powers, and European Integration'’, Beyond the Regulatory Polity (2013): pp. 211–229. 
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 See Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal, ‘National administative sovereignty: Under pressure’, edited by Erik 
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(Routledge, 2015), pp. 173–189. 
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 See Felicity Matthews, ‘Governance and state capacity’, edited by David Levi-Faur, in The Oxford handbook of 
governance (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 281–293. 
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 See Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs, Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European Integration of 
Core State Powers (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
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(national administration).99 It follows that the more the Union is involved in law and 
policy application and enforcement across its Member States, the more crucial the 
modalities of interactions between the supranational and national (or subnational) 
levels of EU administration become.100 
3.2. The development of EU administrative capacities for the 
provision of financial stability  
Financial stability may serve as an example of a sophisticated public good the 
delivery of which has become a complex process. It can be considered as a public 
good - that is, one which can be enjoyed by all society – “because it provides non-
excludable and non-rival benefits”.101 While financial stability serves as a public good 
which public administration is expected to provide, it is somehow challenging to 
offer a precise definition of what this stability encompasses. There exist numerous 
approaches on how to define financial stability so that it could serve as an objective 
to guide financial stability policy. Notably, it can be perceived in terms of 
preconditions and outcomes.102  
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In terms of preconditions, financial stability is secured when “risks in the financial 
system are adequately identified, allocated, priced and managed”.103 In terms of 
outcomes, in turn, financial stability can be understood as the absence of a negative 
crisis characterized by “some combination of (a) divergence of asset prices from 
fundamentals (b) significant distortions in market functioning and credit availability 
that thereby causes (c) aggregate spending to deviate (or to threaten to deviate) from 
long run potential”.104 In addition, financial stability is also about “the smooth 
functioning of the key elements which make up the financial system”105 and relates 
to the robustness in the face of negative shocks.106 Finally, it may be also perceived as 
“a condition in which the financial system – intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructures – can withstand shocks without major disruption in financial 
intermediation and in the general supply of financial services.”107 
Financial stability is nowadays considered as one of the most important public 
goods, which transcends geographic, sectoral and jurisdictional borders.108 It has a 
local, national, regional and international dimension since it is “important to the 
international community that for the most part cannot or will not be adequately 
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addressed by individual countries acting alone”.109 As the recent crisis experience 
indicated, instability can spread quickly through international and sector-specific 
linkages across different financial sectors, from one jurisdiction to another, and from 
one region to another. Therefore, adequately designed cross-sectoral and cross-
border administrative supervisory arrangements are paramount to promote financial 
stability in a global and interconnected environment.110  
A series of EU financial and economic crises111 highlighted the crucial importance of 
financial stability for both public administration (which had to carefully design 
necessary anti-crisis measures) and ordinary people (who bear the majority of the 
costs of these measures) in the majority of developed countries. The magnitude of 
financial stability as a public good can be illustrated by the fact that, between 2008 
and 2015 EU administration (the Commission’s Directorate General Competition) 
approved under State aid rules different anti-crisis measures at the value of almost 5 
trillion euros to ensure financial stability in the EU (amounting to around 35% of the 
total EU’s GDP in 2015), of which Member States used around 2 trillion euros.112  
Furthermore, these crises were further aggravated by the interlinkages between 
banks and sovereigns (“vicious circle”) which transmitted problems faced by the EU 
banking sector to the public finances of many EU Member States (mostly originating 
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from the southern part of the euro area). Their serious difficulties to access the 
market for public debt financing transformed the unravelling EU bank crisis into the 
EU debt crisis, which threatened the very existence of the single currency. In this 
adverse environment, the EU administrative system went through a tremendous 
transformation which considerably affected the design of the EU’s economic 
constitution.113 The sum of the EU’s responses to the recent global financial crisis was 
designed to boost its independent administrative capabilities to produce more 
financial stability across its Member States. These responses resulted in the 
attribution of new tasks and competences in the areas of fiscal, macroeconomic and 
financial supervision to Union level administration.  
In the fiscal and macro-economic area, the “Six-Pack” legislation114 created a new 
administrative framework providing for the EU’s administrative supervision of fiscal 
and budgetary policies and macro-economic coordination of all Member States. 
Furthermore, a number of administrative arrangements were created to cover a 
subset of Member States (the euro area). These included the so-called “Two-Pack” 
legislation115 establishing an administrative basis for reinforced monitoring and 
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surveillance in the euro area, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
providing access to financial assistance programs for euro area Member States in 
financial difficulty.116 In addition, 23 EU Member States were subject to the 
framework of the “Euro Plus” Pact117, and 25 EU Member States signed the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance, which created special administrative 
procedures to monitor the implementation of the so-called “balanced budget rule”.118 
This study will however not focus on the new EU administrative capacities in these 
policy fields. 
The EU’s recent crisis experience initiated debates on the failing of EU arrangements 
governing the supervision of financial market participants operating in the Single 
Market, and in particular of those governing the supervision of banking sector. In 
the EU, credit supply to the real economy in Europe is strongly linked to banks’ 
financing services and thus dependent, too, on banks’ capital and funding 
conditions.119 It necessarily implies that EU’s financial stability is closely connected 
to the soundness of the EU banking sector and predominantly relies on the “on-
going capacity of banks to meet the demands of their depositors and other creditors 
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such as retails customers, enterprises as well as other banks.”120 Therefore, optimal 
institutional arrangements governing the supervision of credit institutions operating 
in the Single Market became of paramount importance to avoid disruptions in the 
provisioning of financial stability across the EU.  
Prior to the EU banking crisis, the system of banking supervision in the Union was 
based on the principle of home-country control, according to which the national 
competent authorities (NCAs) of the Member States are responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of a bank licensed in their jurisdiction and operating 
across the Single Market, including its foreign branches and operations. This 
approach stemmed from another central principle governing the functioning of the 
Single Market – namely, mutual recognition as formulated by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in its landmark judgments Dassonville121 and Cassis de 
Dijon.122 The principle of mutual recognition implies that a bank duly authorized in 
one Member State obtains a so-called single passport, through which it can freely 
provide its services in the rest of the EU, even without the harmonization of national 
banking regulations across the Union. A rapidly advancing EU financial integration 
led to deeper systemic interlinkages between the different domestic banking sectors 
of the Member States. Already by 2005, almost one fourth of all banking operations 
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in Europe were cross-border, largely exceeding the levels of integration seen in the 
US and Asian-Pacific financial sectors.123 
Although domestic policies and decisions adopted by national supervisors of one 
Member State could affect (either positively or negatively) other Member States’ 
jurisdictions, there was no robust framework for obligatory cross-border cooperation 
between national administrative authorities responsible for banking supervision. 
Those mechanisms which existed were primarily based on non-binding agreements 
(Memoranda of Understanding, MoUs), voluntary peer-to-peer reviews and 
information exchange in colleges of supervisors. The MoUs did not provide 
incentives for a home supervisor to adopt a more encompassing supervisory 
perspective on a cross-border banking group under its supervision.124 This became 
particularly apparent during the global financial crisis. Rather than seeking common 
solutions for troubled banking groups through the established channels of 
supervisory cooperation, national supervisors sought unilateral, often nationally 
biased regulatory intervention which effectively led to the renationalization of the 
Single Market for banking services and made the solvency of individual institutions 
dependent on the budgetary capacities of individual Member States.125  
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These weaknesses of the supervisory cooperation framework thus contributed to the 
financial contagion across the Union because the rescues of and guarantees given to 
cross-border groups became solely dependent upon on the ability of their home 
country jurisdictions to provide a fiscal backstop. The lack of EU-wide administrative 
arrangements able to deal with cross-border crisis prevention and management of 
bank crises gave impetus to the construction of a new regulatory framework for EU 
banking supervision, which resulted in the creation of new EU administrative 
structures with an aim to intensify the integration of banking supervision across the 
Member States’ jurisdictions. 
The process of a further integration of EU banking supervision started with the 
establishment of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) in 2010. The 
ESFS was set up in order to coordinate the policies of national authorities of the 
Member States which are responsible for banking, securities and insurance sector 
supervision (arrangements for micro-prudential supervision) as well as for the 
mitigation of systemic risks (arrangement for macro-prudential supervision). It was a 
historic reform: for the first time ever, it was agreed to allocate specific supervisory 
competences at the Union’s level, although not in absolute terms,126 due to the 
constitutional limitations imposed by the Treaties and the jurisprudence of the 
Court.127 
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Within the ESFS, three newly created European Supervisory Authorities, or the ESAs, 
including the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) became responsible for micro-prudential supervision. They were 
entrusted a range of regulatory and supervisory tasks. In the field of financial 
regulation, they have been tasked with building a single set of rules (the “Single 
Rulebook”) applicable to market participants (respectively banks (EBA), investment 
companies (ESMA) and insurance companies (EIOPA)) operating across the Single 
Market. In the field of financial supervision, they have been mandated to ensure 
consistent application of the Single Rulebook through the harmonization of national 
supervisory practices with an overall objective to “reduce the risk or incidence of 
future episodes of financial disruption and contribute to developing a European 
dimension of financial supervision to complete the Single Market for financial 
services”.128 These policies, formulated by the ESAs in the financial sectors under 
their respective remits, are addressed to competent national authorities (of the 
banking, securities and insurance sectors) which remain however responsible for the 
application of these policies in their day-to-day supervisory activities.  
The establishment of the “banking arm” of the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) in 2010 considerably altered the way in which banking 
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supervision had been carried out across the EU. For the first time Member States 
agreed to confer upon the Union competences in banking supervision, although in a 
very limited form. However, it was only a halfway point in setting the conditions for 
a more integrated system of EU banking supervision.129 Increasing the coordination 
between supervisors was indeed vital, but the crisis demonstrated that “mere 
coordination was not enough, in particular in the context of a single currency”.130 
The EU debt crisis, which unfolded between 2010 and 2012, made it clear that a 
highly systemically interconnected area, such as the euro area, requires a more 
centralized regulatory framework for banking supervision.  
Deepening integration between banking sectors of its Member States made the euro 
area more prone to cross-jurisdictional contagion. In particular, there was a need to 
loosen the tight links existing between banks and sovereigns (famously referred to as 
the “vicious circle”), which negatively affected the credit supply to the real economy, 
as well as the possibilities to refinance public debt by governments in some of euro 
area Member States. Notably, in Greece and Italy high public deficits plagued banks 
as consequences of the strong domestic exposure in the banks’ bond portfolios.131 In 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where failing banks added massive liabilities to the 
balance sheets of the sovereigns, the recapitalization of failing banks drew huge 
                                                          
129
 See Boccuzzi, The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution (above, n.126): p. 30. 
130
 See Recital 5 of the ‘Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions: SSM 
Regulation’ (above, n. 72).  
131
 See D. J. Elliot, Key issues on European Banking Union: Trade-offs and some recommendations. Global Economy 
and Development at Brookings, Working Paper 52; Benoît Coeuré, Why the euro needs a banking union: Speech at 
Conference “Bank funding - markets, instruments and and implications for corporate lending and the real economy” 
(Frankfurt am Main, 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp121008_1.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
67 
 
amounts of public resources. Deteriorating financial indicators of those euro area 
Member States provoked massive outflows of funds from their financial markets 
towards the euro area center. This was motivated by market fears about possible 
default on these Member States’ national debts132 and took place despite negative 
yields offered in central euro area Member States.133  
As a result, diverging funding conditions for businesses across the euro area arose 
despite the same level of key interest rates being set centrally by the ECB. In these 
difficult circumstances, there existed a “natural” bias of national supervisors who 
aimed to ring-fence domestic banking sectors from the spread of contagion, both in 
euro area peripheral and central Member States.134 These practices contributed to 
the accumulation of massive liabilities on banks and sovereigns balance sheets to 
secure the existence of national (banking) champions. National attempts to deal 
with weaker and undercapitalized banks only exacerbated the fragmentation of the 
Single Market along national borders135 and constituted a clear signal that the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism had stopped to work efficiently across the 
euro area.136 As argued by Vítor Constâncio, high degrees of financial integration, 
understood as diversification of assets and liabilities of financial institutions across 
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the euro area, were essential for efficient monetary policies in a single currency 
area.137  
Therefore, in order to restore the proper monetary policy transmission mechanism 
and robust functioning of the single currency area, the “vicious circle” between the 
banks and sovereigns had to be addressed. It became widely recognized among 
European politicians that a monetary union could work only with a stronger 
economic pillar,138 notably including an integrated banking supervision.139 In this 
context, on 26 June 2012, the President of the European Council presented a vision of 
a “stable and prosperous Economic and Monetary Union” which would rest on four 
building blocks, including an integrated financial framework. This framework 
entailed creating “a single European banking supervision system with a European 
and a national level” and elevating “responsibility for supervision to the European 
level”.140 On 29 June 2012, euro area leaders reaffirmed that it was “imperative to 
break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”, and urged the European 
Commission to present respective proposals on the creation of a “single supervisory 
mechanism” for the euro area banking supervision.141 They also invited the President 
of the European Council to develop a specific roadmap in line with the report 
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submitted on 26 July. Against this background, on 12 September 2012 the European 
Commission released a “Roadmap towards a Banking Union”142 accompanied by two 
draft legislative proposals.  
The first legislative proposal provided for the establishment of a single supervisory 
mechanism transferring “to the European level and specifically to the European 
Central Bank a number of specific, key supervisory tasks for banks established in 
euro area Member States”143 which was based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).144 The second legislative proposal 
envisaged limited changes to the functioning of the European Banking Authority in 
the context of the newly established Banking Union.145  
Following the conclusions of the summit of the European Council on 26 June 2012, 
the President of the European Council subsequently presented a specific roadmap 
named “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”.146 On 13 December 
2012, the Council reached an agreement among EU Member States on the final 
design of the basic legal framework governing the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
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(SSM). The consensus reached considerably altered the original draft proposal 
presented by the EU Commission.147 Instead of the initially proposed ECB direct 
supervision over all euro area credit institutions within the SSM, it was decided to 
carry out prudential supervision within the SSM in a “differentiated way and in a 
close cooperation with national supervisory authorities”.148 Such an arrangement 
effectively instituted two distinct supervisory subsystems: one for large and systemic 
banks (significant ones) and another one for small and medium sized banks (less 
significant ones). Although the European Parliament was not empowered to be 
consulted according to the special legislative procedure set by Article 127(6) of the 
TFEU, it nevertheless managed to be heard on this proposal by leveraging its role as 
co-legislator in the context of the EU Commission’s legislative proposal – a 
regulation adapting the functioning of the EBA to coexistence with the SSM. On 19 
March 2013, the Council and the Parliament reached a compromise on the final 
wording of the SSM draft regulation. The final version of the SSM Regulation was 
adopted by the Council on 15 October 2013 and entered into force on 4 November 
2013. One year later, on 4 November 2014, the SSM became operational.  
The SSM is the first and key pillar of the European Banking Union supplementing 
the existing Economic and Monetary Union. It is built around the ECB and the NCAs 
of the so-called “participating Member States”149 which together “constitute a system 
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of financial supervision”.150 This system rests on a more genuine allocation of 
supervisory tasks and competences related to both micro- and macro prudential 
supervision than the one existing within the “banking arm” of the ESFS. The 
participation in the SSM is obligatory for euro area Member States, but under certain 
conditions it also remains open to the participation of non-euro area Member 
States.151 
In the realm of micro-prudential supervision, the ECB became exclusively competent 
to carry out key supervisory tasks in relation to all credit institutions headquartered 
in (SSM) participating Member States.152 However, the ECB’s exclusive micro-
prudential supervisory competence is exercised in a differentiated way that forms “a 
unique and unprecedented juxtaposition of European and national responsibilities 
which defies any clear definition or categorization”.153 It includes the ECB’s 
responsibility for direct supervision of large and systemic euro area credit 
institutions and the NCAs’ responsibility for direct supervision of smaller and 
medium-sized euro area credit institutions, as well as the ECB’s oversight role over 
the efficient and consistent functioning of the system.154 In the realm of macro-
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prudential supervision, the competence to apply macro-prudential measures is 
shared between the ECB and the national macro-prudential designated authorities 
(NDAs) in a way that the ECB may only apply higher requirements than those set by 
the NDAs in respect of capital buffers or more stringent macro-prudential measures 
aiming at addressing systemic or risks if deemed necessary (top-up power).155 
Importantly, the ECB cannot preempt the NDAs in the exercise of their macro-
prudential competence from imposing capital buffers on credit institutions 
operating in their jurisdictions.  
For euro area Member States, their obligatory participation in the SSM entails a 
significant transfer of authority from the national to the supranational level in the 
policy area that governs credit allocation by banks in their economy.156 Due to its 
extreme sensitiveness from a political economy perspective, this process has 
tremendous political-administrative implications. In terms of gravity, this can be 
compared with the transfer of euro area Member States’ sovereign rights of creation 
and regulation of currency (lex monetae) to the Union, which took place when the 
euro was introduced. Given the largely bank-based financial structure of the 
European economy,157 the introduction of the SSM has had a direct impact on the 
regulatory and institutional environment in which the main credit suppliers to the 
European economy operate.  
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This brief sketch of the institutional foundations of the EU’s new administrative 
architecture of banking supervision allows for a number of preliminary remarks. In 
the light of such a complexity and multitude of layers, a comprehensive analysis of 
the new administrative arrangements has to inherently go beyond the legal wording 
which categorizes them as “single” or “uniform” systems. On the contrary, these 
newly created supervisory frameworks appear to be intricate systems between 
supranational administrative units and their national counterparts designed as 
multilevel and internally differentiated systems where administrative units at 
different levels “are linked together in the performance of tasks”.158 In the field of 
banking supervision, there exists an administrative system applicable to all EU 
Member States (the ESFS), and another system applicable to a subset of EU Member 
States (the SSM).159 As a result, the post-crisis architecture of EU banking 
supervision exhibits a deeply plural composition which can be sketched in terms of 
“administrative pluralism” which is a far less developed theoretical phenomenon 
than constitutional pluralism.160 These circumstances have at least two relevant 
implications.  
Firstly, a multilevel nature of EU banking supervisory administration implies that 
supervisory tasks cannot be carried out without having recourse to national 
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authorities for the operational conduct of supervision.161 As already pointed out, such 
a multilevel design may create centrifugal challenges and dilemmas at lower levels162 
and generate a question of whether lower level (national) supervisors are sufficiently 
incentivized to comply with the policy preferences and objectives of higher level 
(supranational) supervisors. This issue seems to be indeed fundamental to achieve 
the optimal institutional design of regulatory regimes characterized by the 
multilevelness.  
Secondly, by distinguishing administrative arrangements applicable to the euro area 
alone, there exist different administrative structures binding different subsets of EU 
Member States within the same sector rather than among different sectors of public 
policy as the traditional concept of differentiated integration entails.163 This, in turn, 
generates a question of whether the Single Market for banking services will remain 
truly single or whether the creation of the SSM strengthens a permanent split 
between euro area and non-euro area Member States.  
Against this backdrop and line with the research design proposed in chapter two, the 
following two chapters construct two pillars for the analytical framework to be 
subsequently applied to the analysis of the phenomena of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Organisational design of EU multilevel 
administration 
4.1. Introductory remarks 
This dissertation deems the organisational design of a given EU multilevel 
administrative arrangement to be the first structural condition which influences the 
lower level actor’s likelihood to comply with the policy preferences and objectives of 
the higher level actor pertaining to that arrangement. This structural condition is 
primarily related to the systemic position of the higher and lower level actors within 
the multilevel regime. Under the assumptions of the Enforcement hypothesis, the 
organisational design of a given multilevel regime should provide for a strong 
systemic position of the higher level actor therein in order to promote higher levels 
of top-down compliance expectation. In the same vein, the Management hypothesis 
asserts that the existence of a strong shadow of the higher level actor’s hierarchy 
therein positively influences top-down compliance expectation.  
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to build a typology of different 
models of EU multilevel administration, which would allow a determination of the 
systemic position of the higher level actor in relation to the lower level actor and of 
the correlated shadow of its institutional hierarchy. Developing such a framework is 
instrumental to initiating the first step in the testing of the Enforcement and 
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Management hypotheses in respect to the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision, which is conducted in chapter five.  
4.2. Conceptual perspectives on EU multilevel administrative 
order 
Although a range of well-established concepts of public administration have been 
developed by the bureaucracy or new public management scholarship, they fail to 
cover the intricacies of the EU administrative realities which have grown beyond the 
architecture of the modern state.164 It has been noted that the majority of studies on 
public administration are largely confined to the realm of national sovereignty, 
notwithstanding the fact that public policy formulation and application go beyond 
the borders of the state and increasingly involve such actors as the EU.165 While it is 
true that recent administrative studies distinguish between a variety of typologies 
concerning EU multilevel administrative relations,166 they are perhaps not the best 
choice to fully capture the intricacies of the new administrative regulatory 
frameworks established following the global financial crisis.  
The administrative and constitutional character of the European Union is 
exceptional. As noted by Eva Heidbreder, “no genuine or coherent EU administrative 
system – or administrative space – can be discerned after some 60 years of legal 
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integration”.167 Devised as an international organization exercising powers delegated 
by its Contracting States, nowadays it increasingly resembles a “federal order of 
competences”,168 or a “particular federation”.169 The EU’s exceptionality is reflected in 
the fact that it encompasses of multiple complex and multilevel administrative 
systems, in which supranational and national (as well as sub-national) 
administrative apparatus “jointly exercise powers delegated to the EU in a system of 
shared sovereignty”.170 Traditionally, this system was based on the assumption that 
general and abstract rules and policies in a given sector would be formulated at the 
EU level, while the application and enforcement of those rules and policies would 
take place at the national level (“executive federalism”).171 However, recently one can 
observe a new trend concerning an increasing involvement of higher level 
(supranational) level actors in the application and enforcement of different EU 
policies across the Member States. This is evidenced by the fact that over the last 15 
years the number of EU institutions, agencies and bodies vested with (more or less) 
direct application and enforcement competences have grown from one to seven.172 
As a result, currently there exists a plethora of new and more sophisticated 
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configurations between higher and lower level administrative actors interacting 
within different EU multilevel contexts across various fields of public policies.  
The allocation of tasks and competences between the Union and national levels and 
the modalities of their exercise (in particular, how the Union’s competences are 
exercised) can be regarded as decisive aspects determining the character of the EU 
administrative system. Furthermore, aspects such as the extent to which a Union-
level administrative capacity is established independently from Member States’ pre-
existing administrative structures and the territorial applicability of the EU’s 
administrative arrangement are also of importance. This links the discussion about 
EU administration to the theoretical accounts of federalism which consider the 
vertical attribution of authority across higher and lower levels as the pivotal element 
of studies on multilevel polities. 
According to Daniel R. Kelemen, three basic criteria can be used to identify federal 
structures. These include i) the division of power between higher and lower levels, ii) 
the existence of some decision-making authority on each level in relation to 
respective issues, and iii) the existence of an authority which is competent to 
adjudicate disputes between both levels.173 In the case of the European Union, all of 
these criteria are fulfilled. Firstly, due to the principle of conferral laid down in 
Article 5 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the limits of the action of 
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higher (supranational) level are clearly delineated.174 Secondly, Articles 3-6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) distribute authoritative 
decision-making powers in different EU policy areas between the higher 
(supranational) and lower (national) level administration.175 Thirdly, based on 
Articles 263 and 267 of the TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has competences to adjudicate disputes between the higher (supranational) and 
lower (national) level. It therefore follows that the EU can be considered as a 
federally structured polity according to the foregoing criteria. This assumption 
allows for drawing insights from the theory of federalism to inform the analysis of 
the organisational design of the EU multilevel administration.  
To develop models of different EU administrative arrangements, a vertically-oriented 
perspective will be employed. This perspective would allow driving particular 
attention to the formal allocation of tasks and competences and between the higher 
level (supranational) and lower level (national) actors, as well as to the decision 
making modalities of each of these actors. It will be indicated that the EU 
administrative system exhibits a deeply pluralistic nature because the configurations 
of power balance between those actors may vary depending on the applicable 
administrative arrangements and the policy field. This would support the claim that 
the EU can not only be characterized by the coexistence of concurring legal orders 
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which may partially overlap (constitutional pluralism), but also by the coexistence of 
concurring regulatory structures which may also partially overlap (administrative 
pluralism).176 Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a continuous “ebb and flow” of 
tasks and responsibilities between lower and higher levels of EU administration.177  
To create a typology of the organisational models of the EU multilevel administrative 
arrangements, this study also accepts insights from the concepts of multilevel 
administration178 and differentiated integration.179 The multilevel administration 
(MLA) approach perceives the EU administrative order as a variety of arrangements 
situated between the “indirect” and “direct” systems of administration. In traditional 
regimes characterized by multilevelness, the higher level actor is expected to 
formulate common policy objectives and preferences which are subsequently applied 
and enforced by the lower level actors in a decentralized manner. This setting 
reflects the traditional division between the regulatory and implementation (i.e. 
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application and enforcement) stages of the policy cycle in the EU.180 In recent years, 
this type of EU policy-making process has changed considerably and the emergence 
of new modes of policy application and enforcement can be identified. In some 
instances, EU policies have become increasingly implemented directly and 
autonomously on behalf of the higher level (supranational) administrative actors 
with the sole assistance of lower level (national) administrative actors. In other 
instances, EU policies remain implemented autonomously by the lower level 
administration, but under the oversight of the higher level administration. Finally, 
the application and enforcement of EU policies may be shared between different 
levels of territorial administration. Consequently, there exist different organisational 
models of EU multilevel administration which reflect the degree of control of the 
higher level administration over the process of day-to-day application and 
enforcement of common EU policies across Member States’ jurisdictions.  
As pointed out by Herwig Hofmann, the standard distinction between forms of 
either “direct” or “indirect” administration has become of small analytical relevance 
within the EU context.181 This standard distinction assumes that the EU inherited the 
“indirect” administration approach from classical international organizations, in 
which policies formulated by international organizations (higher level actors) are 
subsequently implemented by signatory member states alone (lower level actors), 
without any interference from bodies owned by international organizations.182 This 
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arrangement leaves however a considerable room for maneuver for the member 
states (and their administrative agencies) which may result in diverging applications 
across national jurisdictions.183 Among the circumstances most accentuated in order 
to explain uneven implementation are the member states’ institutional traditions, 
administrative capacities and political preferences.184 The “indirect” system of 
administration grants national administration full authority with regard to the 
implementation (i.e. application and enforcement) of international (or 
supranational) policies. To reduce the possible negative consequences of such a type 
of regulatory fragmentation and to bring more harmonization into the 
implementation process, more “direct” forms of EU administration have been 
established over time.  
From the outset provided by the Treaty of Rome, the “direct” system of EU 
administration was established to manage the core areas of European integration, 
including competition and internal trade, through supranational institutions such as 
the European Commission.185 Gradually, the different fields of public policy have 
developed a range administrative arrangements in-between pure organisational 
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model of EU “indirect” and “direct administration”.186 Therefore, although the 
models of “direct” and “indirect” administrative arrangements are still important to 
classify dominant modes of policy implementation in the EU, they are not meant to 
be seen as purely centralized or decentralized forms of administrative action.187 To 
account for this administrative evolution, two sets of arrangements which represent 
new organisational patterns of EU “direct” administration can be identified.  
The first is an “intergovernmental European administration”,188 in which higher level 
actors (EU administration) work closely with lower level actors (Member-State 
administrations) partly bypassing national ministries in the pursuit of public 
policies.189 This occurs either because higher level actors need to pool administrative 
resources across EU Member States,190 or because they need support from national 
governments.191 In this setting, lower level actors (national administrative apparatus) 
may operate in a “double-hatted” manner, serving both as parts of member states' 
structures and as parts of a Union administration.192 Under the second hat, national 
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administrative structures are directly networked with EU institutions and agencies, 
yet not via their ministerial superiors as is typical for indirect administration.193 The 
trend towards instituting this particular set of organisational arrangement has been 
well-captured by the increasing “agencification” of the EU administrative system. In 
this context, EU “decentralized” agencies and bodies have a particular role to play in 
areas where the administrative powers of the Member States must be pooled to 
avoid overconcentration of powers at Union level.194 On the other hand, national 
agencies organized at arm’s length from their parent ministerial departments are 
regarded as building blocks of a multilevel “direct” EU administration.195 This 
specific setting constitutes a compromise between functional needs to create more 
regulatory capacity at the EU level in certain areas of public policy and EU Member 
States’ reluctance to transfer more tasks and competences to the EU institutions, 
agencies and bodies196 which increasingly exercise administrative functions in the 
EU.197 
The second is a “supranational European administration”,198 in which higher level 
actors (EU administration) can pursue public policies without including lower level 
actors (national administration), although these decisions might be influenced by 
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interests communicated by the member-state administrative apparatus, since the 
lower level continues to play a significant role in the domestic implementation of 
said policies.199 In the “supranational European administration”, by virtue of its 
position in hierarchical structure, a higher level actor holds the authority to impose 
decisions on lower level actors and is able to determine policy objectives, 
procedures, standards and expectations, but it can never implement these policies 
on its own.200 This form of EU “direct” administration can be established if “the 
implementation by the institutions and other authorities of the Union takes place 
(…) when there is a clear constitutional basis conferring administrative functions on 
the as such”,201 which includes the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank, but not necessarily EU “decentralized” agencies.202 It follows that the concept 
of multilevel administration may be of support to elucidate the foundations, internal 
distribution of tasks and competences and inter-administrative relations between 
administrative actors operating within multilevel arrangements. 
The differentiated integration (DI) approach has been surrounded by a great degree 
of conceptual ambiguity. It does not carry a single name, nor has it a meaning even 
to those which would be commonly agreed on.203 This approach includes notably 
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such concepts as multi-speed Europe, variable geometry Europe, Europe à la carte, 
or EU concentric circles. As such, around 30 forms of differentiated integration were 
identified along three dimensions of time, space and policy content.204 For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will however rely on the most recent approach to 
understand the phenomenon of DI as proposed by Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger 
and Frank Schimmelfennig.205 This approach considers the DI phenomenon as a 
three-dimensional configuration of supranational authority within the EU 
represented by (i) the level of its centralization, (ii) its functional scope, and (iii) its 
territorial extension.206 The level of centralization accounts for the allocation of 
decision-making authority to the central level, the functional scope is determined by 
whether the authority is granted over one or more sectors of public policies, and the 
territorial extension expresses the authority’s jurisdictional outreach. In particular, 
the third dimension of the DI concept provides an added value to the conceptual 
framework developed in this chapter since the MLA approach does not capture this 
dimension. 
Based on the specific configurations of those three dimensions, one can distinguish 
vertical and horizontal differentiations.207 The former refers to the level of 
centralization - that is the outreach of the authoritative decision-making at the 
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central (EU) level, and its functional scope – that is policy coverage limited to single 
or entire range of policies. In terms of the organisational design of EU “direct” 
administration, it follows that the vertical of aspect differentiation is directly 
connected to the “supranational” (as opposed to “intergovernmental”) type of 
European administration. Therefore, this dimension of the DI approach may be 
deemed overlapping with the MLA’s tenants. On the other hand, the latter 
(horizontal) differentiation refers to the territorial extension and reflects the fact 
that many administrative arrangements are not applicable in all EU Member States. 
In terms of the nature of the EU administrative system, it manifests the existence of 
“administrative pluralism”, in which there exists some arrangements, from which 
some EU Member States may choose to opt-out. Consequently, the concept of 
differentiated integration may shed some light on the internal distribution of tasks 
and competences and on the territorial applicability of multilevel administrative 
arrangements. 
4.3. Elements of the organisational design of EU multilevel 
administration 
Based on insights jointly derived from the concepts of federalism, multilevel 
administration and differentiated integration, it is suggested that four specific 
institutional elements may influence the organisational design of a given EU 
administrative arrangement: i) its constitutional foundations, ii) the vertical 
allocation of administrative tasks and competences therein and iii) the 
administrative interrelations between levels, as well as iv) its jurisdictional 
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(territorial) outreach. As a result of a specific configuration of the four 
abovementioned elements, this chapter proposes to differentiate three formal 
models of EU administration, which can be referred to as: i) EU centrifugal 
administration, ii) EU intervention-based administration, and iii) EU centripetal 
administration. Each of those models predicts different configurations of power 
balance between the higher and lower level actors pertaining to a given 
administrative arrangement.  
4.3.1. Constitutional foundations for an EU administrative arrangement 
According to the principle of conferral laid down in Article 5 of the TEU, the Union 
may act only where relevant competences have been explicitly or implicitly 
attributed to it. It therefore follows that in order to establish an EU multi-level 
system vested with regulatory capacities at the Union level, there must exist a legal 
basis in the Treaty permitting supranational intervention in national legal and 
administrative orders and legitimizing the involvement of national administration in 
such a system. In this respect, two types of constitutional benchmarks authorizing 
the creation of such EU multi-level regulatory regimes can be distinguished within 
the Treaties.208  
On the one hand, a Treaty legal basis can directly mandate the establishment of an 
EU multi-level administrative arrangement and directly attribute to the responsible 
unit of Union administration the corresponding competences necessary to pursue its 
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objectives. Specific Treaty provisions like Articles 105 or 126(7) of the TFEU can be 
interpreted as an explicit constitutional mandate to develop supranational regulatory 
arrangements. Article 105 of the TFEU empowers the Commission to apply the 
Union’s substantive rules on competition in relation to individual enterprises 
operating across the Single Market through a system of cooperation with national 
competition authorities established by the Regulation 1/2003. Article 127(6) of the 
TFEU sets a legislative procedure that authorizes the Council to attribute to the ECB 
competences to carry out certain tasks related to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, which has been operationalized through a system of cooperation with 
national competent authorities established by the SSM Regulation.  
On the other hand, the Treaty’s general or objective-related legal bases, such as for 
example the “internal market clause” encapsulated in Article 114, have been 
interpreted as entailing an implicit mandate which enables the creation of an EU 
multi-level administrative arrangement vested with regulatory capacities at the 
Union level.209 According to Article 114(1) of the TFEU, Union legislators are 
empowered to “adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”.  
As recognized by the Court, the above legal basis can be used for the creation of 
administrative regulatory structures at the Union level insofar as the objectives and 
tasks of the unit of Union administration in question are closely linked to the subject 
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matter of existing harmonising legislation, and are "likely to facilitate" the 
application of the harmonising legislation by supporting it and providing a 
framework for its implementation.210 The functioning of the EU multi-level 
administration created on the basis of Article 114 of the TFEU is subject however to 
constrains imposed by the so-called “Meroni doctrine”. 
At its core, the “Meroni doctrine” embodies a set of the legal requirements 
concerning the admissibility of an attribution of discretionary competences to units 
of Union administration (notably to EU agencies and bodies) whose creation has not 
been explicitly foreseen by the Treaties (such as EU agencies and bodies created by 
means of Union secondary legislation).211 The “Meroni Doctrine” prohibits such 
attribution of powers, especially in cases in which the use of discretion makes 
possible the execution of actual economic policy of the Union.212 The attribution of 
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discretionary powers to define the policy of the Union in a given field is allowed only 
to units of Union administration designated for this purpose by the Treaties. A unit 
of EU public administration not foreseen by the Treaties may be however 
empowered to adopt legally binding measures of an individual scope as long as its 
powers are not discretionary, in the sense that the exercise of those powers must 
result from the application of a given set of well-defined legal rules to a particular 
factual situation (objective criteria).213 
In the light of those constitutional constraints, the use of direct or indirect Treaty 
bases to establish an EU multi-level administrative arrangement vested with 
regulatory capacities at the Union level may entail far reaching institutional 
implications regarding the scope and modalities of the exercise of supranational 
competences within that administrative system.214  
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4.3.2. Vertical allocation of responsibilities between levels in an EU administrative 
arrangement 
European integration has always been about the transfer of responsibility for the 
pursuit of common public policies from the national to the European level. The 
division of responsibilities, tasks and competences between the higher 
(supranational) and lower (national) level is the key principle governing federally 
organized polities.215 It implies that the policy mandate, understood as a 
combination of responsibility and autonomous decision-making exercised by a 
public agent in order to pursue certain public policy goals,216 is split between higher 
and lower levels of government or administration. In doing so, it “distributes the 
power of government between the center and the regions in such a way that each set 
of governmental institutions has a direct impact on the individual citizens and other 
legal persons within its area of competence”.217 However, in federal systems which 
are based upon the rule of law, the competence of the central level (higher level 
actors) to pursue certain public policy tasks and objectives can only be exercised 
when there exists a legal basis to do so. In this sense, allocating the competences 
between both levels is considered as a means to constitutionally define the power 
balance between the higher (central) and lower (peripheral) levels of government 
and administration. 
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Although the terms “power” and “competence” are often used interchangeably in 
different contexts, they are not equivalent, but rather constitute two sides of the 
same coin. While power refers to the capability of a public actor (e.g. government, 
administrative authority) to pursue public policies, the notion of competence refers 
to the reasons and limits to apply powers.218 As a consequence, there may exist 
multilevel structures which favor either higher or lower level actors in terms of 
power balance, also providing checks and balances for the authority migration, 
either upwards or downwards. 
4.3.3. Administrative interactions between levels in an EU administrative 
arrangement 
The notion of “level” refers to the existence of separate and relatively independent 
sets of administrative units with their own rules, apparatus, and financial 
resources.219 As the EU administration has evolved beyond the architecture of the 
modern state, a higher (Union) level of administration is built upon existing national 
structures by adding the administrative capacities of EU institutions, agencies or 
bodies.220 While the EU administration has often been referred to as a powerful 
Eurocratic machinery in national political debates, existing research has drawn a 
more nuanced picture and emphasized the interrelations and power sharing 
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between European and national bureaucracies.221 In particular, due to the lack of the 
“state capacities” on the Union’s side, the EU administration cannot operate as a 
fully independent organisational structure, but rather constitutes a “fusion” of 
national and European administrative apparatus.222 This necessarily implies that the 
pursuit of administrative tasks conferred upon the Union is carried out in a close 
cooperation among higher level bureaucrats based in EU institutions, agencies and 
bodies and their lower level equivalents in national ministries or agencies.223 
National public administration remains “strictly an area of national sovereignty, 
there cannot be any European policy since there is no community competence in this 
area”.224 This paradoxical mix of independence and interdependence raises a delicate 
question concerning the modes of the interactions between higher and lower level 
actors in terms of the ability of the former to steer the application and enforcement 
of supranational public policies by the latter. In this context, Article 4 of the TFEU 
obliges the Union and the Member States to cooperate sincerely and assist each 
other when carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. This also applies to 
interactions between the higher Union level and the lower Member State level 
administrations. In addition, in some policy areas the duty to cooperate loyally is 
further backed by powers allowing the Union-level to impose coercive measures in 
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case of non-compliance by the national level (such as instructions or 
conditionality).225  
4.3.4. Jurisdictional outreach of an EU administrative arrangement 
The EU administration usually operates and is managed on the basis of European 
principles, rules and regulations uniformly enforced across the Member States.226 In 
certain cases, there may however be a situation in which the jurisdiction of a new 
supranational regulatory administrative framework applies to fewer than 28 EU 
Member States. Such a state of affairs can be described as EU differentiated 
integration. This encapsulates a tension between two diverging moves: unity and 
differentiation. The first reflects the reinforcement of the administrative capacity of 
the EU as a whole, and the second, the creation of administrative arrangements 
applicable to a subset of EU Member States only (i.e. euro area Member States). As a 
result, the administrative structures of all Member States do not participate 
simultaneously in all components of EU administrative machinery. The co-existence 
of different administrative disciplines covering different sets of EU Member States 
may raise uneasy legal issues in the future. In particular, different EU capacities 
available within corresponding administrative arrangements are likely to develop 
different administrative practices, techniques, regulatory strategies and 
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accountability instruments.227 Importantly, this raises a question of appropriate 
balance between the unity and differentiation of the EU administrative system as a 
whole, including the “minimum degree of unity” which is needed to ensure its 
smooth and robust operation.228 
4.4. Organisational models of EU multilevel administration 
4.4.1. EU centrifugal administration 
This organisational pattern can be described as an EU administrative arrangement, 
in which the distribution of responsibilities between the higher and lower levels in a 
certain area of public policies leans towards Member State administration rather 
than towards the Union one. Conceptually, it can be classified as the closest 
equivalent to the traditional design of EU multilevel regimes, in which the higher 
level (supranational) actor formulates public policies applicable within them and the 
lower level (national) actors are responsible for their decentralized implementation 
(application and enforcement). In administrative sciences scholarship, this is known 
as the “intergovernmental European administration” or the “EU indirect 
administration”.229 
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This administrative arrangement is faced with inherent centrifugal pressures and 
dilemmas at the lower level,230 which are reflected in a systemic tendency to “pull 
apart member states, to the point where the federal system fragments”, and which 
may reduce the authority of the Union’s administrative center.231  
In organisational terms, higher level actors are vested with power to formulate 
common, “supranational” public policies in a given area, but their systemic position 
is rather weak. They have limited possibilities to formally steer the implementation 
of these policies by lower (national) level actors since direct application and 
enforcement remains the responsibility of the latter. They may however use 
persuasive techniques such as issuing guidance, application guides, communications 
and other soft law instruments to steer the behaviour of the lower level actors, who 
retain core decision-making powers characteristic to a particular public policy field. 
They enjoy “administrative sovereignty” as the emanations of EU Member States and 
the possibilities of the higher level (the Union) administration to control how 
specific public policies are implemented by the lower level (state) administration are 
limited. Rather than operating in the “shadow of hierarchy”, lower level actors find 
themselves in more peer-to-peer inter-administrative relationships vis-à-vis higher 
level actors.  
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To promote compliance with supranational policies, higher level actors are likely to 
adopt the “mediating” administration approach232 rather than developing legally 
binding ordinances and operational rules for national administrations. Since higher 
level actors’ possibilities to adopt “command and control” approaches are limited, 
they will take a more pragmatic and informal orientation, leaving room for 
bargaining in light of individual circumstances.233  
4.4.2. EU intervention-based administration 
This organisational pattern can be described as an EU administrative arrangement in 
which the distribution of responsibilities between the higher and lower level actors 
in a certain area of public policies is relatively balanced. At its discretion, Union level 
administration may however unilaterally shift the power balance towards the higher 
level by assuming direct application and/or enforcement in emergency situations, 
especially where any of the elements of national implementation fails.234 It does not 
have an equivalent amongst the types of EU multilevel administration distinguished 
by administrative science scholarship, thus the closest conceptual equivalent would 
constitute a tier between the “intergovernmental” and “supranational” European 
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administration.235 This study proposes to refer to it as the “intervention-based 
European administration”.236 
In organisational terms, higher level administration retains power to formulate 
common, “supranational” public policies in a given area across the whole EU, but its 
systemic position is rather moderately strong. The higher level has limited 
possibilities to steer the implementation of these policies by lower (national) level 
administration by means of direct control. Lower level actors enjoy “administrative 
sovereignty” as the emanations of EU Member States, but there exist possibilities of 
administrative intervention by the Union regarding the ways in which specific public 
policies are carried out by means of binding instructions or procedural regulations. 
The Union’s intervening styles may be characterized by rather adversarial interaction 
patterns, whereas their consensual relations with lower level actors will be 
predominantly mediating in nature.237 At the highest level of escalation, there will be 
also ‘nuclear options’ at the higher level administration’s disposal, whose activation 
would tip the equilibrium of powers within the regime in favor of the high level 
actor. 
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4.4.3. EU centripetal multilevel administration 
This organisational pattern can be described as an arrangement in which the 
distribution of responsibilities between the higher and lower level in a certain area of 
public policies leans towards the Union administration rather than towards the 
Member States’. Conceptually, it can be classified as an exception to the traditional 
design of EU multilevel regimes, in which the higher level (supranational) actor 
formulates public policies and the lower level (national) actors are responsible for 
their decentralized implementation (application and enforcement).238 In this case, 
the higher level (the Union) is heavily involved in both the formulation and 
implementation of public policies across EU Member States. In administrative 
sciences scholarship, this is known as the “supranational European administration”, 
or the “EU direct administration”.239 This arrangement is characterized by a 
tendency to tip the internal power balance towards the Union’s level by reducing the 
autonomy of the EU Member States’ administrative structures in a longer term.240  
In organisational terms, the systemic position of the higher level administration is 
strong.  It has not only power to formulate common, “supranational” public policies 
in a given policy area, but also to apply and enforce these policies directly or to 
formally steer their implementation by lower (national) level administration by 
means of binding instructions and procedural regulation. Lower level actors are 
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expected to assist higher level actors in the exercise of their tasks and competences 
and have limited autonomous decision-making powers. They find themselves in a 
rather subordinated and auxiliary position vis-à-vis higher level actors. In this 
context, the principles of direct effect and primacy of the Union law set aside the 
principle of respect for national constitutional/administrative identity and full 
national administrative autonomy.241  
To promote compliance with supranational policies, higher level actors tend to rely 
on their own resources and to adopt the “enforcing administration” approach.242 
They do so by adopting sector-specific ordinances (regulations) for national 
administrative structures and operational rules on how to perform particular tasks 
within the multi-level system.243 These ordinances may include explicit “intentional 
binding or non-binding rules that about administrative functions, structure, 
organization, practices and behaviour” or implicit “unintentional byproducts of 
realizing policy goals whose implementation entails adaptations of domestic 
administrations”.244 Although lower level actors retain “administrative sovereignty” 
as the emanations of EU Member States, they are also deployed at higher level 
actors’ disposal in pursuit of specific public policies. The lower level actors operate in 
the shadow of hierarchy, which however does not necessarily entail that higher level 
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actors do not use other interaction techniques in inter-administrative relations other 
than command and control, such as persuasion.  
Organisational 
model 
Main features 
Conceptual 
equivalents 
EU centripetal 
administration 
Operational primacy of higher (EU) level 
administration over lower (national) level 
administration in terms of supranational policies 
implementation across participating EU Member 
States. 
“supranational 
European 
administration”, EU 
direct 
administration 
EU centrifugal 
administration 
Operational primacy of lower (national) level 
administration over higher (EU) level 
administration in terms of supranational policies 
implementation across participating EU Member 
States. 
“intergovernmental 
European 
administration”, EU 
indirect 
administration 
EU intervention-
based 
administration 
Operational primacy of lower level administration 
over higher level administration in terms of 
supranational policies implementation across 
participating EU Member States, which can be 
changed by unilateral action of the latter in 
particular circumstances. 
between 
“supranational 
European 
administration” and 
“intergovernmental 
European 
administration” 
Figure 5 Analytical tools for the inquiry on the organisational design of the SSM 
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CHAPTER 5 
Operational design of EU multilevel 
administration 
5.1. Introductory remarks 
This dissertation deems the operational design of a given EU multilevel 
administrative arrangement to be the second structural condition which influences 
the lower level actor’s likelihood to comply with the policy preferences and 
objectives of the higher level actor pertaining to that arrangement. This structural 
condition is primarily related to the functioning of internal mechanisms designed to 
address possibly conflicting preferences and objectives of both actors. Under the 
assumptions of the Enforcement hypothesis, the operational design of a given 
multilevel regime should provide credible capacity for the higher level actor’s control 
over the lower level actor’s actions in order to increase level of the formal top-
bottom compliance expectation. On the other hand, the Management Hypothesis 
assets that operational design of a given multilevel regime should ensure credible 
cooperation capacity between the higher and lower level actors in order positively 
influence the formal top-down compliance expectation. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to explain why the Principal-
Agent approach is a suitable analytical framework to study internal mechanisms 
designed to address possibly conflicting preferences and objectives of between the 
higher level (the principal) and lower level (the actor) actors operating in a 
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multilevel context. This exercise is necessary to proceed to the second step in the 
testing of the Enforcement and Management hypotheses in respect to the 
subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision conducted in chapter six. 
5.2. The Principal-Agent perspective on top-bottom compliance 
This section advocates that the Principal-Agent framework, which is an analytical 
device for the application of the agency theory,245 is a suitable approach to conduct 
the analysis of two following operational aspects of multilevel administrative 
arrangements: the capacity for the higher level actor control over the lower level 
actor, and the capacity for cooperation between them. It starts with the presentation 
of the origins and assumptions of the agency theory, and of two different Principal-
Agent perspectives (II.4.2). Subsequently, it reviews the applications of Principal-
Agent models to the analysis of politico-administrative phenomena in national, 
supranational and international contexts (II.4.3).  
5.2.1. Origins 
The foundations of the agency theory are linked to the emergence of the school of 
“new institutional economics”.246 This school was a direct response to the inability to 
recognize the importance of the structural (or institutional) context for economic 
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activity by traditional neoclassical economic accounts.247 In essence, new 
institutional economics rests on two pillars: (i) any activity (whenever economic, 
political, professional or private) of actors operating in a given setting is informed by 
“bounded rationality”,248 which however is not open-ended, but (ii) constrained by a 
specific institutional context.249 By virtue of these basic assumptions, the new 
institutional economics school has become an interdisciplinary academic 
powerhouse combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, 
sociology and anthropology to understand social, political and commercial 
institutions.250 The economic accounts of the agency theory typically explore the 
relations between company management and its shareholders, between managers 
and workers, between retailers and suppliers, between acquisition and diversification 
strategies or between ownership and financing structures.251  
Although originally developed to explain economic phenomena, the analytical tools 
offered by the agency theory were “neither by natures nor by definition” solely 
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restricted to the economic domain.252 As noted by Terry Moe, there were no 
impediments to apply them to explore the intricacies of politico-administrative 
relations: 
“Democratic politics is easily viewed in Principal-Agent terms. Citizens are 
principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians are principals, bureaucrats 
are their agents. Bureaucratic superiors are principals, bureaucratic 
subordinates are their agents. The whole of politics is therefore structured by a 
chain of Principal-Agent relationships, from citizen to politician, from 
politician to bureaucratic superior, from bureaucratic superior to bureaucratic 
subordinate and on down the hierarchy of government to the lowest-level 
bureaucrats who actually deliver the services directly to the citizens.”253 
In the realm of political science, the usefulness of the agency theory has been 
recognized as early as in the mid-1980s when a growing number of rational choice 
scholars started to draw fruitful analytical tools254 derived from the new institutional 
economics to the study of political phenomena.255 It has become widely known as 
new institutionalism in rational choice theory, or in simpler terms, as rational choice 
institutionalism. 
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Similarly to other forms of institutional analysis, rational choice institutionalism 
strives to provide answers to two fundamental inquiries: how the structures in which 
actors operate shape their political, economic and social behaviour, and these 
structures originate, persist and change. In particular, the Principal-Agent 
framework addresses the consequences of complexities of political, economic and 
societal realities from a specific angle: notwithstanding an increasingly specialized 
world, an individual actor (the so-called “principal”), who lacks specific resources, 
can still achieve its objectives when it concludes an agreement (the so-called 
‘”agency”, or “delegation contract”) with another actor with specific know-how (the 
so-called “agent”) who is made responsible for the pursuit of specific tasks in order 
fulfill the objectives of the principal.256  
Such a contractual relation is however far from unproblematic since the transfer of 
certain responsibilities to the agent may not only imply benefits, but also costs for 
the principal. These costs may be produced by a divergence in preferences regarding 
the carry-out of these responsibilities and information asymmetry between the 
principal and its agent.257 The principal cannot control completely all actions 
undertaken by the agent in the fulfillment of responsibilities under the agency 
contract since too strict control is costly and may undo the benefits of that 
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transfer.258 This adds a layer of uncertainty to the position of the principal who 
cannot gauge whether its agent undertakes only such actions which are in line with 
its preferences.259 The state of uncertainty is additionally inflected by an inherently 
incomplete nature of their contract.260 
5.2.2. Assumptions 
As already highlighted, the agency theory deals with situations where “one 
individual depends on the action of another”261 or, more specifically, where one actor 
(the principal) engages another actor (the agent) to carry out a task on its behalf.262 
In doing so, they conclude a more or less formalized agency contract263 of a fiduciary 
nature.264 Transferring, or delegating the responsibility by the principal to the agent 
to autonomously carry out certain tasks is the core constitutive feature of a 
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Principal-Agent relationship.265 In line with its rational choice origin, the main 
assumption is that the principal – a rationally bounded actor266 – decides to enter 
into such an agreement for efficiency (self-welfare maximizing) reasons since it 
expects that the agent is likely to achieve better outcomes than the principal would 
on its own. This is in accordance to the principal’s interests as a rationally bounded 
actor.  
However, the principal cannot be sure that its autonomous agent actually achieves 
the expected outcomes because the agent may minimize the effort it exerts when 
pursuing the principal’s interests and may also pursue its own rationally-driven 
interests which may not be fully aligned with those of its principal.267  In this context, 
the agent is considered to be an opportunist,268 and may even go as far as to engage 
“behaviour in ways inimical to the preferences of the principal” 269 if it considers that 
such a course of action will produce more self-welfare than following the preferences 
of its principal. These uneasy dynamics between the principal and the agent are 
further aggravated by the already mentioned information asymmetry and essential 
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incompleteness of their contact which may provide the agents with incentives to use 
the informational and contractual gaps to pursue own preferences.270 
Consequently, the principal is faced with the problem of how to ensure that the 
agent takes all the effort to respect the principal’s interests and undertakes only such 
an action which follows its preferences and interests in a situation, where the agent 
knows more about its own preferences and interests than its principal.271 Such 
informational advantage on the agent’s side places the principal in an essentially 
asymmetric position and may contribute to “agency slack”, which occurs when the 
agent acts opportunistically and takes independent actions which are undesired by 
the principal.272 
Thereby, the question of instituting dedicated mechanisms to incentivize the agent 
to maximize their efforts in pursuing the principal’s agenda and better align its 
possibly heterogeneous preferences constitutes the overwhelming analytical focus of 
Principal-Agent research. The most of Principal-Agent accounts treat incentive 
incompatibility between the principal and the agent as “an inherent feature of their 
contracting relationships”.273 The challenge is to put in place such safeguards which 
would provide incentives for the agent to proactively pursue the principal’s 
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objectives and to align its preferences with those of the principal,274 and thereby 
minimize the possibility of agency loss on the principal’s side.275  
(i) The “conservative” Principal-Agent perspective 
The traditional and conservative perspective on Principal-Agent relations sees the 
agent as a “self-interest seeker with guile”276 who is apt to pursue their own agendas 
at the expense of the principal. The solution for this problem lies in the construction 
of adequate control mechanisms by the principal over the agent. The agent’s 
autonomy and the principal’s control are thus considered to be two sides of the same 
coin. Through the use of those mechanisms, the principal is expected to carry out 
regular compliance-checks on the agent’s performance and impose sanctions when 
the agent’s transgression has been detected. In particular, the so-called 
congressional school of dominance277 takes Principal-Agent-inspired thought to its 
outermost possible reaches and insists on setting up of a range of sophisticated 
monitoring devices, which include the development of ex ante and ex post control 
procedures by the principal.278 In this sense, the traditional Principal-Agent 
approach perceives the transfer of the responsibilities to the agent by the principal 
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and the assurance of the principal’s control over its agent as issues which are 
inextricably linked to each other.279 
On the one hand, the purpose of the ex-ante procedures is to make the expected 
course of action clearer to the agent by defining the scope and modalities of the 
agency (framing agreement). The ex-ante procedures may also fix general 
performance expectations, applicable procedural requirements to govern decision-
making in situations where the agency contract is insufficiently specified as well 
provide rulebooks and manuals which the agents is expected to follow. The ex-ante 
safeguards may be more or less restrictive and modified in response to the 
occurrence of agency loss by the principal or (also) by the third party like judicial or 
administrative authority. Such limitations come however at the cost of the agent’s 
flexibility and comprehensiveness of action.280 This, in turn, may diminish the 
agent’s overall capacity to achieve better outcomes within the agency contact.  
On the other hand, installing the ex-post procedures allows the principal to oversee 
the agent’s behaviour from a backward-looking perspective. They contribute to the 
reduction of the information asymmetry on the principal’s side, as well as influence 
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the agent through the imposition of positive and negative sanctions.281 The typology 
proposed by Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz distinguishes between two 
types of oversight mechanisms: “police-patrols” and “fire-alarms”.282  
By using the first group of mechanisms, the principal engages in continuous 
vigilance of the agent’s actions on its own. The principal’s aim is to “detect and 
remedy any violations of legislative goals, and by its surveillance, to discourage such 
violations”.283 Among the “police-patrols” one can list such monitoring measures as 
public hearings, field observations and inspections and regular reporting.284 It 
implies that they usually have a centralized, proactive and direct dimension.285 
However, these features make them also costly to activate and, as such, their full 
deployment may be problematic for the principal.  
Unlike the “police-patrols”, the second group of mechanisms is considered to have a 
decentralized, reactive and indirect dimension.286 By installing the “fire-alarms”, the 
principal monitors the agent’s activities through third parties, which may be citizens, 
media, markets, organized interest groups, other administrative authorities, or 
ultimately courts. From the principal’s perspective, the potential advantages of the 
“fire-alarms” are twofold: they would target specific violations possibly also affecting 
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the third party which allows for (partial) outsourcing of the monitoring costs to 
them.287  
As the “fire-alarm” mechanisms would only cover a specific subset of the agent’s 
action, it is likely that the agent’s transgressions outside of this subset would remain 
undetected by these oversight mechanisms.288 In addition, a political-legal 
environment in which a number of agencies which are assigned overlapping tasks is 
regarded as a particular variation of the “fire-alarms”.289 Such a setting creates a 
number of institutional checks which can be installed to ensure that although the 
principal does not directly control the agent, the agent nevertheless remains under 
control.290 
Positive (rewards) or negative (punishment) sanctions affect the agent’s behaviour 
by making compliance more beneficial and non-compliance more costly.291 By these 
means, the principal has the opportunity to incentivize the agent to follow the 
principal’s interests. Whereas the economic literature tends to focus on rewards, 
studies in political science stress sanctions.292 In this context, it should be noted that 
neither rewards nor sanctions necessarily take a pecuniary form. They can also be of 
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a non-pecuniary nature and entail positive (appraisals) or negative (naming-and-
shaming) effects on the agent’s reputation.293 Once the agent’s non-compliance has 
been detected, the principal may decide to impose negative sanctions on the 
agent.294 As political science scholarship suggests, typical sanctions would aim to 
rectify the agent’s compliance and prevent the reoccurrence of non-compliance. 
Sanctions potentially include such measures as agency reorganization (possibly 
limiting the agency contract), a decrease in funding, the adoption of new legislation 
(reshaping the agency contract), or challenging the agent in court.295  
The abovementioned insights suggest that the conservative Principal-Agent 
approach develops a rather “punitive” understanding of the principal which has at its 
disposal various centralized monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to cope with 
the agent’s non-compliance. However, the recourse to these mechanisms is not 
without costs for the principal. As noted by McNollgast,296 “not only the magnitude 
of sanctions for non-compliance is limited, but also create costs for political 
principals”.297 This may undermine the credibility of the principal’s commitment to 
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impose these sanctions vis-à-vis its agent and may give the agent the impression that 
non-compliance increases it welfare.298  
Another twist to the “punitive” principal model is added when the principal 
contracts more than one agent. As concluded by Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz, the agent gets extraordinary incentives to engage in non-compliance when 
it operates as a team of agents since the principal can only oversee the performance 
of the group as a whole.299 This problem is commonly referred to as free-riding.300 In 
such conditions, designing an optimal agency contract remains challenging. To 
establish and operate a kind of monitoring and sanctioning mechanism which would 
fully eliminate the potential of agency loss would be “either impossible or 
prohibitively costly”.301 In such an environment, the principal faces a difficult trade-
off: a potential agency loss against higher agency costs302 surrounded by the 
conditions of uncertainty, information asymmetry and incomplete contracting. 
Overall, the conservative Principal-Agent approach suggests that agents need not in 
fact be perfect proxies of their principals.303 
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(ii) The “liberal” Principal-Agent perspective 
More recent and more liberal perspectives on the Principal-Agent relations take note 
of an increasing interdependence between the principal and the agent, especially 
where the agent is a subset of the collective principal and effectively participates in 
the principal’s preference formation and decision-making.304 There might be also 
instances, in which the principal is more closely involved in the activities of the 
agent which may blur a distinction between the principal and agent.305 Furthermore, 
in environments characterized high interdependence and policy-making complexity, 
inherent information asymmetry and incompleteness of the agency contacts is not 
only detrimental for the principal, but may also for the agent.306 There is no real 
incentive for the agent to cheat on the agreement,307 especially where the principal 
and the agent cannot manage these complexities properly without soliciting 
resources from one another.308  
In those specific contexts, lower levels of the agent’s compliance with the 
preferences and objectives of its principal might not be the result of their deliberate 
choice to pursue their particular preferences, but stem from the complexity their 
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(still incomplete) agency contract.309 This renders the contract ambiguous and open 
for different (possibly even equally plausible) interpretations, both by the principal 
and agent.310 Additionally, where agency contracts are highly elaborated, decreasing 
compliance levels may also result from the agents’ limited capacities (expertise, 
manpower, technology) to carry out complex tasks for their principals.311 One may 
therefore concede that in those settings non-compliance may also the result of 
inadvertence since the agents may take sincerely intended actions and expect to 
follow the agency contract as an explicit calculation of costs and benefits for every 
decision on whether to comply or not is itself costly312, but nonetheless fail to meet 
the principal’s expectations.313 
Under such conditions, the principals are likely to base their behaviour on a 
combination of both rational anticipation, trust and the desire for consensus by 
deciding to engage in close cooperation with their agents rather than control.314 
Similarly, the agents may also opt for closer cooperation with their principals. 
Reducing the informational advantage over the principal is in their strategic interest 
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and it enhances their own ability to “adapt to the respective context”.315 Thus, it 
follows that both the principal and agent may have incentives to cooperate mutually 
in order to reduce information asymmetries and generate the consensus as to what 
constitutes the compliance. 
To exploit the agent’s apparent interest in mutual collaboration, the principal - as a 
rationally-bounded actor - is therefore expected to establish by routine, non-
confrontational and informal processes involving the participation the agents, for 
example with the aim to foster a “problem-solving approach”.316 In particular, the 
principal would expected to develop “carrot” strategies to induce the levels of the 
agents’ compliance,317 which could include technical assistance and know-how (i.a. 
sharing of best practices)318 necessary for the fulfillment of their contractual 
obligations.319  
The above overview of the main features of the Principal-Agent framework reveals 
the existence of a correlation between the theoretical pillars underpinning two main 
schools of compliance introduced in section 2.2 of chapter two320 and two Principal-
Agent perspectives discussed in this section. On the one hand, the traditional and 
conservative perspective on Principal-Agent relations fits neatly into the 
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underpinnings of the enforcement school of compliance. On the other hand, the 
recent and more liberal perspectives on Principal-Agent relations are closely linked 
to the main tenants of the management school of compliance. This indicates that the 
emergence of more cooperative, egalitarian and horizontal relations between 
political actors does not necessarily render the application of the Principal-Agent 
framework to the analysis of such phenomena, but requires a relaxation of its initial 
assumptions. It confirms the utility of the Principal-Agent framework a rather 
heuristic tool, which can be “applied liberally”, in the same time needs to be 
“handled with care”.321 As observed by Jonas Tallberg, in real life both enforcement 
and management paths to compliance are “complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, not discrete alternatives”.322 Similarly, in a Principal-Agent situation, it is 
not only instrumental for the principal to formally monitor and sanction its agents 
where necessary, but also it is equally important to engage into informal cooperation 
with them.323 
 
Figure 6 Analytical tools for the inquiry on the operational design of the SSM 
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5.3. Review of Principal-Agent applications to study of inter-
institutional relations 
This section offers a brief detour on the most relevant applications of the Principal-
Agent framework to the studies of inter-institutional contexts324 where one unit of 
public administration (the principal) relies on other unit of public administration 
(the agent) to carry out certain delegated administrative activities in order to achieve 
certain public policy objectives as favoured by the latter. This usually takes form of 
delegation of tasks responsibilities and authority, either explicit or implicit. In 
principle, one can distinguish three clusters of Principal-Agent analysis in such 
politico-administrative contexts.  
The first one focuses on the relations between the majoritarian bodies,325 which are 
either directly elected or are managed by elected policy-makers, and various 
independent regulatory agencies operating within the boundaries of the nation 
state.326 The second one can be regarded as extending the focus of the Principal-
Agent research one step further to cover the intricacies of transfer public authority 
to supranational and international institutions, bodies and fora by sovereign states. 
In those Principal-Agent studies, the development of regimes transcending 
boundaries of nation states is considered to be “the next step of delegation” 
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characterized by delegation from multiple (Member-State) principals.327 Finally, a 
recently inaugurated, third cluster of the Principal-Agent studies aims to address the 
complexities of policy-making in an increasingly globalized environment by drawing 
Principal-Agent relations in inter-institutional context, where supranational bodies 
take recourse to other technocratic bodies (located at national or supranational 
level) to carry out responsibilities delegated to them by majoritarian actors; or to 
(further) sub delegate to other party parts of these delegated responsibilities. 
5.3.1. Relations between majoritarian and non-majoritarian actors in national 
contexts  
With respect to this cluster of Principal-Agent applications, the earliest prominent 
works are linked to American rational choice institutionalist school focusing on the 
modalities of vertical interactions between the US Congress, considered as 
representation of elected policymakers, and non-elected federal bureaucratic 
agencies and offices. The issues concerning the emancipation of the federal 
administration from the control of its “customers”, the legislature and government 
were explored by Anthony Downs328 and William Niskanen329 already in the late 
1960s and 1970s, however without the explicit references to Principal-Agent 
relationships. They challenged the basic assumptions of the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy acting as the trustee and guardian of legal and professional rules. 
Instead they perceived the bureaucratic actors as utility maximizers who aim, in 
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particular, to maximize the budgets of their bureaus. The main question was 
whether the principals can indeed manage to assume control. It was also observed 
that the US Congress might have not been necessarily good at minding its own 
interests when deciding to institute bureaucratic bodies with such a great room for 
maneuver.330 Lack of control might ultimately result in so-called “bureaucratic drift” 
illustrating a discrepancy between the principal and agent’s ultimate objectives. 
The concept of a “bureaucratic drift”331, seen as a variation of agency loss, has become 
one of the main building blocks of the Principal-Agent studies in the US context. It 
revealed that the US Congress had reached a point of abdicating its responsibilities 
to govern by proliferating the creation of one new bureaucracy after another, 
mandating them no more than to “go forth and do good”.332 This research trend was 
followed by the pioneering works of Kenneth Shepsle challenging the traditional 
view of an impotent US Congress unable to control its technocratic agents which 
was further reinforced by the approach which subsequently came to be called the 
congressional school of dominance.333 The main research question the school poses 
is how the US Congress can assert control over its bureaucratic agents. In particular, 
the school offers a very penetrating interpretation of the range of instruments 
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available to the Congress to influence choices made by bureaucratic agencies.334 As 
already discussed, Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz distinguish two types 
of monitoring tools: centralized “police patrols” and decentralized “fire alarms”335 
which can be adopted by the principal (the Congress). In the latter case, the 
Congress surveillance over its bureaucratic agencies may take an indirect form where 
the third parties monitor their performance in liaison with the Congress. However, 
as Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins indicate such “fire-alarms” can be only 
useful when they are considered as credible.336 
There exists also a group of American political scientists which extends the 
Principal-Agent analysis beyond the traditional legislative-bureaucratic dynamics. 
For instance, John Ferejohn explores the relationship between the Congress and the 
courts.337 Sean Gailmard and John Patty are not only interested in the relations 
between the Congress and bureaucracy, but also between the President and 
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bureaucracy.338 Interestingly, they structure the Principal-Agent relationship in 
terms of accountability which brings a new valuable insight to the agency literature. 
For them public accountability becomes a function of the capabilities of principals to 
judge the performance of their agents.339 All these contributions have stimulated a 
lively debate about the capacity of the Congress to exert control over its bureaucratic 
agencies and indicate that the research on legislative and executive relations with 
public administration seems to constitute the singularly most important application 
of the Principal-Agent framework in the American legal-political science scholarship. 
In European context, the creation of independent and specialized administrative 
agencies operating in many European countries beyond the control of majoritarian 
institutions gave further impetus to the development of the Principal-Agent 
analysis.340 This phenomenon was captured by Giandomenico Majone’s concept of 
the emergent “regulatory state”, which in response to the challenges resulting from 
complex socio-economic realities of the modern world increasingly engages in 
regulatory activities.341 In research on “regulatory state”, two broad groups of 
independent administrative authorities exercising delegated public authority can be 
essentially distinguished.  
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The first comprises of utility (“economic-welfare”) regulators tasked with preventing 
unfair competition, such as anti-trust authorities and telecommunications, 
electricity, consumer protection, financial services supervisors. The second can be 
regarded as “social-welfare” regulators pursuing other objectives than competition 
such as environment, water, food and work safety, human rights protection and 
equality. These agencies effectively enjoy a semi-detached status342 and often operate 
at „arm’s length from elected politicians”.343 They are usually vested with a plethora 
of competences (supervisory, regulatory and executive)344 to the extent that some 
authors have started to refer to them as the “fourth branch of government”.345  
Although a political choice to establish independent agencies may be somewhat 
puzzling since it is in the principal’s interest to ensure that his agent does not engage 
in a form of bureaucratic drift, this type of institutional design has long been 
justified by the argument that complex areas of public policy are best governed by 
administrative technocratic authorities insulated from short-term political 
influence.346 Among the benefits of delegation which the elected policymakers can 
reap, one can mention: minimizing transaction costs, resolving credible 
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commitment issues, avoiding market failure, overcoming informational asymmetries 
in technical areas of governance, enhancing efficiency in policy-making, locking in 
“distributional” benefits as well as shifting blame for unpopular decisions.347 
On the one hand, these benefits can only be realized when principals grant 
discretion to their agents by means of sharing some of their constitutional authority. 
On the other hand, the principles of constitutional democracy demand that such 
authority-sharing with non-majoritarian units, whose decisions might be politically 
salient and entail a redistributive effect, is accompanied by a clear system of controls 
over an independent agency to hold it accountable for deviating from its 
objectives.348  
Therefore, the issue of delegating just the right amount of authority without the 
necessity to exceedingly limit the agent’s discretion remains the main focus of the 
Principal-Agent analyses applied to the study of independent regulatory and 
administrative agencies. For the Principal-Agent analysis, the agent should not be 
fully controlled as it would diminish the benefits of delegation, but nevertheless the 
agent should remain under a degree of control in order to prevent it becoming an 
uncontrollable “center of arbitrary power”.349 This only confirms one of key 
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assumptions of the Principal-Agent literature that political principals tend to rely 
more on decentralized fire-alarm controls than on centralized police-patrol controls 
when it comes to monitoring their agents.350 
Against this backdrop, it may be worth pointing out at a sample of important 
comparative works in the area of political science and economy. In particular, Mark 
Thatcher and Fabrizio Gilardi successfully applied the Principal-Agent framework to 
explain delegation across sectors in a number of European countries using a 
comparative approach. One of Thatcher’s analyses covering the functioning of 
various independent regulators in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy 
demonstrates that the elected policy-makers as the principals do not tend to use 
their control mechanisms over their agents to limit agency loss.351 These are 
interesting findings in light of what the traditional Principal-Agent accounts are 
likely to suggest. Using the Principal-Agent models, Gilardi has made an important 
contribution to the study of the formal independence of regulatory authorities by 
refining an “independence index”,352 previously elaborated by scholars measuring 
that of central banks.353 
Given the research focus of this study, it is worth mentioning that national variations 
of monetary and banking supervision policies have been also subject to the 
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Principal-Agent analysis. In central banking literature (both of European and 
American origin), they however largely represent economic accounts which are 
mostly notably related to the so-called time inconsistency problem in monetary 
policy. The seminal applications of the Principal-Agent insights to central banking 
come from Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers who champion the idea of 
designing an optimal incentive scheme by the political principals for the monetary 
agent which solves the time-inconsistency problem on the one hand, while full 
flexibility is retained on the other.354 In the same way, Torsten Persson and Guido 
Tabellini borrow the assumptions of the agency contract theory to develop a 
targeting monetary policy approach, in which the political principals of the central 
bank impose an explicit inflation target and make the central bank leadership 
(agent) explicitly accountable for its success in meeting this target.355 This approach 
is followed by Carl Walsh, who applies the Principal-Agent toolbox to determine 
how a central banker's incentives as of a contracted agent should be structured to 
induce the socially optimal policy.356 Michelle Fratiani et al. find out that central 
bank independence and performance contracts are the best solutions to cope with 
the inflation and stabilization bias regarded as an agency problem.357 More generally, 
Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne accept insights from the agency theory to 
explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent 
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and delegates monetary policy tasks to an independent central bank.358 Using the 
same Principal-Agent device, Alan Blinder suggests that the potential principal 
(legislature or government) may however be lacking the incentive to enforce the 
agency contract.359 This stance is followed in works of Benett McCallum who argues 
that delegation by a Principal-Agent contract fails to eliminate, but merely relocates 
the time-inconsistency problem.360 
In realm of banking supervision, the Principal-Agent studies are less common but 
still existent. Among the significant contributions one can find the following. Martin 
Schüler conducts a Principal-Agent analysis of the incentive problems of the bank 
supervisors acting as agents of national taxpayers.361 This approach is followed by the 
very recent and already mentioned study by Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and 
Robert Marquez.362 In a series of political economy contributions, Donato 
Masciandaro uses insights from the Principal-Agent literature to explain the policy-
makers choices on the institutional design of bank supervision in the EU and around 
the world.363 Together with Maria Nieto and Henriette Priast he also offers a 
Principal-Agent perspective on the financing of banking supervision where the 
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taxpayers act as the principal and the banking supervisory authority as the agent.364 
Finally, together with Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, he also takes recourse to the Principal-
Agent tools when addressing the degree of consolidation of powers in financial 
supervision.365  
5.3.2. Relations between national and supranational/international actors 
Developments in of European integration can be regarded as a research area where 
this cluster of the Principal-Agent analysis has been applied more extensively to 
explain the functioning of international regimes. In particular, the issues related to 
organization of competences transferred vertically to the Union, not by single but 
multiple Member State-principals has been a long-lasting focus on scholars looking 
at the EU through these analytical lenses. At the risk of oversimplification, the main 
reasons for this can be explained by two of the following factors. 
Firstly, for a long time EU institutions were not among the top priorities in the EU 
studies research agenda. As James Caporaso and John Keeler note, “despite the 
seeming importance of the EC’s (EU’s) institutional components, with few 
exceptions institutions have played a scant role theoretically in accounts of European 
integration”.366 Yet, with EU institutions gaining new competences in an increasing 
number of policy domains, over time the focus of EU studies has also naturally 
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shifted to them.367 Secondly, as more and more scholars have become convinced that 
the phenomenon of European integration may be successfully explained and 
understood by analytical tools offered by general political science scholarship,368 and 
especially its rational choice accounts, the demand for the analytical methods 
offered by this family has increased. 
Among the earliest relevant works on European integration which employed the 
Principal-Agent approach supported by the insights coming from the theory of 
contracts, was the analysis of the EU’s legal system and the role of the Court of 
Justice of European Union (CJEU) conducted by Geoffrey Garrett and Barry 
Weingast.369 The Principal-Agent studies on the Union’s legal order are 
supplemented by a historical perspective offered by Karen Alter, Alec Stone Sweet, 
James Caporaso and Bernadette Kilroy on the CJEU’s centripetal role in the context 
of European integration.370 The European Parliament’s role as the agenda setter was 
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also scrutinized through the Principal-Agent lens in a series of publications released 
by George Tsebelis and his fellows.371  
In parallel, Andrew Moravscik’s comprehensive accounts on liberal 
intergovernmentalism cross-fertilize the Principal-Agent logic of European 
integration which can be used to encompass all instances where EU Member States 
decide to delegate sovereign competences to the supranational level.372 He clarifies 
that “delegating sovereignty establishes a Principal-Agent relationship between 
member state governments (multiple principals) and supranational officials, judges 
and representatives (multiple agents)”.373 For Moravcsik however, this phenomenon 
is a reflection of the member states’ interests which operate under the conditions of 
economic interdependence and, as such, constitutes the basis for his 
intergovernmentalist approach.374 
In additional to this work, the Principal-Agent approach to the study of European 
integration gained further momentum with Mark Pollack’s work on the European 
Commission and its uneasy relations with its member-state principals in a series of 
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highly influential contributions.375 His works stand out as truly pioneering as he 
clearly demonstrates that the Principal-Agent toolbox, as developed by the finest 
theorists of the congressional school of dominance, serves well to explain the scope 
of supranational influence. He also demonstrates an open-ended nature of the 
Principal-Agent framework which moves beyond the concurring interpretations of 
traditional intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism regarding the scope of 
supranational autonomy and influence.376  
Another wave of supranational Principal-Agent applications is related to the studies 
of different aspects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this regard, it has 
been employed to analyze the supranational position of the European Central Bank 
by Robert Elgie and Dermot Hodson.377 Elgie adopts a Principal-Agent model to 
analyze the relations between euro area Member States and the European Central 
Bank, with the focus on how the ECB ensures the Euro Area’s policy choices in 
monetary affairs. Hodson uses the tools of the Principal-Agent approach to better 
understand the ECB’s position as a sui generis supranational actor that is reluctant to 
embrace a pro-integrationist approach. More recently, David Howarth and Anna-
Lena Högenauer use the Principal-Agent framework to support their analysis of the 
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democratic implications of the ECB’s unorthodox monetary policies adopted since 
2010.378  
The study of international regimes other than the European Union is another 
academic venue where Principal-Agent models have been widely applied and where 
the issue of control has been also identified the main principal’s problem. As Roland 
Vaubel points out, international organizations and fora are however special and may 
suffer more from agency problems since the chain of delegation is more extended in 
their case.379 Therefore, the extent of member-state control over international 
organizations and fora and its variation remain the focal point of a comparative 
Principal-Agent analysis in the emblematic book edited by Darren Hawkins, David 
Lake and Daniel Nielson.380 
Furthermore, there exists also a range of sophisticated contributions targeting a 
plethora of very specific international contexts. In this regard, Manfred Elsig analyses 
the WTO within a principal–agent framework by focusing on the relationship 
between contracting parties’ representatives and the WTO Secretariat.381 Merih 
Agnin uses the same framework to analyze the functioning of the International 
Monetary Fund, and in particular the impact of the relations between the IMF 
Executive Board and IMF staff and those between the IMF staff and borrower 
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country on the loan features.382 Laurence Helfer and Timothy Mayer look through 
Principal-Agent lens at the International Law Commission’s attempts to codify and 
progressively develop international law.383 
Using some of the Principal-Agent tools to supplement their constructivist analysis, 
David Howarth and Tal Sadeh trace the emancipation of the OECD's Committee on 
Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) from its member-state 
principals’ control.384 Manuela Moschella explores the key institutional features of 
the Financial Stability Board and finds out that the Principal-Agent model does not 
necessarily explain the scope of discretion assigned to this body and its 
membership.385 Finally, Yf Reykers and Niels Smeets go so far as to apply a Principal-
Agent framework to the analysis of the Russian important vote abstentions in the 
UN Security Council.386 
Despite concentrating on the different stages of delegation, the fundamental claim of 
the Principal-Agent analysis holds also for its European applications, both in 
national and supranational contexts: delegation tends to be accompanied by certain 
control mechanisms, whether direct or indirect, aiming to reduce agency loss for 
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principals.387 Viewed in this light, it seems that the Principal-Agent framework has a 
potential to offer fruitful comparative and empirical analyses of European public 
policies. 
5.3.3. Relations between non-majoritarian actors exercising attributed tasks and 
competences in an increasingly globalized environment 
The third cluster of Principal-Agent applications concerns the modalities of intra-
institutional relations between non-majoritarian actors. These contributions have 
been largely developed in the context of intricacies governing the functioning of EU 
administrative machinery. In this regard, one can distinguish (reversed) vertical and 
horizontal contexts.  
In the (reversed) vertical context, Principal-Agent relations have been constructed 
between an EU supranational agent as the principal; and EU Member States’ 
administrative structures necessary for the implementation of Union policies as the 
agents. By reversing the Principal-Agent dynamics from the supranational to the 
national level, these contributions constitute one of few exceptions to the usual 
treatment of the member state governments as the (collective) principal and a unit 
of Union administration as its agent. In this case, EU Member States largo sensu 
would therefore operate as domestic agents of supranational principals. This peculiar 
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situation gives rise to specific Principal-Agent problems which however are still 
massively under-researched.388  
Among pioneering works applying the reversed Principal-Agent approach in this 
constellation, one ought to highlight pioneering contributions of Jonas Tallberg who 
almost twenty years ago developed a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model to capture 
the relations between the Member State governments (multiple principals), the 
Commission and the Court (supervisors) and individual member states (multiple 
agents) in the area of EU law enforcement.389 Later, the reversed Principal-Agent 
models have also become widely applied in the field of studies on EU economic 
governance. Notably, Ludger Schknecht used to get better understanding of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) understood as an agency contract between the 
ECOFIN as the collective principal and individual Member States as its agents.390 
Waltraud Schelkle looks at EU fiscal policy coordination similarly and treats national 
governments the agents of the ECOFIN.391 In the same way, the EU-Member State 
relations under the “E” pillar of the EMU are the focus of the Principal-Agent 
analysis of the SGP reform and the Lisbon Strategy implementation undertaken by 
Dermot Hodson who perceives the infringements of the EMU rules on fiscal 
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discipline as an example of the agency loss on the EU’s (principal) side.392 James 
Savage accepts insights from the Principal-Agent framework to analyze the politics 
of asymmetric information in the so-called European Semester by looking at the 
collection of budgetary and economic statistics.393  
More recently, Jakub Gren, Dawid Howarth and Lucia Quaglia have applied the 
Principal-Agent approach to shed some light on the ECB’s political control over 
national supervisors in the newly created Single Supervisory Mechanism. 394 In the 
same fashion, but from an economic perspective, Elena Carletti, Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia and Robert Marquez analyze incentives for the local supervisors (the 
agents) to submit supervisory information to the central supervisory agency (the 
principal) within the centralized supervisory regime set out in the Banking Union.395 
Interestingly, they found out that the local supervisor’s incentives to collect 
information decreases relative to when it operates interdependently: that means 
outside of the Banking Union. Similarly, Tobias Tröger argues from a legal-
institutional perspective that national supervisors may not necessarily always follow 
the supervisory policies defined by the ECB in a hub-and-spokes setting of the 
                                                          
392
 See Dermot Hodson, ‘Reforming EU economic governance: A view from (and on) the principal-agent 
approach’, Comparative European Politics 7, no. 4 (2009): pp. 455–475. 
393
 See David Howarth and John Savage, Enforcing the European Semester: The Politics of Asymmetric Information 
in the Excessive Deficit and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedures, SGEU ECPR Conference (June). 
394
 See David Howarth, Lucia Quaglia, and Jakub Gren, ‘Supranational banking supervision in Europe: The 
construction of a credible watchdog’, Journal of Common Market Studies 53, s1 (2015): pp. 181–199. 
395
 See Carletti, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, ‘Supervisory incentives in a banking union’ (above, n.362). 
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SSM.396 The analysis of legal fragilities embedded in the SSM’s multilevel design by 
Giorgio Monti and Ann Petit Christy appears to corroborate his findings. 397 
In the horizontal context, Principal-Agent relations have been drawn between EU 
actors located at the same level. In particular, EU’s external policies and 
international negotiations can be highlighted as a prominent area for its application. 
This group is however characterized by a specific peculiarity: the authors tend to 
relax the basic, conservative Principal-Agent assumptions and offer to perceive the 
dynamics between the principal and agent in terms of cooperation. As they suggest, 
the most recent evidence “refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of 
delegation and discretion in the EU”.398 
Tom Delreux applies a “liberal” Principal-Agent model to better understand the EU’s 
participation in international environmental negotiations and finds convincing 
evidence that it is not only characterized by informational benefits favouring the 
agents (as the orthodox accounts would suggest), but also by informational benefits 
for the principals.399 By applying the Principal-Agent framework supported by some 
insights from resource dependence theory, Bart Kerremans and Evelyn Corremans 
suggests that the agents may decide to reduce their informational advantage over 
the principal and choose proactive cooperation when operating in environments 
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 See Tobias H. Tröger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary 
Assessment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’, European 
Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 15, no. 4 (2014): pp. 449–497. 
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solutions, Ademu Working Paper Series WP 2016/016 (2016). 
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 See Delreux, The EU as international environmental negotiator (above, n. 314), chapter three. 
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characterized by informality such as EU’s international trade negotiations.400 When 
discussing the functioning of the European External Action Service, Hylke Dijkstra 
looks at situations where delegation of tasks is non-exclusive and the principal 
retains some decision-making competences constitute a challenge for the overall 
rationale for delegation and the hierarchical relationship between principals and 
agents. He also doubts whether in such a context EU diplomats are capable of 
building up information surpluses, thus challenging the more typical assumptions 
regarding information asymmetries of the Principal-Agent approach.401 
                                                          
400
 See Coremans and Kerremans, ‘Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making’ 
(above, n. 306). 
401
 See Hylke Dijkstra, ‘Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service’, edited by Tom Delreux 
and Johan Adriaensen. In The Principal Agent Model and the European Union (Cham: Springer International 
Publishing, 2017), pp. 55-81.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Organisational design of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
6.1. Introductory remarks 
This chapter analyses the organisational design of multilevel supervisory subsystems 
pertaining to the SSM with a view to determine the systemic position of the higher 
level actor – the ECB (supervisory apparatus) and its corresponding shadow of 
hierarchy therein. This exercise constitutes the first phase of testing of the 
Enforcement and Management hypotheses on the formal top-down compliance 
expectation in the subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision.  
The analysis will be conducted on the basis of the analytical criteria set in section 
three of chapter four (II.4.3) which include: the constitutional foundations of the 
SSM (section two, III.6.2); the distribution of supervisory responsibilities within the 
SSM (section three, III.6.3); the modalities of administrative interactions between 
the higher and lower level actors within the SSM as regards the conduct of 
operational supervision (section four, III6.4) and the territorial applicability of the 
SSM (section five, III.6.5).402 Section six presents the outcomes of the analysis and 
classifies respective SSM supervisory subsystems as reflecting one of the models of 
EU administration (section six, III.6.6) as identified in section four of chapter four 
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 The analytical tools provided in chapter four (the Principal-Agent framework) will not be used to investigate 
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(II.4.4.). This exercise will provide insights into the structure of the first condition 
which is expected to affect the formal top-down compliance expectations within the 
SSM and will feed into the analysis of the operational design of the SSM which forms 
the second phase of testing of the Enforcement and Management hypotheses. In that 
phase, the analysis will focus on the credibility of the formal control and cooperation 
capacity of ECB-based supervisory apparatus (seen as the principal) in respect of 
NCA-based supervisory apparatus (seen as the agent) by means of the application of 
the Principal-Agent framework to the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision.  
6.2. Constitutional foundations of the SSM 
In line with the model delineated in chapter three, the constitutional foundations of 
an administrative arrangement are considered to be the first element which is 
regarded instrumental in characterizing its nature. The SSM, as an EU administrative 
arrangement, was founded on a direct constitutional mandate provided by the 
Treaties. The enabling clause (also referred to as the “sleeping beauty clause”,403 or 
the “last resort clause”404) encapsulated in Article 127(6) of the TFEU allows for the 
establishment of a supranational regulatory regime for prudential supervision. By 
activating this clause, the Union “can endow the ECB with bank supervisory tasks of 
                                                          
403
 See Christos Gortsos, The ‘single supervisory mechanism’: a major building block towards a European Banking 
Union (the full Europeanisation of the ‘bank safety net’), Working Paper Series No 8/2013 (June) (ECEFIL, 2013). 
404
 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and banking supervision, Lecture by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Member 
of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank at the London School of Economics, Financial Markets 
Group on 24 February 1999  
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its own through rather than swift, although weighty legislative action”,405 and 
authorize supranational interference into national constitutional orders. The 
activation of this clause alters the basic constitutional distribution of competences 
between the Union and its Member States laid down by Articles 3-6 of the TFEU 
underpinned by the principle of conferral of powers, enshrined in the Article 5(2) of 
the TEU.406 
According to the Article 127(6) of the TFEU, “the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and 
after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer 
specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the 
exception of insurance undertakings”.  
Although this provision appears to be somewhat vague and open-ended as it refers 
to “conferring tasks (…) concerning policies relating to prudential supervision (…)”, it 
is nevertheless widely considered as a sound constitutional basis which allows the 
ECB to carry out activities (“tasks”), provided that these are connected to, or 
stemming from prudential policies.407 In this respect, it was argued that the 
                                                          
405
 See René Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional aspects, International banking and finance law series 
v.5 (The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 357. 
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 It states that the „Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties to obtain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties shall remain with the Member States. It should be read in conjunction with the Article 4(1) of the TEU 
which stipulates that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
State”. 
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 See Tröger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary 
Assessment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’ (above, n.396); 
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reference to “policies” was introduced to limit the possibilities to engage the ECB in 
actual day-to-day supervision.408 However, these arguments are not universally 
shared since the potential involvement of the ECB in areas of public policies other 
than monetary policy has been fiercely disputed since the creation of the EMU. The 
first time, when an EU-wide discussion on the scope of the ECB’s banking 
supervisory mandate took place, was in the context of preparatory work on the 
Maastricht Treaty and the framework for a future Economic and Monetary Union. 
There were two major camps in this debate.  
On the one side, many national central bank governors were in favor of attributing 
to the ECB responsibilities in the field of banking supervision. At that time, 
significant involvement of central banks in various operational tasks related to 
banking supervision was also the national supervisory model present in the large 
majority of EU Member States in the late 1980s and early 1990s. That predominant 
model followed the traditional understanding of central bank’s mandate as not only 
preserving price stability, but also ensuring sound banking.409 Consequently, the 
initial proposal presented by the Committee of Governors in 1990 explicitly 
designated the prospective monetary authority of the Union (the ECB) as one of 
competent supervisory authorities. The Governors’ proposal envisaged that “the ECB 
may formulate, interpret and implement policies relating to the prudential supervision 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or'SSM', Part One of the Banking Union’, National Bank of 
Belgium Working Paper, no. 255 (2014). 
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 Ibid., p. 18. 
409
 See Vera Constance Smith, The rationale of central banking (PS King London, 1936). 
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of credit and other financial institutions for which it is designated as competent 
authority.”410  
The attribution of supervisory functions to the ECB was opposed by Member State 
governments, some banking supervisors, the Bundesbank as well as some 
academics.411 Mario Sarcinelli expressed a view that the merits of entrusting bank 
supervision as among statutory tasks to a newly created monetary authority “should 
be carefully examined, because, while the activity is globalizing, supervisory 
responsibilities risk remaining fragmented and creating externalities to the 
detriment of this or that national supervisory system”.412 Otmar Issing, an influential 
economist based in the Bundesbank at the time and later the ECB’s chief economist, 
continuously advocated for a “clear and limited mandate” of price stability for a new 
EU monetary authority,413 and strongly opposed attributing it banking supervisory 
“because of potential conflicts with monetary policy, and the dangers of being 
involved in politics”.414 Under his tenure at the ECB, this view was also a dominant 
ECB stance. The ECB argued that “the introduction of the euro has implied an 
institutional separation of monetary jurisdiction (the euro area) and supervisory 
                                                          
410
 See Draft text proposed by the Committee of Governors transmitted to the President of the ECOFIN Council 
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http://safe-frankfurt.de/uploads/media/House_of_Lords_Hearing_Issing_Krahnen.pdf, accessed 01 December 
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jurisdiction (domestic institutions and markets)”.415 Nineteen years later, a similar 
approach was also taken in the “De Larosière Report” which presented six arguments 
against transferring banking supervision to the ECB.416 
Finally, as a result of intensive negotiations between Member States, it was agreed 
that banking supervision should not belong to the basic tasks of the ECB and its 
involvement was reduced to the advisory function.417 In the realm of banking 
supervision, the ECB would exercise an ancillary role by “contributing” to 
supervision by other (national) authorities.418 It was reported that at the personal 
insistence of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa,419 it was however decided that a transfer of 
bank supervisory competences to the ECB level should not be blocked in the future 
in case “the interaction between the Eurosystem and national supervisory authorities 
turned out not to work effectively”.420 This arrangement was incorporated in Article 
103 of the TEC (that became Article 127(6) of the TFEU as a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty reform), notably without recourse to the burdensome (ordinary) Treaty 
amendment procedure laid down in Article 48 of the TUE.421  
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In 2012, political agreement was reached on the need to elevate the responsibility for 
banking supervision to the European level. Despite the existence of alternative 
constitutional bases for the creation of supranational structures governing EU 
financial supervision, it was decided to resort to the “sleeping beauty clause” 
encapsulated in Article 127(6) of the TFEU which explicitly authorizes the conferral 
of Member States’ supervisory competences upon the Union, but limits the 
institutional choice exclusively to the ECB.  
Among other constitutional possibilities allowing creating new EU supervisory 
regime one can point out at a possible recourse to indirect Treaty basis in the form 
encapsulated in Article 114 of the TFEU (“internal market clause”).  This option was 
however ruled out since adoption of individual supervisory measures may entail 
elements of policy judgment going far beyond a mere legal or technical assessment 
of facts based on objective criteria and therefore would be prohibited in the light of 
the “Meroni Doctrine”. 
To set the SSM in motion, a special act of general application (SSM Regulation,)422 
which rests on the constitutional authorisation provided by Article 127(6) of TFEU, 
was adopted by the Council. It confers upon the ECB a number of “specific tasks 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a 
view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability 
                                                          
422
 See ‘Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions: SSM Regulation’ 
(above, n. 72). 
150 
 
of the financial system within the Union (…)”.423 Since Article 127(6) of the TFEU 
solely regulates procedural aspects related to the conferral of banking supervisory 
competences upon the ECB, substantive aspects of the conferral had to be set out by 
a Council legal act. In this sense, the SSM Regulation can be regarded as a basic act 
of the new supranational supervisory regime, which is at the top of legal framework 
governing the SSM and which provides a “constitutional” basis for the adoption of 
subsequent legal instruments regulating the functioning of the SSM administrative 
system, such as inter alia already mentioned the SSM Framework Regulation,424 the 
ECB Regulation ECB/2015/13,425 or the ECB Regulation ECB/2016/4.426 
The SSM Regulation, although forming a single act of Union law, does not however 
establish a single administrative arrangement. As pointed out above, the SSM 
supervisory framework exhibits a deeply pluralistic nature and distinguishes two 
distinct administrative arrangements.427 The first one, the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision, applies to these credit institutions which are considered as significant in 
accordance with the specific quantitative and qualitative criteria (“significance 
criteria”). Those criteria include: (i) size,428 (ii) economic importance,429 (iii) 
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151 
 
significance of cross-border activities,430 (iv) receiving public financial assistance,431 
and (v) being among the three most important banks in local jurisdiction.432 The 
second arrangement, the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, applies to those 
credit institutions which do not fulfill one of the significance criteria and are 
therefore considered as less significant.433 
6.3. Allocation of supervisory responsibilities within the SSM 
The second element that is instrumental in the analysis of the organisational design 
of EU multilevel administration concerns the internal allocation of administrative 
responsibilities between the higher and lower level actors. To generate particular 
legal consequences upon an individual that result from the pursuit of particular 
administrative tasks, an organ of a public administration needs to be attributed a 
corresponding competence to do so. In the EU context, the question related to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
participating Member State of establishment exceeding 20 %, unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 
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 According to the methodology provided in the Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation, this criterion is understood 
as importance for the economy of the Union or any participating Member State. 
430
 According to the methodology provided in the Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB may also, on its 
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obligation for the ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation in respect of the three most 
significant credit institutions in each of the participating Member States, unless justified by particular 
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 See Article 6(7) of the SSM Regulation: (…) national competent authorities shall carry out and be responsible 
for the tasks referred to in points (b), (d) to (g) and (i) of Article 4(1) and adopting all relevant supervisory 
decisions with regard to the credit institutions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 4 of this Article, 
within the framework and subject to the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article. 
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distribution of tasks and competences becomes even more relevant since it sets the 
extent, to which traditional Westphalian state administrative monopoly to influence 
legal status of an individual within their territory may be limited or complemented 
by administrative activities of supranational regulatory structures. 
6.3.1. The exercise of administrative tasks in the SSM 
Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, administrative responsibilities of public 
administration are related to a specific area of public policy: “prudential supervision 
of credit institutions”.434 The SSM Regulation contains however no definition of what 
“prudential supervision” entails. Instead, it includes a list of key prudential 
supervisory tasks that may be considered as the core activity of any prudential 
supervisor.435 According to Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation, the following (micro-
prudential) supervisory tasks have been conferred upon the ECB (“SSM supervisory 
tasks”): 
(1) Granting and withdrawal of authorisation of a credit institution;436 
(2) Supervision of cross-border entities;437 
(3) Assessment of changes in the shareholder structure of supervised 
entities;438 
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 See Article 1 of the SSM Regulation: This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (…)”. 
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 See; Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or'SSM', Part One of the Banking Union’ (above, n. 407), 
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 See Article 4(1)(a) of the SSM Regulation: to authorize credit institutions and to withdraw authorizations of 
credit institutions subject to Article 14. This task stems from the Articles 8-18 and 21 of the CRDIV. 
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 See Article 4(1)(b) of the SSM Regulation: for credit institutions established in a participating Member State, 
which wish to establish a branch or provide cross border services in a non-participating Member State, to carry 
out the tasks which the competent authority of the home Member State shall have under the relevant Union law. 
This task stems from the Articles 35 and 39 of the CRDIV. 
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(4) Ensuring the compliance of supervised entities with key micro-prudential 
requirements;439 
(5) Ensuring the compliance of supervised entities with other micro-
prudential requirements;440 
(6) Conduct of supervisory reviews (“Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Processes”, SREPs) and stress tests on supervisees;441 
(7) Supervision of banking groups on a consolidated basis;442 
(8) Supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates;443 
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 See Article 4(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation: to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying 
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management of credit institutions, risk management processes, internal control mechanisms, remuneration 
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75 and 88-96 of the CRDIV; the obligation to ensure effective ICAAP stems from the Articles 76-87 of  the CRDIV.  
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 See Article 4(1)(f) of the SSM Regulation: (f) to carry out supervisory reviews, including where appropriate in 
coordination with EBA, stress tests and their possible publication, in order to determine whether the 
arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms put in place by credit institutions and the own funds held 
by these institutions ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks, and on the basis of that supervisory 
review to impose on credit institutions specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication 
requirements, specific liquidity requirements and other measures, where specifically made available to 
competent authorities by relevant Union law. The obligation to carry out SREPs and stress tests stems from the 
Articles 97-101 of the CRDIV. The imposition of ad hoc additional requirements is governed by the Articles 102-
107 of the CRDIV. 
442
 See Article 4(1)(g) of the SSM Regulation: to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit 
institutions’ parents established in one of the participating Member States, including over financial holding 
companies and mixed financial holding companies, and to participate in supervision on a consolidated basis, 
including in colleges of supervisors without prejudice to the participation of national competent authorities in 
those colleges as observers, in relation to parents not established in one of the participating Member State. This 
obligation stems from the Articles 111-118 of the CRDIV. 
443
 See Article 4(1)(h) of the SSM Regulation: to participate in supplementary supervision of a financial 
conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it and to assume the tasks of a coordinator where 
the ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out in 
relevant Union law. This obligation stems from the provisions of the Directive 2002/87/EC.  
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(9) “Leaning against the resolution” of supervised entities.444 
The abovementioned supervisory tasks are carried out vis-à-vis “credit institutions” 
in the meaning of Union law,445 and two categories of holding companies: “financial 
holding companies” 446 (in the context of consolidated supervision of banking 
groups) and “mixed financial holding companies”447 (in the context of supplementary 
supervision of financial conglomerates).448 Those three types of financial market 
participants, together with branches operating in participating Member States of 
credit institutions established in non-participating Member States, are included in 
the scope of “supervised entities” in the meaning of the SSM Regulation.  
Prudential supervision of financial market participants other than credit institutions 
is out of the SSM jurisdictional remit and remains exclusively under national 
responsibility, in spite of the fact that some of participants may be of systemic 
relevance to banking system. This notably includes financial institutions such as 
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an insurance undertaking, a reinsurance undertaking, an investment firm, an asset management company, or an 
alternative investment fund manager). See Article 2 point 14 of the Directive 2002/87/EC. 
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leasing, factoring and credit companies, central counterparties,449 payment 
institutions,450 investment firms,451 or UCITS management companies.452 It should be 
noted that Article 127(6) of the TFEU does not however exclude the possibility of 
transferring the prudential supervision of the abovementioned entities to the ECB in 
the future since it also refers to “other” financial institutions. This would however be 
subject to the Council’s approval. The only explicit restriction concerns insurance 
undertakings,453 over which the ECB is constitutionally banned from assuming 
supervisory tasks. Therefore, without the Treaty change, it would be impossible to 
submit all financial institutions under the SSM supervisory jurisdiction.  
Although the foregoing tasks can be considered as pertaining to the core of 
prudential supervision, they cannot be regarded as the exhaustive list of all 
prudential tasks. It therefore follows that they might be areas of prudential 
supervision of credit institutions which have not been conferred upon the ECB, 
which remain within the remit of national competence. In this respect, the SSM 
Regulation lists a number of prudential supervisory tasks regarding credit 
                                                          
449
 See Article 1 of the SSM Regulation, second paragraph. Central counterparty is a legal person that interposes 
itself between the counterparties to the contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer 
to every seller and the seller to every buyer. See Article 2(1) of the Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (“EMIR”). 
450
 Payment institution is a legal person that has been granted authorization to provide and execute payment 
serviced across the EU. See Article 4 para 4 of the Directive 2007/64/EC. 
451
 An investment firm is any legal person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of one or more 
‘investment services’ to third parties, and/or the performance of one or more ‘investment activities’ on a 
professional basis. In turn, ‘investment services and activities’ are defined as meaning any of the services and 
activities listed in Section A of Annex I relating to any of the instruments listed in Section C of Annex I of the 
MiFID I. See Article 4 par. 1 point 1 of the Directive 2004/39/EC. 
452
 UCITS is an undertaking (1) with the sole object of collective investment in transferable securities or in other 
liquid financial assets of capital raised from the public and which operates on the principle of risk-spreading, and 
with units which are, at the request of holders, repurchased or redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those 
undertakings’ assets. See Article 2 par. 1 point(b) of the Directive 2009/65/EC. 
453
 An insurance undertaking is a direct life or non-life insurance undertaking which has received official 
authorization in accordance with Article 6 of the Directive 73/239/EEC or Article 6 of the Directive 79/267/EEC. 
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institutions, which remain within the exclusive competence of the NCAs (non-SSM 
supervisory tasks) regardless of their significance status. They include:454 
(1) Receiving of notifications on the exercise of the right of establishment 
and the free provision of services by credit institutions across the internal 
market; 
(2) Supervising undertakings which are not covered by the definition of 
credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit 
institutions under national law;455 
(3) Supervising branches of credit institutions from third countries; 
(4) Supervising payments services; 
(5) Conducting day-to-day verifications of all credit institutions; 
(6) Supervising credit institutions as regards markets in financial 
instruments; 
(7) Preventing of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing; 
(8) Ensuring consumer protection. 
It follows that the micro-prudential supervision within the SSM is governed by the 
principle of conferral which fulfills a twofold role: firstly, it sets the legal boundaries 
for the Union’s action in the field of micro-prudential supervision and, secondly, it 
provides foundations for the legitimate exercise of competences by the Union in 
relation to supervised entities. Moreover, the attribution to the ECB of 
overwhelming, but not exhaustive number of tasks concerning prudential 
                                                          
454
 See, indicatively, Recital (25) of the SSM Regulation which lists a number of supervisory tasks not conferred on 
the ECB that should remain with the national authorities. 
455
 Importantly, this includes specialized French financial institutions which under national law may be 
considered credit institutions without receiving deposits from public. 
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supervision of credit institutions follows also the principles of proportionality, which 
sets the scope and depth of conferral to the extent necessary to achieve the 
objectives set by the SSM Regulation. This is in line with an approach that the 
distribution of tasks and competences between EU and national level in specific 
policy field is usually better organized on a case-by-case basis in light of the political, 
economic and social factors of a sector at stake.456 Lastly, the implementation of 
supervisory tasks in the SSM is underpinned by the principle of decentralization. 
This is reflected in the regime established by Articles 6(4)-(6) of the SSM Regulation 
delineating the personal scope of supervised entities, over which the ECB exercises 
its supervisory tasks directly (SSM Direct Supervision); over which the exercise of the 
ECB’s supervisory tasks is legislatively attributed to the NCAs but under the ECB 
oversight (SSM Indirect Supervision). 
The first arrangement, the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, applies to credit 
institutions established in any of participating Member States that are classified as 
significant in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 6(4) of the SSM 
Regulation. For this group of entities, the ECB is exclusively competent to carry out 
all SSM supervisory tasks listed in the Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation.457 Although 
the ECB is exclusively responsible and accountable for the exercise of these tasks, the 
                                                          
456
 See Miroslava Scholten and Annetje Ottow, ‘Institutional Design of Enforcement in the EU: The Case of 
Financial Markets’, Utrecht Law Review 10, no. 5 (2014): pp. 80–91 (p. 91). 
457
 See supra n. 436-447. 
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NCAs remain responsible for assisting the ECB in the preparation and 
implementation of any supervisory acts related to them.458  
The second arrangement, the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, applies to 
credit institutions established in any of participating Member States deemed less 
significant. For this group of entities, the NCAs are legislatively attributed the 
responsibility to carry out supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB that are listed in 
Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation,459 with three notable exceptions: (i) granting and 
(ii) withdrawal of authorisation of a credit institution,460 and (iii) assessments of 
changes in the shareholder’s structure of a supervised institution.461 The exercise of 
these three supervisory tasks is directly attributed to the ECB and governed by a 
special two-stage regime that nevertheless foresees substantial involvement of NCAs 
in the preparatory work (“common procedures” regime).462 The reminder of SSM 
supervisory tasks in relation to less significant institutions is carried out by the NCAs 
under (multi-dimensional) oversight of the ECB.463 The exercise of other supervisory 
tasks vis-à-vis, both significant and less significant, supervised entities which were 
                                                          
458
 See Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
459
 See Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation: “In relation to the tasks defined in Article 4 except for points (a) and 
(c) of paragraph 1 thereof, the ECB shall have the responsibilities set out in paragraph 5 of this Article and the 
national competent authorities shall have the responsibilities set out in paragraph 6 of this Article, within the 
framework and subject to the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article”. 
460
 See supra n.436. 
461
 See supra n. 438. 
462
 For the applicable regime, see Article 14- 15 of the SSM Regulation. 
463
 See Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
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not conferred upon the ECB,464 remains within a competence of the relevant 
national authorities.465 
6.3.2. The exercise of administrative competences in the SSM 
To carry out their supervisory tasks and responsibilities, both the ECB and NCAs 
need to be attributed relevant powers (competences) which would make them 
capable of adopting acts producing legal consequences vis-à-vis supervised entities. 
Although the terms of powers and competences are often used interchangeably, they 
are not the conceptually equivalent. Whereas the notion of power refers to capability 
of a public actor (government, administrative authority) to pursue public policies 
and is considered as an attribute of a State, the competence expresses the idea of 
limits and designates the “scope of application of power, and not the power itself”.466 
In this sense, it is associated with the English notion of “jurisdiction”, which 
determines the sphere and the boundaries in which that power is allowed to be 
exercised.467 Since the Union is not a State, the exercise of the exercise of any 
“power” attributed to it needs to follow the principle of conferral stating that it “shall 
act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it”.468 
Another aspect which needs to be highlighted is a divide between the Union’s 
regulatory and supervisory competences related to prudential policies. Prior to the 
                                                          
464
 See supra n.454. 
465
 See Article 1 of the SSM Regulation: This Regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and related 
powers of the competent authorities of the participating Member States to carry out supervisory tasks not 
conferred on the ECB by this Regulation. 
466
 See Combacau, J. (2005) ‘Conclusions generales’ in Les compétences de l’Etat en droit International, Colloque 
de Rennes 2005, Paris: Pedone, p. 308. 
467
 See Beaud, ‘The Allocation of Competences in a Federation—A General Introduction’ (above, n.90), p. 31. 
468
 See Article 5(2) of the TEU. 
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crisis, it was widely accepted that regulation and supervision is closely interrelated 
that practically form two sides of the same coin. Given the elusive nature of both 
terms, they were often used (and are still being used by some commentators)469 
interchangeably.470 Even today, competent authorities are sometimes referred to as 
bank regulators and sometimes as bank supervisors. However, during the crisis, 
attempts to formally distinguish both activities were undertaken. As the de Larosière 
report pointed out: 
“Regulation is the set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions; 
their main objective is to foster financial stability and to protect the customers 
of financial services. Regulation can take different forms, ranging from 
information requirements to strict measures such as capital requirements. On 
the other hand, supervision is the process designed to oversee financial 
institutions in order to ensure that rules and standards are properly applied. 
This being said, in practice, regulation and supervision are intertwined (…).”471 
The abovementioned differentiation equates regulation to rule-making and 
supervision to the implementation (application and enforcement) of these rules. The 
main reason for this was to ensure the applicability of a single set of common 
banking rules (the Single Rulebook) to all credit institutions in EU Members States 
                                                          
469
 Notably in the Anglo-American legal scholarship. Here, regulation refers to the exercise of control or direct 
government intervention into an otherwise autonomous sphere of the market and is frequently opposed to 
competition. For an overview, see for example, Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard University 
Press, 2009). 
470
 See Rosa María Lastra, International financial and monetary law (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 112. 
471
 See Larosière et al., The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosiere—
Report (above, n. 416), para 38. 
161 
 
in order to avoid regulatory fragmentation and maintain institutional balance 
between EU institutions, agencies and bodies which gained new regulatory and 
supervisory competences over banking sector. Notwithstanding these attempts to 
provide more conceptual clarity by introducing objective-based differentiation 
between both concepts, the borders between them remain rather blurred in terms of 
the actual effects on the conduct of market participants operating in the banking 
sector. Both the regulation (rule-making) and the supervision (application of these 
rules) may entail direct or indirect supervisory consequences472 and sometimes the 
vice versa.473 Nevertheless, when analyzing the exercise of competences in the SSM, 
this section will distinguish between their regulatory and supervisory type.   
6.3.3. In particular: the exercise of administrative regulatory competences in the 
SSM 
The actual scope of the ECB’s regulatory competence to set the rules for banking 
market participants has been debated in the academic literature, primarily in 
relation to the horizontal distribution of powers between different supranational 
actors.474 It has been envisaged that the assignment to the ECB general rulemaking 
powers would upset the institutional balance with the European Commission and 
with the EBA, and would introduce a new non-level playing field within the EU since 
                                                          
472
 To illustrate this relation, consider provisions introducing options and national discretions with explicitly 
defined procedures regarding their exercise. These procedures may have an effect on established supervisory 
practices of competent authorities which by definition belong to the supervisory dimension of their activities. 
473
 To illustrate this relation, consider internal handbooks issued by competent authorities on how to apply 
certain provisions of applicable banking regulation (i.a. setting procedures, conditions, methodologies and other 
specifications which institute a certain interpretation of these provisions in a given jurisdiction).  
474
 See Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini, The European Banking Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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the outreach of the SSM jurisdiction does not cover the entire Single Market.475 That 
is why the SSM Regulation emphasizes that the ECB is bound by EU-wide rules when 
carrying out its supervisory tasks. To this end, the ECB is obliged to apply relevant 
Union law476, in particular legal acts which constitute the Single Rulebook for 
banking services, such as EU binding legislative acts (notably Regulation and 
Directives).477 As the Union cannot bypass the Member States in the transposition of 
Directives,478 the ECB has to apply national legislation transposing those 
Directives.479 This rule has been formulated by jurisprudence of the CJEU and is 
known as the prohibition on horizontal direct effect of directives.480 Furthermore, 
the ECB also applies delegated and implementing acts of the European 
Commission481 based on draft technical standards developed by the EBA in 
accordance with the Articles 10-15 of the EBA Regulation (Level 2 acts),482 as well as 
                                                          
475
 See Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or'SSM', Part One of the Banking Union’ (above, n.407), 
pp.12-13. 
476
 See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation: For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this 
Regulation, and with the objective of ensuring high standards of supervision, the ECB shall apply all relevant 
Union law, and where this Union law is composed of Directives, the national legislation transposing those 
Directives. Where the relevant Union law is composed of Regulations and where currently those Regulations 
explicitly grant options for Member States, the ECB shall apply also the national legislation exercising those 
options (...)”. 
477
 See Article 289 of the TFEU. 
478
 Notably, even when a provision of a directive is clear and sufficiently precise and constitutes the condition for 
direct applicability (in line with the case law of the CJEU). See Judgment of 19 January 1982, Case C-8/81 Ursula 
Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt EU:C:1982:7, para 25. 
479
 For these reasons, national law provisions implementing directives governing prudential supervision of credit 
institutions shall be also considered as a part of “relevant Union law” in this context. 
480
 See Judgment of 26 February 1986, Case C-152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority (Teaching) EU:C:1986:84, para 48. 
481
 See Article 290 and 291 of the TFEU. 
482
 See ‘Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC: (EBA Regulation)’, in OJ L 331, 15.12.2010. 
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guidelines and recommendations of the EBA based on the Article 16 of the EBA 
Regulation (Level 3 acts).  
(i) Regulatory powers in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
To efficiently and consistently apply the Single Rulebook to supervised entities, the 
ECB may issue different legal instruments,483 including binding legal acts of general 
application, such as Regulations albeit limited to the extent necessary in order to 
organize or specify the modalities for carrying out its supervisory tasks.484 These 
legal acts ought to be issued in conformity with the Single Rulebook legislation, as 
well the EBA Single Supervisory Handbook.485 The question essentially lies on 
whether the ECB’s competence to adopt directly applicable Regulations is restricted 
to purely organisational arrangements for the carrying out of the tasks conferred on 
the ECB under the SSM Regulation, or can be functionally extended to ensure that 
“Union’s policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is 
implemented in a coherent and effective manner”.486 Under Article 132 of the TFEU, 
the ECB is empowered to “make regulations to the extent necessary to implement”, 
among others, the tasks concerning policies related to prudential supervision.487 
Seen from this perspective, some authors have interpreted that the notion of policies 
                                                          
483
 Including Decisions (individual or without addresses) pursuant to Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation, second 
subpara; as well as Guidelines pursuant to Article 12(1) of the ECB/ESCB Statute and Recommendations pursuant 
to Article 132 par. 1 of the TFEU in conjunction with the Article 34 of the ECB/ESCB Statute (Protocol No. (4) to 
the Treaties onn the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank). 
484
 See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
485
 Accorcing to Article 1 of the EBA Regulation, the EBA has a task to develop and maintain up to date (…) a 
European supervisory handbook on the supervision of financial institutions in the Union as a whole, which sets 
out supervisory best practices for methodologies and processes. 
486
 See Recital (11) of the SSM Regulation. 
487
 See Article 25 (2) of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
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could “no doubt include some rule-making powers in the areas of prudential 
supervision that the Council could very well specify in its mandate to the ECB when 
grounding the SSM”.488  
The issue whether the ECB can also engage in regulatory supervision of credit 
institutions became very sensitive in the context of the exercise of so-called options 
and national discretions (ONDs) granted to competent authorities by European and 
national supervisory legislation. In particular, the Level 1 acts (notably the CRR and 
the CRDIV) and the Level 2 acts (delegated and implementing acts issued by the 
Commission), which form the Single Rulebook, contain a high number of material 
provisions which allow either to choose from alternative treatments for supervised 
institutions (“options”) or not to apply certain provisions (“discretions”) to their 
supervision.489 Such room for maneuver was left to Member States and their 
competent supervisors by the EU legislators partly to facilitate the transition to a 
new regulatory regime (Basel III) and to accommodate existing diverging domestic 
regulatory and supervisory approaches.490 The national exercise of ONDs creates 
significant discrepancies in the way the relevant Union law is applied nationally 
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 See Guido A. Ferrarini, ‘Single Supervision and the Governance of Banking Markets’, ECGI-Law Working 
Paper, no. 294 (2015), p. 33. 
489
 ONDs affect every part of the prudential framework and range from the progressive phase-in of new standards 
and definitions to more permanent exemptions from the general rules. They can have a general, jurisdiction-
specific outreach, or require a case-by-case assessment based on individual requests by banks – such is the case of 
capital or liquidity waivers for instance. See Danièle Nouy, Introductory statement: Second ordinary hearing in 
2015 of the Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee (Brussels, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se151019.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
490
 See Ignazio Angeloni, Exchange of views on supervisory issues with the Finance and Treasury Committee of the 
Senate of the Republic of Italy (Rome, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150623.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
165 
 
since in extreme scenario 19 different national banking acts varying from a word-by-
word transposition of European norms to national gold-plating could persist.491 In 
such a situation, it could become impossible for a single supranational supervisor 
(ECB) to ensure equal treatment of credit institutions and consistent supervisory 
approach, which would impede basic objectives of the Banking Union.492  
For these reasons, it might be argued that the ECB enjoys implicit regulatory powers 
to formulate common policies for credit institutions operating in participating 
Member States, including harmonization of supervisory approaches and perspectives 
which also go beyond options and national discretions. Such an understanding 
would be based on the functional interpretation which relies on the inseparability of 
supervisory and regulatory powers in the context of pursuing objectives of the 
Banking Union and could be supported by a joint reading of Articles 127(6), 132 of 
the TFEU and Recital 34 of the SSM Regulation.493 
(ii) Regulatory powers in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
In addition, the ECB has been attributed specific regulatory powers to set the rules 
related to the functioning of the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. For the 
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 See Sabine Lautenschläger, Looking ahead - Closing Remarks at the ECB Forum on Banking Supervision: Closing 
remarks at the SSM Banking Supervision Forum (Frankfurt, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se151104_1.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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 It should be clearly recognized that inconsistent application of national discretions, especially when leading to 
cross-border discrepancies in the level and the quality of capital, increases the potential reliance of banks on 
external support in certain constituencies relative to others. In this context, see inter alia Recital (12) of the SSM 
Regulation (coherent and effective supervision), Article 1 of the SSM Regulation (equal treatment of credit 
institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage).  
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 See Marco Lamandini, David Ramos Muñoz, and Javier Solana, ‘Depicting the Limits to the SSM's Supervisory 
Powers: The Role of Constitutional Mandates and of Fundamental Rights’ Protection’, Quaderni di Ricerca 
Giuridica, no. 79 (2015): pp. 1–119. 
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purpose of ensuring the consistency of supervisory outcomes in the SSM, Article 
6(5)(a) of the SSM Regulation provides the ECB with a possibility to issue binding 
regulations, guidelines and general instructions to the NCAs which may relate to the 
performance of supervisory tasks and to the adoption of supervisory decisions by 
them. In this respect, the ECB may undertake regulatory action covering such areas 
of prudential supervision of less significant institutions, as supervision of cross-
border entities, ensuring the compliance of a supervised institution with micro-
prudential requirements provided by the Single Rulebook (for example: own funds 
(capital) requirements and securitization, liquidity requirements, leverage, public 
disclosure, robust governance arrangements, internal capital and liquidity adequacy 
assessment processes, conducting of supervisory reviews (SREPs), stress tests, 
supervision of banking groups on a consolidated basis, supplementary supervision of 
financial conglomerates, recovery planning of a credit institution and early 
intervening. In particular, the ECB can issue general instructions to NCAs 
concerning groups or categories of credit institutions focusing on the way how 
supervisory decisions on LSIs are adopted.494 This may cover such aspects as capital 
requirements, restoring general compliance with supervisory requirements, business 
model, risk profile, liquidity requirements, governance, disclosure requirements as 
well as removal of managers.  
Crucially, to achieve level playing field in the SSM, the ECB’s powers to regulate the 
supervisory regime governing the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision should be 
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 A contrario, the ECB cannot instruct the NCAs on the supervision of individual institutions.  
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regarded as instrumental to ensure that the options and discretions for competent 
authorities as provided in relevant Union law and national laws transposing 
directives are applied consistent both amongst LSIs and between SIs and LSIs. 
Diverging exercise of ONDs by the ECB and NCAs across the SSM could jeopardize 
level playing field for both groups of institutions. Ultimately, inconsistent 
application of ONDs across the SSM could potentially impact on the comparability 
of prudential requirements across credit institutions. As a result, gauging the overall 
capital adequacy and compliance with prudential requirement by credit institutions 
would prove to be difficult for market participants and the general public.495  
6.3.4. In particular: the exercise of administrative supervisory competences in the 
SSM 
In the micro-prudential sense, supervision is a process which starts with the entry on 
the banking market of an individual entity to the termination of its banking 
activities, either caused ordinary (e.g. mergers, discontinuation of the banking 
business, lapsing of authorisation) or extraordinary circumstances (e.g. resolution, 
insolvency). It can be understood a continuous process, which consists of four 
stages: (1) entity’s entry into banking market, (2) supervision stricto sensu over 
entity,496 (3) sanctioning and imposition of penalties on an entity in case of its non-
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 See European Central Bank, Public consultation on a draft Guideline and Recommendation of the ECB on the 
exercise of options and discretions available in Union law for less significant institutions: Explanatory 
Memorandum (November), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/ond_lsi/ond_lsi_em.en.pdf, accessed 
01 December 2017; see also Informal interview with N (03 November 2016) in Annex. 
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 Understood in terms of the oversight over banks’ conduct (in particular risks monitoring, asset quality, capital 
adequacy, liquidity, governance). It has a forward-looking dimension in the sense that at this stage, a supervisor 
can impose the measures if discovers a likeness possibility of any non-compliance with prudential requirements 
in the foreseeable future. 
168 
 
compliance with prudential requirements, and finally (4) crisis management, 
including possible resolution or liquidation of an entity.497 In the SSM, the ECB 
(either directly or indirectly via the NCAs) is exclusively competent to carry out 
specific supervisory tasks laid down in Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation for each of 
these stages of the supervisory process. These tasks are carried out primarily on a 
case-by-case basis in a preventive and forward-looking manner, aiming not only at 
ensuring that individual supervised entities meet the formal requirements stipulated 
in the relevant Union law, but ultimately to ensure their safety and soundness and 
the stability of the financial system within the Union and each Member State.498 
Relevant Union law attributes to competent authorities a range of supervisory 
powers to intervene in the activity of credit institutions which are necessary to carry 
out their tasks499 and which cover monitoring and enforcement of applicable 
banking rules vis-à-vis their supervisees. The scope of powers conferred upon the 
ECB as a bank supervisor is regulated primarily by the SSM Regulation. In this 
respect, it provides that “the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers (…) 
and should have the powers conferred upon competent authorities by Union law 
(…)”500 in order to carry out supervisory tasks conferred upon it. To large extent, 
these supervisory powers mirror the powers prior attributed under the CRR/CRDIV 
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 See Lastra, International financial and monetary law (above, n.470), p. 115. 
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 See Article 1(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
499
 See Article 64(1) of the CRDIV in conjunction with Article 2 of the CRR. The former provides that “competent 
authorities shall be given all supervisory powers to intervene in the activity of institutions that are necessary for 
the exercise of their function, including in particular the right to withdraw an authorization in accordance (…) 
and the powers set out in Articles 104 and 105” whereas the latter extends it ensuring compliance with CRR (“for 
the purposes of ensuring compliance with this Regulation, competent authorities shall have the powers and shall 
follow the procedures set out in Directive 2013/36/EU”). 
500
 See Recital 45 of the SSM Regulation. 
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framework to the competent authorities of the Member States. In this respect, 
Member States are instructed to grant their competent authorities a specified set of 
“at least the following powers”501 and the powers “at least in respect of”502 in their 
national transpositions of the CRDIV. It may therefore occur that in some 
jurisdictions national law goes beyond the minimum requirements stipulated in the 
CRDIV and attributes to competent authorities broader administrative supervisory 
powers.  
The ECB does not however exercise all its supervisory powers listed in the SSM 
Regulation directly over all credit institutions, despite the fact that it became 
exclusively competent to carry out specific supervisory tasks laid down in Article 4(1) 
of that Regulation. Firstly, in the fulfillment of the supervisory tasks conferred upon 
the ECB and under the ECB’s oversight,503 the NCAs continue to exercise their 
supervisory powers of competent authorities in relation to less significant 
institutions.504 They are legislatively authorized to do so as long as the ECB has not 
decided to “exercise directly itself all the relevant powers for one or more” less 
significant credit institutions.505 Secondly, it remains unclear whether the ECB is 
competent to make use of the supervisory powers attributed to competent 
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 In this respect, see for example Article 104 of the CRDIV. 
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 In this respect, see for example Article 66 of the CRDIV. 
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 See Article 6(5)(c) of the SSM Regulation: the ECB shall exercise oversight over the functioning of the system, 
based on the responsibilities and procedures set out in this Article (…). 
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 By virtue of Article 6(6) of the SSM Regulation, but with exception to the tasks related to authorizations and 
approvals (“common procedures”). 
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authorities by national law that are not explicitly required by the minimum set listed 
in the CRDIV.  
To better understand power dynamics in the SSM, the following sections will analyze 
supervisory competences available to the ECB and NCAs to carry out their respective 
supervisory responsibilities over credit institutions operating in participating 
Member States. Following the understanding of micro-prudential supervision a 
process, the following subsections look at the exercise of competences within the 
SSM that relate to the guardianship of the banking market’s access (authorisations 
and approvals powers); to the supervision stricto sensu that include the use of 
investigatory and early intervention powers; and to the use of sanctioning and 
enforcement powers vis-à-vis supervised entities. 
(iii) Authorisations and approvals in SSM (common procedures regime)506 
The SSM Regulation established a special supervisory regime – “common 
procedures” – that governs the “birth, maturity and death” of credit institutions. It 
covers to the following three supervisory activities: (i) granting of a bank license to 
entities willing to operate on the banking markets (“authorisations”),507 (ii) 
managing the exit of credit institutions from banking markets irrespective of a cause 
(“withdrawals of authorisations”)508 and (iii) approving significant changes in banks’ 
                                                          
506
 It is noted that this subsection does not cover approvals related to fit and proper assessments. This is due to 
the fact it not a separate competence under SSM Regulation, but rather stems from national transpositions of the 
CRDIV.  
507
 See Article 4(a) of the SSM Regulation: “to authorize credit institutions and to withdraw authorizations of 
credit institutions subject to Article 14”. 
508
 Ibid.  
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shareholding structures (“acquisitions of qualifying holdings”).509 In those three 
foregoing cases, the ECB is exclusively competent to adopt supervisory decisions in 
relation to both significant and less significant institutions and the principle of 
differentiated supervision reflected by the division between SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision does not apply. Instead, a two-stage procedure that involves 
contribution from both national and supranational supervisory apparatus is 
foreseen.  
The reason why licensing (authorizing) a bank requires direct supranational 
involvement in the Banking Union stems from the fact that it is the first and crucial 
step in the supervisory process. Since the funding of EU economy predominantly 
relies on banks, it is of the utmost importance is to ensure that only such entities 
which have viable and sustainable business models enter into the banking business. 
To limit the possibility of an easier access to the European Single Market for banking 
services resulting form of possible supervisory leniency in certain domestic 
jurisdictions, applicable procedures ought to be rule-based510 with the conditions 
maximally harmonized across different Member States. This is of particular 
importance since credit institutions incorporated in one Member State may also 
operate in other Member States based on the freedom of establishment and freedom 
to provide cross-border services (the single passport). In the SSM, the licensing 
process begins when an NCA acknowledges the receipt of a request for the 
                                                          
509
 See Article 4(c) of the SSM Regulation: “to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying 
holdings in credit institutions, except in the case of a bank resolution, and subject to Article 15”. 
510
 See Lastra, International financial and monetary law (above, n.470), Ibid.p .116. 
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authorisation from the applicant. It subsequently assesses whether the applicant 
complies with all conditions of authorisation as provided by national transpositions 
of the relevant CRDIV provisions511 which include: the entry capital requirements,512 
the programme of activities (i.e. business plan) and an internal organization that will 
be able to manage the implementation of the business plan,513 the existence of 
effective leadership of the business and suitability,514 the existence of a link between 
the activities and the Member State where the license is to be granted,515 the 
suitability of a management body,516 the suitability of significant shareholders,517 the 
absence of close links with other legal or natural persons which would prevent 
effective supervision518 as well as membership in the deposit guarantee scheme.519 
Having initially assessed a licensing application, the NCAs have two options. If the 
applicant does not comply with the CRDIV requirements for obtaining the 
authorisation laid down in national banking laws, the NCA can autonomously decide 
to reject the application and close authorisation procedure at this stage520 and 
without submitting it to the ECB.521 If the applicant does comply with the 
                                                          
511
 See Articles 8-21 of the CRDIV. 
512
 See Article 12 of the CRDIV. 
513
 See Article 10 of the CRDIV. 
514
 See Article 13(1) of the CRDIV. 
515
 See Article 13(2) of the CRDIV. 
516
 Ibid. 
517
 See Article 14 of the CRDIV. 
518
 See Article 14(3) of the CRDIV. 
519
 See Article 4(3) of the DGSD (‘Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on deposit guarantee schemes’, in OJ L 173, 12.6.2014). 
520
 See Article 15 of the CRDIV. 
521
 See Laura Wissink, Ton Duijkersloot, and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between Member States 
and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their Consequences for Judicial 
Protection’, ULR 10, no. 5 (2014): pp. 92–115, p. 96). 
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authorisation requirements, the NCA prepares a draft authorisation decision 
proposing to grant a bank license and submits in to the ECB in line with the deadline 
set in applicable laws. The NCA may also propose to attach recommendations, 
conditions and restrictions imposing additional requirements in accordance with 
national and EU law. 
A significant supranational involvement is also foreseen in the context of subsequent 
expansion, mergers or other transformations of credit institutions. In the Banking 
Union, only suitable entities - whether natural or legal persons - can be allowed to 
hold significant stakes (“qualifying holdings”) in credit institutions in order to 
promote public trust in banking system and prevent any disruptions to the smooth 
functioning of the banking system. Common procedures related to acquisitions of 
qualifying holdings go through the same two-stage process since they also constitute 
a form of (secondary) entry in the banking market.  
In those cases, the NCAs serve as a point of entry for the notifications and they 
conduct initial assessment of the applicants based on the harmonized criteria set out 
in national transpositions of the CRDIV that include the reputation of the 
acquirer,522 suitability of management bodies which will direct the business of a 
credit institution as a result of the acquisition,523 financial soundness of the 
                                                          
522
 See Article 23(1)(a) of the CRDIV: the reputation of the proposed acquirer. 
523
 See Article 23(1)(b) of the CRDIV: the reputation, knowledge, skills and experience, as set out in Article 91(1), 
of any member of the management body and any member of senior management who will direct the business of 
the credit institution as a result of the proposed acquisition. 
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acquirer,524 ability to comply with relevant prudential requirements by the credit 
institution,525 money laundering and terrorist financing issues.526 The national stage 
of qualifying holding assessment is finishes when the NCAs prepare a draft decision 
whether to oppose or not to oppose to the acquisition of a qualifying holding that is 
subsequently submitted to the ECB. In the second stage, the ECB evaluates the 
assessment conducted by the NCAs in accordance with relevant requirements of 
applicable Union law and makes final supervisory decisions.  
The common procedures regime constitutes “a mix of advisory and decisive roles for 
both national and EU authorities” governed by the “four eyes principle” in a sense 
supranational supervisors double-check the assessment prepared by their national 
counterparts. As such may be regarded as an example of “mixed banking supervisory 
process in the SSM”.527  
                                                          
524
 See Article 23(1)(c) of the CRDIV: the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, in particular in relation to 
the type of business pursued and envisaged in the credit institution in which the acquisition is proposed. 
525
 See Article 23(1)(d) of the CRDIV: whether the credit institution will be able to comply and continue to comply 
with the prudential requirements based on this Directive and the CRR, and where applicable, other Union law, in 
particular Directives 2002/87/EC and 2009/110/EC, including whether the group of which it will become a part 
has a structure that makes it possible to exercise effective supervision, effectively exchange information among 
the competent authorities and determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities. 
526
 See Article 23(1)(e) of the CRDIV: whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with 
the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing is being or has been committed 
or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase the risk thereof. 
527
 See Wissink, Duijkersloot and Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between Member States and the EU in 
the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their Consequences for Judicial Protection’ (above, n.521), 
p. 97. 
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(iv) Investigations in the SSM 
It has been widely recognized in political economy literature that there exists an 
information gap between the banks and the supervisors.528 The information 
submitted by supervised entities in the context of their standard reporting 
requirements (for example, via standardizes templates or supervisory dialogue) may 
not necessarily always be sufficient for supervisors to adequately and 
comprehensively assess intrinsic risks faced by individual entities from an unbiased 
supervisory perspective, or to detect potential breaches of the applicable prudential 
requirements.  
Another twist to this inherent information asymmetry can be added when banking 
supervision is arranged in multilevel regime, in which a central supervisor relies on 
the supervisory information transmitted by local supervisor. This may further 
complicate the flow of information between the supervisees and the ultimate 
supervisor due to the emergence of agency problems between the central and local 
supervisor.529 Therefore, it is imperative that (central) supervisors have at their 
disposal a set of investigatory powers which allow them to obtain additional 
information directly form the supervised entities. In order to carry supervisory tasks 
conferred upon the ECB by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and NCAs are attributed a 
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 See Schüler, ‘Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision-The European Case’ (above, n. 124); Edward J. Kane, 
‘The evolving US legislative agenda in banking and finance’, in Regulation and Supervision of Financial 
Institutions in the NAFTA Countries and Beyond (Springer, 1997), pp. 180–193. 
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 See, for example, Howarth, Quaglia and Gren, ‘Supranational banking supervision in Europe: The construction 
of a credible watchdog’ (above, n. 394) Carletti, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, ‘Supervisory incentives in a banking 
union’ (above, n.362); Tröger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? 
Preliminary Assessment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’ 
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set of investigatory powers which they may use directly in relation to significant and 
less significant institutions subject to the constraints instituted by the principle of 
differentiated supervision.  
- Investigatory powers in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
To overcome information asymmetries and agency problems in respect to significant 
supervised entities, the SSM Regulation grants the ECB three types of investigatory 
competences: (i) the power to request information,530 (ii) the power to conduct 
investigations,531 and (iii) the power to conduct on-site inspections.532 At the lowest 
level of intrusiveness, the ECB may request credit institutions, financial holding 
companies and mixed financial holding companies established in participating 
Member States as well as persons “belonging” to these entities533 to provide all 
information necessary to carry out its tasks. These requests may cover both ad hoc 
information and information “at recurring intervals” and “in specified formats” for 
supervisory and related statistical purposes.534 All the above listed addresses have a 
duty to provide the information requested to the ECB, and such a provision is not 
deemed to be in breach of professional secrecy.535 This investigatory power is 
exercised in line with procedures stipulated in the SSM Framework Regulation 
involving cooperation with the NCAs.  
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 See Article 10 of the SSM Regulation. 
531
 See Article 11 of the SSM Regulation. 
532
 See Article 12 of the SSM Regulation. 
533
 This also includes third parties with whom these entities formed outsourcing agreements. 
534
 See Article 10(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
535
 See Article 10(2) of the SSM Regulation in conjunction with Article 53 of the CRDIV. 
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The ECB’s power to conduct investigations can be regarded as a next step on the 
level of investigatory intrusiveness. When information requests turn out to be 
insufficient to effectively to carry out its tasks, the ECB has the power to conduct all 
necessary investigations. During these investigations, the ECB may require to submit 
documents examine the books and records and take copies or extracts therefrom, 
obtain written or oral explanations from these persons or their representatives or 
staff and to interview any other person who consents to be interviewed for the 
purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an 
investigation.536 It is important to note that any investigations needs to be conducted 
on the basis of an ECB formal decision,537 which has to specify legal basis and its 
purpose, the ECB’s intention to exercise the powers to conduct investigations, and 
the fact that any obstruction of the investigation by the person being investigated 
constituted a breach of an ECB decision (Union law) and may be penalized.538 In case 
an obstruction occurs, the competent national supervisor (NCA) is obliged to 
provide the “necessary assistance” to the ECB, including facilitating the access to the 
business premises of the entity under investigation.539 
Finally, the ECB has the power to conduct on-site inspections which may be 
regarded as the most intrusive investigatory power available. Subject to prior 
notification to the national competent authorities concerned, it may conduct all 
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 See Article 11(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
537
 See Article 11(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
538
 See Article 142 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
539
 Ibid. 
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necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of supervised entities and any 
other undertaking included in consolidated supervision.540 Similarly as in the case of 
exercising power to conduct investigations, initiating on-site inspections has to be 
based on an ECB formal decision.541 If deemed necessary for the proper conduct and 
efficiency of an onsite inspection, the ECB does not to announce its willingness to 
carry out such an inspection to the entity concerned.542 The officials and other 
personnel authorized by the ECB may enter any business premises and land of 
entities subject to the ECB decision launching an on-site inspection, and they enjoy 
all the powers with regard to general investigations.543 Where an on-site inspection 
requires judicial authorisation, the ECB has to apply for it. In such cases, national 
court has to review the authenticity of an ECB decision regarding an on-site 
inspection, as well as proportionality and suitability of the envisaged coercive 
measures.544 While conducting its review, national court may request the ECB to 
provide more detailed explanations however is not allowed to rule on the necessity 
of an on-site inspection since ECB decisions as acts of Union law are subject to 
review only by the CJEU.545 
                                                          
540
 As well as subsidiaries in non-participating Member States in the cases where the ECB is consolidating 
supervisor. 
541
 See Article 12(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
542
 See Article 12 (1) of the SSM Regulation. 
543
 As stipulated by the Article 11(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
544
 See Article 12(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
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 See Article 13(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
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- Investigatory powers in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
To address exposure to information asymmetries concerning the supervision of less 
significant supervised entities, under the CRDIV the NCAs are granted the exactly 
the same set of competences as the SSM Regulation attributes to the ECB. The fact 
that the SSM Regulation mirrors the CRDIV is necessary to ensure the equal 
treatment of credit institutions operating within the Single Market. It would be at 
odds with the objectives of ensuring level playing field if one EU supervisor had 
more investigatory instruments than another one. However, the CRDIV – like the 
SSM Regulation – also requires making use of any administrative powers vis-à-vis 
supervised entities in “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” way.546  
Accordingly the NCAs can make use of all the investigatory powers vis-à-vis 
institutions under their supervisory remit in the same manner as the ECB vis-à-vis 
those under its supervisory jurisdiction. This includes the power to request 
information also covers ad hoc information and information “at recurring intervals” 
and “in specified formats” for “supervisory and related statistical purposes” from 
institutions established financial holding companies and mixed financial holding 
companies established in the Member State concerned as well as persons belonging 
to this entities and third parties which were outsourced operational functions or 
activities.547 The NCAs are also empowered to conduct all necessary investigations 
vis-à-vis supervised entities which may requests for the submission of documents,548 
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 See Article 65 (1) of the CRDIV, last sentence.  
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 See Article 65(3)(a)(i-vi) of the CRDIV. 
548
 See Article 65(3)(b)(i) of the CRDIV: the right to require the submission of documents. 
180 
 
examinations of the books and records and taking copies or extracts from such 
books and records,549 obtaining written or oral explanations,550 and conducting 
interviews.551 Lastly, the NCAs may also conduct all necessary inspections at the 
business premises of the supervised entities.552 In jurisdictions where an onsite 
inspection requires judicial authorisation, the NCAs are obligated to apply for it in 
advance.553 
The allocation of investigatory powers within the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision displays some particularities. Article 6(5)(d) of the SSM Regulation 
provides that the ECB may at any time make use of its investigatory powers in 
relation to less significant institutions, without a necessity of its prior decision to 
“exercise directly itself all the relevant powers for one or more less significant credit 
institutions”554 (takeover clause). This suggest the ECB may directly use its 
investigatory powers vis-à-vis all credit institutions operating in participating 
Member States, notwithstanding the principle of differentiated supervision laid 
down in Article 6(6) of the SSM Regulation. Therefore, the use of investigatory 
powers in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision could be regarded to some 
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 See Article 65(3)(b)(ii) of the CRDIV: to examine the books and records of the supervised entities and take 
copies or extracts from such books and records. 
550
 See Article 65(3)(b)(iii) of the CRDIV: to obtain written or oral explanations from supervised entities or their 
representatives or staff. 
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 See Article 65(3)(b)(iv) of the CRDIV: to interview any other person who consents to be interviewed for the 
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 See Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
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extent as the example of concurring competences between the Member States and 
the Union since both the NCAs and the ECB – as the competent authorities – are 
authorized to exercise them in respect of less significant institutions.  
(v) Early supervisory interventions in the SSM 
Despite the fact that banks main role is to generate profits for their shareholders, it 
is widely recognized that they are different from other profit-seeking undertakings 
due to their important role in payments and financial systems, and the real 
economy. For these reasons, they require tougher supervision than other financial 
markets participants.555 In this context, it is important that the authorities 
responsible for banking supervision have at their disposal appropriate tools to 
effectively monitor prudential situation of individual credit institutions. However, 
competent authorities can also be subject to regulatory capture and apply their 
supervisory powers more leniently in order to favor their national banking 
champions.556 The EU banking crisis demonstrated that in some European 
jurisdictions it was indeed the case.557  
As noted by the Commission’s experts, the existence of different national systems of 
supervision has led to the inconsistent use of supervisory powers across Member 
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 See Lastra, International financial and monetary law (above, n. 470), p.117. 
556
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment: Proposal for a Directive on 
the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms (…), SEC/2011/0952 final, p. 113-114. 
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 See i.a. Larosière et al., The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiere—Report (above, n. 416). 
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States that resulted in regulatory competition and supervisory capture.558 Thus, in 
order to enhance the European supervisory framework, the CRR/CRDIV framework 
introduced more consistent supervisory toolkit to be used by national supervisors 
and set the conditions for their activation. In this respect, the SSM Regulation 
attributed accordingly supervisory powers, provided to national supervisors in the 
CRDIV, to the ECB which may use them directly vis-à-vis institutions under its direct 
supervision. Following the principle of differentiated supervision, the NCAs may 
make use of the supervisory powers assigned to them by the CRDIV when carrying 
out the ECB’s supervisory tasks in relation to less significant institutions.  
- Early intervention powers in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision  
Article 16(2) of the SSM Regulation559 provides the ECB with recourse to a 
comprehensive set of supervisory powers whose exercise is however constrained by 
the occurrence of one of the following conditions. In particular, when a supervised 
entity does not meet prudential requirements provided in relevant Union law; or 
when the ECB has evidence that a supervised entity may breach these requirements 
within next 12 months; as well as when “the arrangements, strategies, processes and 
mechanisms implemented by the credit institution and the own funds and liquidity 
held by it do not ensure a sound management and coverage of its risks”, the ECB is 
competent to impose the following intervention measures concerning: 
                                                          
558
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment: Proposal for a Directive on 
the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms (…) (above, n. 556), p. 107. 
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 The scope of supervisory powers assigned to the ECB mirrors the scope of powers assigned to national 
competent authorities by virtue of Article 104 of the CRDIV. 
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(1) Capital requirements of a significant supervised entity;560 
(2) Restoring general compliance of a significant supervised entity with 
supervisory requirements;561 
(3) Business model of a significant supervised entity;562 
(4) Risk profile of a significant supervised entity;563 
(5) Liquidity requirements of a significant supervised entity;564 
(6) Governance of a significant supervised entity;565 
(7) Disclosure requirements of a significant supervised entity;566 
(8) Removal of managers of a significant supervised entity.567 
                                                          
560
 Four measures can be identified: (1) to require institutions to hold own funds in excess of the capital 
requirements (…) related to elements of risks and risks not covered by the relevant Union acts (Article 16(2)(a) of 
the SSM Regulation); (2) to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in 
terms of own funds requirements (Article 16(2)(d) of the SSM Regulation); (3) to require institutions to use net 
profits to strengthen own funds (Article 16(2)(h) of the SSM Regulation); (4) to restrict or prohibit distributions 
by the institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition 
does not constitute an event of default of the institution (Article 16(2)(i) of the SSM Regulation). 
561
 Two measures can be identified: (1) to require institutions to present a plan to restore compliance with 
supervisory requirements pursuant to the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) and set a 
deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline (Article 
16(2)(c) of the SSM Regulation); (2) to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including 
reporting on capital and liquidity positions (Article 16(2)(j) of the SSM Regulation). 
562
 One measure can be identified: to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to 
request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution (Article 16(2)(e) of 
the SSM Regulation). 
563
 One measure can be identified: to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and 
systems of institutions (Article 16(2)(f) of the SSM Regulation). 
564
 One measure can be identified: to impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities (Article 16(2)(k) of the SSM Regulation). 
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 Two measures can be identified: (1) to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms 
and strategies (Article 16(2)(b) of the SSM Regulation); (2) to require institutions to limit variable remuneration 
as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base (Article 
16(2)(g) of the SSM Regulation). 
566
 One measure can be identified: to require additional disclosures (Article 16(2)(l) of the SSM Regulation). 
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In addition, a number of intervention powers were granted to the ECB by the EU 
legislation governing resolution of credit institutions. The ECB as a competent 
supervisor is involved in the precautionary stage of the resolution process (pre-
resolution) which relate to the assessment of recovery plans presented by credit 
institutions,568 and may take measures to address their deficiencies.569 The purpose 
of recovery planning is to prepare measures to restore viability and address fragilities 
of a significant institution, in cases it comes under severe stress or experiences a 
significant financial deterioration. Recovery plans are submitted by significant 
supervised entities on a yearly basis, or after a significant change to the 
presumptions of the previous recovery plan.570 They should not assume any access to 
or receipt of extraordinary public financial support,571 such as an ESM financial 
assistance. The assessment of these plans should take into account their 
completeness, quality and credibility and should also determine the adequacy of the 
measures foreseen by recovery plans. 
Lastly, under the BRRD, the ECB as a competent authority is granted more specific 
early intervention powers572 which can be used vis-à-vis supervised entities in 
extraordinary cases where, for example due to rapidly deteriorating financial 
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 One measure can be identified: to remove at any time members from the management body of credit 
institutions who do not fulfil the requirements set out in the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 
4(3) (Article 16(2)(m) of the SSM Regulation). 
568
 See Article 6(6) subpar 3 of the BRRD which recommends to use supervisory measures related to capital and 
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implementation. 
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 See Article 6(5) and (6) of the BRRD. 
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 See Article 5(2) of the BRRD. 
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 See Article 5(3) of the BRRD. 
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 See Article 27-28 of the BRRD. 
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conditions, they infringe or are likely to infringe prudential requirements laid down 
in relevant Union law (notably the CRR/CRDIV legislation), including quantitative 
thresholds of the institution’s own funds requirements plus 1.5 percentage points.573 
These powers are consistent with the supervisory powers conferred upon it by the 
SSM Regulation and complement in one aspect: a possibility to install one or more 
temporary administrators in a supervised entity, who either replace the management 
body of the institution temporarily or work temporarily with the management body 
of the institution.574 
- Early intervention powers in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
To exercise the ECB’s supervisory tasks listed in the Article 4(1) of the SSM 
Regulation vis-à-vis less significant institutions, Article 104 of the CRDIV attributes 
to the NCAs a range of intervention powers that corresponds to the powers 
conferred upon the ECB by Article 16(2) of the SSM Regulation.575 The NCAs may 
exercise them in relation to less significant institutions subject to similar conditions 
imposed upon the ECB. They include measures related to: 
(1) Capital requirements of a less significant supervised entity;576 
                                                          
573
 See Article 27(1) of the BRRD. 
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 See Article 29 of the BRRD. 
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(2) Restoring general compliance of a less significant supervised entity with 
supervisory requirements;577 
(3) Business model of a less significant supervised entity;578 
(4) Risk profile of a less significant supervised entity;579 
(5) Liquidity requirements of a less significant supervised entity;580 
(6) Governance of a less significant supervised entity;581 
(7) Disclosure requirements of a less significant supervised entity.582 
In addition, a number of administrative powers have been granted to the NCAs as 
competent authorities by the EU legislation governing resolution of credit 
institutions. The NCAs are involved in the precautionary stage of the resolution 
process (pre-resolution) of less significant institutions. This includes such 
supervisory activities as the assessment of recovery plans presented by credit 
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 Two measures can be identified: (1) to require institutions to present a plan to restore compliance with 
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of the CRDIV). 
582
 One measure can be identified: to require additional disclosures (Article 104(1)(l) of the CRDIV). 
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institutions or undertaking appropriate measures to address their deficiencies.583 
Under the BRRD, the NCAs are also granted specific early intervention powers which 
can be used vis-à-vis supervised entities in extraordinary cases where, for example 
due rapidly deteriorating financial conditions, they infringe or are likely to infringe 
prudential requirements laid down in relevant Union law (notably the CRR/CRDIV 
legislation), including quantitative thresholds of the institution’s own funds 
requirements plus 1.5 percentage points. These powers are consistent with the 
supervisory powers listed in Article 104 of the CRDIV and complement in two 
aspects: a possibility remove member of management boards,584 and to install one or 
more temporary administrators in a supervised entity, who either replace the 
management body of the institution temporarily or work temporarily with the 
management body of the institution.585 
It remains unclear whether the ECB could circumvent NCAs’ responsibility to adopt 
supervisory decisions in the exercise of their respective supervisory powers in 
relation to less significant institutions, as attributed to them by Article 6(6) of the 
SSM Regulation, and apply its early intervention powers under Article 16(2) of the 
SSM Regulation directly in relation to LSIs. It appears that the SSM Regulation does 
not explicitly provide such a possibility as in the case of the use of the ECB’s 
investigatory powers. Instead, Article 6(5)(a) of the SSM Regulation empowers the 
ECB to issue regulations, guidelines and general instructions to the NCAs which may 
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 On the content of recovery plans, see Article 5 of the BRRD. 
584
 See Article 28 of the BRRD. 
585
 See Article 29 of the BRRD. 
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regulate the ways how the NCAs should exercise their early intervention powers vis-
à-vis less significant institutions. This arrangement suggests that the ECB cannot 
exercise directly its early intervention powers in the system of SSM Indirect 
Supervision unless it decides to “exercise directly all relevant powers” for one or 
more less significant institutions in accordance with the procedure set by Article 
6(5)(c) of the SSM Regulation.  
(vi) Sanctions and enforcement in the SSM 
The accomplishment of the aims set by banking and financial regulation, including 
notably public confidence in financial markets, is always dependent upon its 
effective enforcement.586 In legal scholarship, there is a fine line between the 
concepts of application and enforcement of a legal act. Application of law refers to 
the responsibility of a public law body (such as a ministry or an independent 
administrative agency), whereas enforcement is the responsibility of a judicial 
authority.587  
In complex and highly regulated areas of public policies such as banking supervision, 
this division becomes somewhat blurred and results in overlaps between the 
processes of application and enforcement of a legal act. In those cases, the 
enforcement of law cannot be easily detached from its application and is also a part 
of supervisory actions without the need for a court to endorse a certain 
                                                          
586
 See Lastra, International financial and monetary law (above, n.470), p. 120. 
587
 See Asen Lefterov, The Single Rulebook : legal issues and relevance in the SSM context, ECB Legal Working 
Paper Series No 15 (Frankfurt, 2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp15.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017, p. 23. 
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requirement.588 This becomes particularly visible in cases when there is a need to 
punish a credit institution for its breaches of applicable prudential requirements, or 
to restore its compliance with applicable prudential regulation. Whereas sanctioning 
measures are characterized by their non-periodical and (predominantly) pecuniary 
nature intending and can only be applied once for individual cases; enforcement 
measures are characterized by their periodical and (sometimes) non-pecuniary 
nature and can be applied so long until non-compliance is evicted.  
- Sanctioning powers in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
To achieve the abovementioned objectives, Article 18 of the SSM Regulation 
attributes the ECB with autonomous sanctioning and enforcement powers vis-à-vis 
supervised entities without necessity to recourse for a judicial authorisation. Where 
the ECB considers that there is reason to suspect a significant supervised entity of a 
breach of regulatory requirements under directly applicable EU legal acts,589 it has at 
its disposal two sanctioning options: either (i) to directly impose administrative 
pecuniary penalties on that entity,590 or (ii) to ask NCAs to open sanctioning 
proceedings against that entity with an objective to impose non-pecuniary penalties 
foreseen by relevant national legislation.591 Administrative pecuniary penalties 
imposed directly by the ECB can be of up to twice the amount of the profits gained 
or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 10% 
                                                          
588
 Ibid. 
589
 See Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
590
 Ibid. 
591
 See Article 134(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year or such 
other pecuniary penalties as may be provided for in relevant Union law.592 
However, in a situation where there is a suspicion that natural persons representing 
supervised entities might have breached directly applicable EU legal acts, the ECB 
does not any direct sanctioning powers vis-à-vis those natural persons, and is only 
empowered to ask NCAs to impose either pecuniary or non-pecuniary penalties on 
them.593 The NCAs, acting on their own initiative, may ask the ECB to request them 
to open such proceedings.594 The same regime applies to situations where the ECB 
considers that there exist reasons to suspect a breach of regulatory requirements 
under national rules transposing EU Directives, both with regard to supervised 
entities595 and natural persons representing these entities.596 
A specific sanctioning regime is foreseen when there is a suspicion that a supervised 
entity breached ECB legal acts,597 notably its Regulations and Decisions. In these 
cases, the ECB may also impose fines and periodic penalty payments (PPPs) based on 
the provisions of the Council Regulation 2532/98.598 Such a periodic penalty payment 
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 See Article 18(1) and (2) of the SSM Regulation. 
593
 See Article 134 (1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
594
 See Article 134 (2) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
595
 The ECB may ask NCAs to impose pecuniary penalties on supervised entities in line with Article 18(5) of the 
SSM Regulation and/or non-pecuniary penalties in line with Article 134(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
596
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line with Article 18(5) of the SSM Regulation and/or non-pecuniary penalties in line with Article 134(1) of SSM 
Framework Regulation. 
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 See Article 18(7) of the SSM Regulation. 
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 See ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central 
Bank to impose sanctions’, in OJ L 318, 27.11.1998 (amended in 2015 adapt the ECB to its supervisory function), 
together with (supplementing) ‘European Central Bank Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of 23 September 1999 on 
the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (ECB/1999/4)’, in OJ L 264, 12.10.1999 (amended in 
2014 to adapt the ECB to its supervisory function). 
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shall be effective and proportionate and is capped at 5% of the average daily turnover 
per day of infringement for a maximum period of six months.599 Given their 
prolonged nature, they may be regarded as an enforcement measure despite of the 
fact the Council Regulation 2532/98 refers to them per sanctions. Theoretically, 
national enforcement measures vis-à-vis significant institutions should be also at the 
ECB’s disposal, both directly and indirectly, by virtue of Article 9(1) of the SSM 
Regulation. Its second subparagraph attributes to it all the powers vis-à-vis 
significant supervised entities which national competent authorities enjoy under the 
relevant Union law, including national transposition of directives.600 Notably, the 
CRDIV regulation confers upon the competent authorities certain enforcement 
competences, such as for example cease-and-desist orders.601 Finally, its third 
subparagraph provides the ECB with the possibility to require, by way of instruction, 
national competent authorities to make use of their supervisory powers not 
conferred upon the ECB.602 This legal basis could serve as a platform to take indirect 
enforcement measures by the ECB vis-à-vis significant supervised entities. 
                                                          
599
 See Article 4(1)(b) of the ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of 
the European Central Bank to impose sanctions’ (above, n. 598). 
600
 See Article 9(1) of the SSM Regulation, subpara 2 states that “for the exclusive purpose of carrying out the 
tasks conferred on it, the ECB shall have all the powers and obligations set out in this Regulation. It shall also 
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Union law, unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation (…)”. 
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 See Article 66(2)(b) and 67(2)(b) of the CRDIV. 
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 See Article 9(1) of the SSM Regulation, subpar. 3: To the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred on it 
by this Regulation, the ECB may require, by way of instructions, those national authorities to make use of their 
powers, under and in accordance with the conditions set out in national law, where this Regulation does not 
confer such powers on the ECB. Those national authorities shall fully inform the ECB about the exercise of those 
powers. 
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- Sanctioning powers in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
When it comes to the sanctioning of less significant institutions, the foundations of 
the applicable regime are primarily laid down in the CRDIV whose objective was not 
only to bring more consistency to the typology of supervisory powers allowing 
national supervisors to effectively oversee credit institutions, but also equip them 
with “sufficiently strict and convergent sanctioning powers”.603 
Prior to the crisis, European banking sector was one of the areas where national 
sanctioning regimes were divergent and not always appropriate to ensure 
deterrence.604 As already briefly mentioned,605 the accomplishment of the aims set 
by banking and financial regulation, including notably public confidence in financial 
markets, is always dependent upon its effective enforcement which in the area of 
banking supervision cannot be easily detached from its application. This is explicitly 
manifested by such situations, in which there is a need to punish a credit institution 
for breaches of prudential requirements or to restore its compliance with applicable 
prudential regulation. Therefore, in order to strengthen European supervisory 
framework, it became of utmost importance to spell out certain key sanctioning 
powers in the EU law so that effective enforcement of the CRDIV regulatory package 
could be ensured across all the Member States. 
                                                          
603
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment: Proposal for a Directive on 
the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms (…) (above, n.558), p. 3. 
604
 Ibid. 
605
 See supra subsection 6.3.4(vi) (with regard to sanctioning powers in the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision). 
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Relevant Union law empowers the competent authorities to impose administrative 
pecuniary penalties, other administrative measures without necessity to recourse for 
a judicial authorisation. It is also without prejudice to criminal penalties defined in 
applicable national regulations.606 The CRDIV envisages a minimum set of 
sanctioning powers which ought to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”,607 
and which should be imposed on supervised entities in event of a substantial non-
compliance with applicable prudential requirements.608 It obliges Member States lay 
down rules on administrative penalties and other administrative measures”609 as well 
as to retain the power to be able provide higher levels of sanctions.610 Thus, it follows 
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 Notably, it was provided that in cases when the Member States decide not to lay down rules for administrative 
penalties for breaches which are subject to national criminal law they shall communicate to the Commission the 
relevant criminal law provisions. 
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 Ibid., last sentence. 
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 Among the examples of substantial non-compliance (derived from Article 70 of the CRDIV), one can find 
situations in which (i) an institution has obtained an authorization through false statements or any other 
irregular means; (ii) an institution, on becoming aware of any acquisitions or disposals of holdings in their capital 
that cause holdings to exceed or fall below one of the applicable thresholds, fails to inform the competent 
authorities of those acquisitions or disposals (…); (iii) an institution listed on a regulated market (…) does not, at 
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qualifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings (…); (iv) an institution fails to have in place governance 
arrangements required by the competent authorities(…); (v) an institution fails to report information or provides 
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incomplete or inaccurate information on the leverage ratio; (x) an institution repeatedly or persistently fails to 
hold liquid assets (…); (xi) an institution incurs an exposure in excess of the limits set out in the CRR (…);(xii) an 
institution is exposed to the credit risk of a securitization position without satisfying the conditions set out in the 
CRR; (xiii) an institution fails to disclose information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information (…); (xiv) 
an institution makes payments to holders of instruments included in the own funds of the institution (…) or in 
cases where such payments to holders of instruments included in own funds are prohibited; (xv) an institution is 
found liable for a serious breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive 2005/60/EC; (xvi) 
an institution allows one or more persons not complying with the fit and proper requirement to become or 
remain a member of the management body. 
609
 See Article 65(1) of the CRDIV, first sentence. 
610
 See Recital (41) of the CRDIV. 
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that the applicable sanctions for breaches of applicable prudential regulations may 
possibly vary from to a jurisdiction to jurisdiction.611  
The CRDIV provides a range of sanctioning measures, mainly of a non-periodical 
and pecuniary nature.612 In particular, seven specific sanctioning instruments can be 
used by competent authorities that can be grouped into four categories. The first 
category encompasses sanctions of non-periodical and non-pecuniary nature, such 
as “naming-and-shaming” statements,613 and cease-and-desist orders.614 The second 
category of sanctions covers measures of non-periodical and pecuniary nature that 
comprise of administrative pecuniary penalties on supervised institutions,615 
administrative pecuniary penalties on natural persons belonging to those 
institutions,616 as well as of special administrative pecuniary penalties.617 The third 
category refers to sanctions of periodical and non-pecuniary nature that notably 
cover temporary bans against a member of the management body of a supervised 
                                                          
611
 In this context, as stipulated by recital (42) of the CRDIV, “this Directive should be without prejudice to any 
provisions in the law of Member States relating to criminal penalties”. 
612
 As already explained, sanctioning measures are characterized by their non-periodical and (predominantly) 
pecuniary nature intending and can only be applied once for individual cases; enforcement measures are 
characterized by their periodical and (sometimes) non-pecuniary nature and can be applied so long until the 
non-compliance is evicted.  
613
 See Article 67(2)(a) of the CRDIV: “a public statement which identifies the natural person, institution, 
financial holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach”. 
614
 See Article 67(2)(b) of the CRDIV: “an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the 
conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct”. 
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 See Article 67(2)(e) of the CRDIV: “in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 
% of the total annual net turnover including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar 
income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees receivable in 
accordance with Article 316 of the CRR of the undertaking in the preceding business year”. 
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 See Article 67(2)(f) of the CRDIV: “in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 
EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national 
currency on 17 July 2013”. 
617
 See Article 67(2)(g) of the CRDIV: “administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the benefit 
derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined”. 
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institution.618 The fourth group of sanctioning measures relates to exclusion from the 
banking market in a form of withdrawals of the authorisation of the institution.619 To 
highlight the crucial importance of the entry into the banking markets, the CRDIV 
framework provides a detailed sanctioning regime for the breaches of prudential 
requirements related to authorisations of a credit institutions620 and approvals of 
qualifying holdings.621 For these purposes, the NCAs have recourse to “naming-and-
shaming” statements,622 cease-and-desist orders,623 and various pecuniary 
sanctions.624 In addition, they may also suspend voting rights of the 
shareholder(s).625  
The imposition of any of the abovementioned sanctions needs to be carried out in a 
proportionate manner by competent authorities while taking into account all 
relevant circumstances.626 Member States are also obliged to ensure the right of 
                                                          
618
 See Article 67(2)(d) of the CRDIV: “subject to Article 65(2), a temporary ban against a member of the 
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license (Article 66(1)(b) of the CRDIV). 
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 See Article 66(2)(a) of the CRDIV which mirrors Article 67(2)(a) of the CRDIV. 
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duration of the breach, (ii) the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, 
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the total turnover of a legal person or the annual income of a natural person, (iv) the importance of profits 
gained or losses avoided by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, insofar as they can be 
determined, the losses for third parties caused by the breach, insofar as they can be determined, (v) the level of 
196 
 
judicial review of their sanctioning decisions.627 Subject to professional secrecy 
requirements, they should be also published and notified to the EBA which shall 
maintain a central database on all sanctions imposed by competent authorities.628 In 
addition, the ECB may also directly impose sanctions on the institutions supervised 
in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, but only where relevant ECB legal acts 
impose obligations on the less significant institutions vis-à-vis the ECB. 
It therefore follows that the scope of sanctioning powers available for the NCAs 
under the CRDIV framework is broader than one directly attributed to the ECB by 
the SSM Regulation. It follows that the NCAs have recourse to a more 
comprehensive set of sanctioning toolbox than the ECB. The NCAs are empowered 
to impose sanctions both on supervised entities and persons belonging to those 
entities, whereas the ECB may directly sanction only supervised entities and only in 
case of a breach of directly applicable EU legal acts.629 In the field of sanctioning 
competences, the NCAs still play a significant role and remain competent to impose 
sanctions available in under CRDIV regime also vis-à-vis entities directly supervised 
by the ECB.630 To certain extent, such an allocation of sanctioning competences may 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
cooperation of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach with the competent authority, (vi) previous 
breaches by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach and finally (vii) any potential systemic 
consequences of the breach. 
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 See Article 72 of the CRDIV: “Member States shall ensure that decisions and measures taken pursuant to laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive or to Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013 are subject to a right of appeal. Member States shall also ensure that failure to take a decision within six 
months of submission of an application for authorization which contains all the information required under the 
national provisions transposing this Directive, is subject to a right of appeal”. 
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 See Article 69 of the CRDIV. 
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 This also includes ECB Regulation and Decisions, which are however subjected to special regime. 
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 The ECB needs to ask an NCA concerned in cases when it finds appropriate to impose sanctions on natural 
persons for breaches of directly applicable EU legal acts as well as in cases of a breach of national transpositions 
of the CRDIV by both significant supervised entities and persons belonging to those entities. 
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occur problematic in terms of ensuring the equal treatment of credit institutions 
across in the Banking Union, and more broadly, across the Single Market. 
 
 
Figure 7 Areas of supervisory decision-making competence in the SSM 
6.4. Administrative supervisory interactions within the SSM 
The modalities of administrative interactions between the higher and lower level 
actors are considered to be the third element which influences the organisational 
design of a multilevel regime. The SSM Regulation provides that supervisory 
interactions between the ECB and the NCAs within the SSM are governed by three 
main principles: cooperation in good faith, exchange of information and NCA 
assistance to the ECB.631 The SSM, as a multilevel regime, has been defined as “a 
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system of financial supervision consisting of the ECB and NCAs of participating 
Member States”632 which together with the Single Rulebook for banking services and 
new frameworks for banking resolution underpins the construction of the Banking 
Union.633 The reference to the SSM as a system indicates that it cannot be qualified 
neither as an EU institution nor other EU body, but rather as an arrangement 
comprising of independent and, in the same time, interdependent, actors residing at 
different levels. Such a design was driven by a need to avoid setting up a new 
centralized EU bureaucracy and to upstream the aggregated benefits of local 
supervisory expertise towards supranational level. The SSM Regulation broadly 
characterizes the SSM by its objectives rather than its nature. It is expected to ensure 
that the Union’s supervisory is implemented in a coherent and effective manner on 
the basis of the Single Rulebook applicable across the entire Single Market and in 
line with the highest standards.634 A layer of complexity to the SSM’s functioning is 
added by the principle of differentiated supervision set by Article 6(6) of the SSM 
Regulation which distinguishes two SSM supervisory (sub)systems: SSM Direct 
Supervision for significant institutions, and the system of SSM Indirect Supervision 
for less significant institutions. 
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 See Article 2(9) of the SSM Regulation. 
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 See Recital (11) of the SSM Regulation. 
634
 See Recital (12) of the SSM Regulation: a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union’s policy 
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Depending on the applicable SSM supervisory subsystem, supervisory interactions 
between the ECB and the NCAs are moderated in different ways as regards the 
participation in the supervisory process over individual institutions. The following 
subsection will analyze these supervisory interactions in both subsystems in relation 
to three main phases of the supervisory process: (i) the ongoing conduct of day-to-
day supervisory activities which may lead to (ii) the adoption of a supervisory 
decision, and (iii) its subsequent implementation vis-à-vis supervised entity 
concerned where necessary.  
6.4.1. Interactions in the supervisory process of the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision 
Whereas the ECB centralizes the exclusive competence to adopt supervisory 
decisions (phase two) concerning significant supervised entities, the day-to-day 
supervision (phase one) and the implementation of ECB supervisory decisions 
(phase three where applicable) are decentralized and carried out “close to the 
ground”.635 For the ECB, this implies a possibility to take recourse to the 
administrative capacities of the NCAs in order to benefit from their closer proximity 
to the supervised credit institutions.636 The NCAs are responsible for assisting the 
ECB with the preparation and implementation of any acts concerning the exercise of 
                                                          
635
 See Tröger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary 
Assessment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’ (above, n.396), p. 
470. 
636
 The SSM Regulation explicitly recognizes that national supervisors have important and long-established 
expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and 
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those purposes at national level. See Recital (37) of the SSM Regulation, first sentence. See also Teixeira, 
‘Europeanising prudential banking supervision. Legal foundations and implications for European integration’ 
(above, n. 125), pp. 558-560. 
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its supervisory tasks relating to all significant institutions. These responsibilities 
include such supervisory activities as the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a credit 
institution’s situation and related on-site verifications, preparing of ECB draft 
decisions637 (phase one of the supervisory process) as well as ensuring their effective 
enforcement, including the initiation of sanctioning proceedings upon the ECB 
requests where necessary (phase three of the supervisory process).638 
Such an institutional arrangement however does not imply that the NCAs became a 
part to the ECB’s internal structures. On the contrary, they will remain public 
administrative units of participating Member States and are governed by national 
rules in respect of their organization and functions. The way how national 
supervisory apparatus assists and remains closely involved in the supervision of 
significant institutions is primarily realized through the activities of so-called Joint 
Supervisory Teams (JSTs). 
(i) Day-to-day supervision of significant institutions (phase one of the supervisory 
process) 
JSTs are dedicated administrative structures responsible for the operational 
supervision of significant institutions.639 By virtue of the SSM Regulation, each 
significant supervised entity is assigned to a specific JST.640 A JST is composed by 
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 See Recitals (37) of the SSM Regulation and (3) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Recital (36) of the SSM Regulation, last sentence. 
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 See Danièle Nouy, Toward the European Banking Union: achievements and challenges: Speech at the OeNB 
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supervisory apparatus originating from both the ECB and NCAs.641 The vast majority 
of JST members are appointed by NCAs642 who are however expected to work under 
functional management of a JST Coordinator appointed by the ECB from its staff 
members. The composition of a JST needs to take into account geographical 
diversity, specific expertise and profile of the team members,643 as well as different 
types, business models and size of credit institution.644 In particular, the size of JSTs 
may vary substantially depending on the scope of activities of credit institutions. The 
largest JSTs may even comprise of more than 70 members whereas the smallest one 
has only 5 members.645 Therefore, for efficiency reasons, some JST members 
(including JST Coordinators) may be involved in work of more than a one JST.646 
In order to minimize the possible risk of the supervisory capture, a JST Coordinator 
is initially appointed for three years and is expected to rotate on a regular basis.647 
The coordinator is supported by sub coordinators designated by the respective 
NCAs, who are usually also direct line managers of national supervisors assigned to a 
given JST by the NCAs. The sub coordinators are responsible for clearly defined 
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thematic or geographic areas of supervision and represent the views of relevant 
NCAs in JSTs.648 It follows that national supervisors are subject to two reporting 
lines: functionally their ultimate manager is a JST Coordinator, but organisationally 
they are accountable to their respective heads of divisions (who are also often JST 
sub coordinators).649 The sub coordinator may also give instructions regarding the 
conduct of supervisory activities to the members of a JST appointed by his home 
NCA as long as they do not conflict with the instructions given by a JST 
Coordinator.650 
The JSTs operate as remote administrative structures. Whereas the members of JST 
appointed by the ECB (JST Coordinator and ECB supervisors) are affiliated in one of 
the ECB’s intermediate structure pertaining to its supervisory arm,651 the members of 
JSTs appointed by the NCA(s) remain based at their headquarters. Given the 
distance between the supranational and national supervisory apparatus, it was 
decided that JSTs’ workflow management and business process will be fully 
digitalized. For this purpose a special cyberinfrastructure, including the Information 
Management System (IMAS) was set up to provide JST members with secure 
communication channels.652 
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Among the main day-to-day supervisory tasks of JSTs, one can list the following 
ones: 
(1)  Performing the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP);653 
(2) Preparation a supervisory examination programme (SEP), including yearly 
on-site inspection plan;654 
(3) Implementation of a supervisory examination programme (SEP);655 
(4) Coordination of on-site inspection teams in the context of inspection plans.656 
The conduct of SREPs is considered to be the main tool of banking supervision657 
and thus it may be regarded as the primary supervisory responsibility of JSTs. It 
encompasses a wide range of supervisory activities carried out in order to determine 
the risk profile658 of a credit institution, which are subject to a common 
methodology combining quantitative and qualitative elements in the overall 
assessment.659 In doing so, JST supervisors analyze four main characteristics of each 
supervised institution660: its business model,661 its internal governance and risk 
                                                          
653
 See Article 3 (2)(a) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
654
 See Article 3 (2)(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
655
 See Article 3 (2)(c) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
656
 See Article 3 (2)(d) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
657
 See Julie Dickson, Dealing with diversity – the European banking sector: Speech at the 17th Handelsblatt Annual 
Conference on European Banking Regulation (Frankfurt, 2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se161128.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
658
 The risk-based approach (Principle Six) is one of main guiding principles in the SSM. See European Central 
Bank, Guide to banking supervision (Frankfurt, 2014), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision201411.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017, p. 8. 
659
 See European Central Bank, SSM SREP Methodology Booklet: 2016 edition (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/srep_methodology_booklet_2016.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017, p. 2. 
660
 Ibid., p. 14. 
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management,662 its capital position and related risks,663 and its liquidity and funding 
position and related risks.664 The analysis of each element consists of three phases: 
data gathering, initial automated scoring and subsequent scoring based on 
supervisory judgement.665 
The results of SREPs may require undertaking some preventing supervisory 
measures vis-à-vis individual institutions, notably the use of power to impose 
additional capital requirements (Pillar Two “add-ons”) by the ECB. For each 
supervised institution, the assigned JST drafts a SREP report. Importantly, the report 
states how much supervisory (Pillar Two) capital the bank should hold in addition to 
the required regulatory capital. In case there is a need for a capital add-on, a JST 
submits its proposal to the ECB’s Supervisory Board for a draft SREP decision, which 
is subsequently transmitted to the Governing Council in the non-objection 
procedure.666  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
661
 The assessment focuses on the viability (one year perspective), sustainability (two years perspective) and 
sustainability over the cycle (three years perspective) of the business model. 
662
 The assessment focuses on the adequacy of governance and risk management. 
663
 The assessment focuses on the risks to capital (e.g. credit, market, operational risk and IRRBB). 
664
 The assessment focuses on the risks to liquidity and funding (e.g. short-term liquidity risk, funding 
sustainability). 
665
 In this phase, the supervisors use their judgments to account for different business orientations and 
operational styles of a credit institution concerned. They are not however granted full flexibility. As such, their 
judgment is constrained in the following way: on a four-grade scale, phase 2 automated score can be improved by 
one notch and worsened by two notches. Ibid. p. 16. 
666
 As a result of the SREP exercise for 2015, there was a moderate increase in the aggregate overall Pillar 2 
requirements for significant institutions amounting to around 30 basis points as a ratio to risk-weighted assets 
and was quite diversified across banks. See Ignazio Angeloni, Challenges facing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: 
Speech at De Nederlandsche Bank’s ‘Netherlands Day’ (Amsterdam, 2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se161006.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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From 2016 onwards, additional capital requirements imposed in ECB decisions on 
SREPs have two components: a binding Pillar 2 Requirement (P2R)667 and a non-
binding Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G).668 To certain extent, this may be regarded as an 
element introducing more flexible supervisory expectations. While the P2R has an 
immediate effect and non-compliance with lead to the formal breach of capital 
requirements, failing to comply with the P2G will not entail such an effect, but 
trigger instead more intensified supervision and the imposition of institution-
specific measures.669 The JSTs may also set the liquidity requirements564 for 
significant institutions as well as to propose to take additional, specially tailored 
measures choosing from the list of early intervention powers assigned to the ECB.  
The SREP’s outcomes are also used to plan the priorities for JSTs’ supervisory 
activities concerning each credit institution over the following 12 to 18 months.670 
They are incorporated into individual Supervisory Examination Programmes (SEPs) 
which lay down the supervisory cycle and define the scope and intensity of future 
day-to-day supervisory activities for each bank aiming to monitor their risks and to 
address their weaknesses.671 
                                                          
667
 The level of supervisory capital set by P2R will have to be reached immediately and maintained all the time. 
668
 The level of supervisory capital set by P2G will indicate to banks the adequate level of capital to be maintained 
over a longer horizon. A breach of P2G will not trigger automatic supervisory action, nor prevent the distribution 
of internal resources for dividends and bonuses. But it will trigger closer supervisory scrutiny and surveillance. 
669
 See Danièle Nouy, Introductory statement: First ordinary hearing in 2016 of the Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory 
Board at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se160613.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
670
 See European Central Bank, ‘How does banking supervision work?’, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/approach/cycle/html/index.en.html, accessed 01 December 
2017. 
671
 On the recommended content of SEPs, see Article 99 of the CRDIV. 
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The imposition of supervisory measures foreseen by JSTs, both in individual SEPs 
and SREP reports, requires however the formal ECB’s approval and cannot be 
executed at JST level. At this stage, the phase two of supervisory process is initiated 
and higher (supranational) level is primarily involved. The exclusive competence to 
adopt formal supervisory decisions on significant supervised entities is centralized in 
the ECB, which operates through its internal (the Supervisory Board) and decision-
making bodies (the Governing Council). 
(ii) Adoption of supervisory decisions on significant institutions (phase two of the 
supervisory process) 
The adoption of formal supervisory decisions constitutes the phase two of the 
supervisory process. In most cases, it results from the findings collected in the course 
of day-to-day-supervision conducted by the JSTs.672 This phase of the supervisory 
process entirely takes place at the ECB level and consists of (i) the review of the 
proposals of the draft supervisory decision by the Secretariat to the Supervisory 
Board,673 and (optionally) its endorsement by the Steering Committee,674 (ii) the 
endorsement of the complete draft supervisory decisions by the Supervisory 
                                                          
672
 It should be pointed out that the ECB’s intermediate structures or the NCAs may also trigger ECB supervisory 
procedures, notably with supervisory activities authorizations or their withdrawals and assessment of qualifying 
holdings. These supervisory activities carried out by non-JST supervisory staff of the ECB and NCAs who needs to 
liaise with the JST concerned especially with regard to institution-specific issues.  
673
 The Secretariat to the Supervisory Board is an ECB intermediate structure which ensures the efficiency of the 
decision-making processes of the SSM and the institutional quality of its decisions. It supports the Supervisory 
Board, the Steering Committee as other substructures of the ECB supervisory arm.  
674
 The Steering Committee is an ECB internal body whose establishment is foreseen by the SSM Regulation. As 
of January 2017, it consists of eight members, including the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, an 
ECB representative and five representatives of NCAs. Its main tasks include support activities of the Supervisory 
Board, including preparing its meetings. See Article 26(10) of the SSM Regulation. 
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Board,675 (iii) the adoption of the supervisory decisions by the Governing Council676 
in the special non-objection procedure and their subsequent issuance. Despite the 
fact that the decision-making process takes place entirely at the ECB level, the 
national supervisory decision-makers are also involved in all the stages of ECB 
supervisory procedures due to the composition of both the Supervisory Board and 
the Governing Council.  
Once a proposal for the draft supervisory decision has been submitted by a JST to 
the Secretariat to the Supervisory Board through the ECB intermediate structures,677 
a quality check is conducted that includes inter alia the completeness of the legal 
basis of draft decisions. In order to guarantee due process, the Secretariat organizes 
the hearing of the supervised entity concerned where the proposed decision may 
affect it adversely.678 At this stage, the Secretariat usually seeks views and opinions of 
NCAs before transmitting the complete draft proposal to the attention of the 
Steering Committee and Supervisory Board. This takes place through the so-called 
SSM coordination network679 managed by the Secretariat which gathers high-level 
                                                          
675
 The Supervisory Board is an ECB internal body whose establishment is foreseen by the SSM Regulation. It 
consists of the Chair, the Vice-Chair, four ECB representatives appointed by the Governing Council and one 
representative of the NCAs from each participating Member State. Its tasks include the planning and execution 
of the ECB supervisory tasks, proposing to the Governing Council complete draft decisions to be adopted by the 
latter and conduct preparatory works regarding the ECB’s supervisory tasks. See Articles 26(1) and (8) of the SSM 
Regulation. 
676
 The Governing Council is one of three ECB’s decision-making bodies. See Article 129 of the TFEU in 
conjunction with Articles 9 and 10 of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
677
 Importantly, the ECB horizontal services should ensure their consistency across the JSTs (both formally and 
materially) in order to avoid distortions in treatment and fragmentation in line with the Principle Three – 
Homogeneity within the SSM, See European Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n. 658), p. 7. 
678
 See Article 22 of the SSM Regulation, and Article 31 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
679
 This informal network brings together representatives of NCAs’ SSM coordination departments who have 
access to all dossiers submitted to the Supervisory Board, including those requiring formal ECB supervisory 
decisions. 
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officials from the NCAs. Based on the feedback received, the wording of the draft 
decision may be amended (inter alia by changes in wording or actions to be taken) in 
order to accommodate NCAs’ diverging opinions.680 The Secretariat can also return 
the proposal to originating business area and request revisions.  
After the review conducted by the Secretariat and the SSM Coordination Network, a 
proposal becomes a complete draft decision. Depending on the gravity of a foreseen 
supervisory measure, it may be either endorsed by the Supervisory Board in so-called 
written procedure,681 or put on the agenda of the Board’s upcoming meeting where 
there is a need for a high-level discussion.682 In the second case, it is transmitted to 
the Steering Committee which prepares the Board’s meetings.683 The Supervisory 
Board endorses the complete draft decisions by simple majority of its members.684 It 
may however still alter the complete draft decision in order to reflect deliberations 
and discussions between its members that took place during the meeting. 
Finally, the complete draft decision endorsed by the Supervisory Board is 
transmitted to the Governing Council.685 The Supervisory Board’s proposal is 
considered to be adopted unless the Governing Council objects it within a maximum 
                                                          
680
 See Informal interview with L (14 November 2016) in Annex. 
681
 The Article 6.7 of the Supervisory Board's Rules of Procedure provides that decisions may also be taken in a 
written procedure. In those cases, decisions are not put on the agenda of the Board’s meeting but adopted 
electronically. As reported by the ECB, the majority of the Supervisory Board decisions is taken this way, see 
European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmar2015.en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017, p. 11. 
682
 In addition, where at least three members of the Supervisory Board with voting rights object to a written 
procedure, the item shall be put on the agenda of the subsequent Supervisory Board meeting. See Article 6.7 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board. 
683
 See Article 26(10) of the SSM Regulation.  
684
 See Article 26(6) of the SSM Regulation. 
685
 It should be accompanied by explanatory notes outlining the background to and the main reasons underlying 
the draft decision. See Article 13.g.1. of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank. 
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period of ten working days.686 When the Governing Council objects to the complete 
draft decision,687 it is obliged to state the reasons in writing, in particular as regards 
monetary policy concerns.688 In case the NCA(s) affected by the decision have 
different views regarding the objection raised by the Governing Council, they may 
request the Supervisory Board to refer the issue the Mediation Panel.689 The 
notification of a supervisory decision non-objected by the Governing Council to the 
addressee(s) formally concludes this stage of the supervisory process690 unless the 
addressee decides to submit the decision to the Administrative Board of Review. 
(iii) Enforcement of supervisory measures on significant institutions (optional 
phase three of the supervisory process) 
Significant supervised entities are expected to comply with decisions adopted by the 
ECB. However, there may exist instances where ECB supervisory decisions need to be 
formally enforced against their addresses due to a variety of reasons (e.g. refusal or 
inability to comply). In these situations, based on Article 291(2) of the TFEU, these 
would be primarily the organs of the Member States’ administration that would have 
the obligations to implement ECB decisions due to the fact that they enjoy 
                                                          
686
 In emergency situations a reasonable time period shall be defined by the Supervisory Board and shall not 
exceed 48 hours. See Article 13.g.2.of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank ( ‘Decision of the ECB 
of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2004/2)’, in OJ L 80, 
18.3.2004). 
687
 To ensure the effectiveness of the principle of separation, the Governing Council meetings regarding the 
supervisory tasks shall take place separately from regular Governing Council meetings and shall have separate 
agendas. See Article 13k of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank. 
688
 See Article 26(8) of the SSM Regulation. 
689
 The Mediation Panel is an internal ECB body whose establishment is foreseen by the SSM Regulation in order 
to ensure separation between ECB monetary policy and supervisory tasks. It is composed by of one member per 
participating Member State and Chaired by the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. In this regard, see 
‘Regulation (EU) No 673/2014 of the European Central Bank of 2 June 2014 concerning the establishment of a 
Mediation Panel and its Rules of Procedure (ECB/2014/26)’, in OJ L 179, 19.6.2014. 
690
 The ECB may notify its decision in five ways: orally, by delivering a hard copy, by registered mail, by express 
courier service, by telefax or electronically. See Article 35 (1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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administrative sovereignty in their respective jurisdictions. The ECB powers to 
directly enforce its decisions in Member States’ jurisdictions are limited to the 
imposition of pecuniary penalties, including fines and periodic penalty payments 
(PPPs)691 which are provided by the Council Regulation No 2532/98.692 This 
necessarily implies that to a large extent Union law is enforced in the Member States 
on the basis of the national enforcement rules, and is commonly referred to as 
“decentralized enforcement” of Union law stemming from the principle of national 
procedural autonomy.693 In this respect, the NCAs have been clearly made 
responsible for assisting the ECB in the implementation of any acts relating to the 
exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks primarily by means of ongoing day-to-day 
assessment of a credit institution’s situation and related on-site verifications.694  
The NCAs are expected to ensure that a supervisory measure adopted by the ECB is 
effectively implemented in their home jurisdictions. To this end, the SSM Regulation 
provides the ECB with two indirect instruments to enforce its supervisory measures. 
The first one is the power to instruct the NCAs and the second is the power request 
the opening of national sanctioning or enforcement proceedings. The scope of the 
ECB’s power of instruction vis-à-vis NCAs is very broad. It does not only entail a 
possibility to give the NCAs instructions related to the exercise of the ECB’s 
                                                          
691
 PPPs are imposed in event of a continuing breach of a regulation or supervisory decision of the ECB in order to 
restore compliance of supervised entities/persons belonging to them. See Article 129(1) of the SSM Framework 
Regulation. 
692
 See Article 120(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation, see also supra n.597. 
693
 See See Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander Türk, Legal challenges in EU administrative law: towards an 
integrated administration (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009); Cristopher Harding and Bert Swart, Enforcing 
European Community Rules: Criminal Proceedings, Administrative Procedures and Harmonization (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1996). 
694
 See Recital (37) of the SSM Regulation. 
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supervisory tasks,695 but also to make use of their residual powers which stem from 
relevant Union law.696 It implies that in jurisdictions, where NCAs are assigned 
specific enforcement powers, the ECB has a possibility to instruct those NCAs to 
make use of them vis-à-vis credit institutions in order to ensure their compliance 
with the ECB’s supervisory decisions and other measures. As pointed out by Andreas 
Witte, it is still to be determined in the future administrative practice and possible 
jurisprudence whether the ECB should be empowered to use this authority whenever 
it lacks a power to act itself.697  
The second instrument at the ECB’s disposal is to request the NCAs to open 
respective sanctioning or enforcement proceedings vis-à-vis significant supervised 
entities as well as against natural persons belonging to them.698 This option may be 
used by the ECB when there is a need to impose specific penalties of a non-pecuniary 
nature vis-à-vis supervised entities or natural persons for their non-compliance with 
the prudential requirements stipulated in an ECB supervision decision.699 However, 
the request only aims at opening of a proceeding, while the imposition of these 
measures (by a national administrative act) remains within the NCAs’ 
                                                          
695
 See Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation which refers to instructions given by the ECB when performing the 
tasks mentioned in Article 4(1) of that Regulation (SSM supervisory tasks). 
696
 See Article 9(1) of the SSM Regulation, third paragraph. 
697
 See Andreas Witte, ‘The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of 
Executing EU Law?’’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 21 (2014): pp. 89–109 (pp.103-104).  
698
 See Article 18(5) of the SSM Regulation in conjunction with Article 134(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
699
 See Recital (36) of the SSM Regulation: “(…) where the ECB considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its 
tasks that a penalty is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national competent 
authorities for those purposes”. 
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competence.700 The ECB should be informed by the NCAs on the results of these 
procedures.701 In addition, when the ECB suspects that a criminal offence could have 
been committed, it has also the power to request the relevant NCA to refer the 
matter to appropriate law enforcement authorities.702 
6.4.2. Interactions in the supervisory process of the system of SSM Indirect 
Supervision 
The supervisory process applicable to the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision can 
be perceived as encompassing the same three phases as the one governing the 
subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. However, it displays important differences in 
terms of administrative interactions between the ECB and NCAs when compared to 
its counterpart. Whereas formal decision-making on significant institutions is 
centralized at the ECB level, formal decision-making on less significant institutions 
carried out in a decentralized way and is split across the NCAs of nineteen 
participating Member States. This stems from the principle of differentiated 
supervision reflected in Article 6(6) of the SSM Regulation which attributes decision-
making authority on less significant institutions to the NCAs. In the same manner, 
the ongoing conduct of day-to-day supervisory activities and implementation of 
NCA supervisory decisions and other measures are also allocated to the national 
level.  
                                                          
700
 For an overview of sanctioning and enforcement measures provided to the NCAs by the CRDIV, see supra 
n.613 et seq.  
701
 See Article 134(3) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
702
 See Article 136 of the SSM Framework Regulation  
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This however does not imply that the supranational level is isolated from the 
supervisory process concerning less significant institutions. First of all, the NCAs do 
not have their own micro-prudential supervisory tasks within the SSM, but exercise 
supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB by the SSM Regulation. Secondly, NCA 
supervisory process is subject to the special, multidimensional ECB’s oversight 
regime703 including supervisory oversight,704 institutional/sectoral oversight,705 as 
well as analytical and methodological support.706 It therefore follows that the 
outreach of NCAs assistance to the ECB in the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision is built of the relations of information707 than hierarchical subordination 
which however does not exclude a possibility of supranational intervention by the 
ECB. 
(i) Day-to-day supervision of less significant institutions (phase one of the 
supervisory process) 
The NCAs retain full autonomy concerning the internal organization of the 
supervision of less significant institutions. However, as a part of institutional 
adaptation to the realities of the SSM, the majority of NCAs have created separate 
business areas dedicated exclusively to carry out their responsibilities in relation to 
                                                          
703
 The legal foundations of this special regime are based on the ECB’s general responsibility to exercise oversight 
over the functioning of the system. See Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
704
 The main objectives of this oversight dimension are to promote best supervisory practices and develop 
common standards and ensure consistency of supervisory outcomes. For more specific information, see European 
Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n. 658), p. 40. 
705
 The main objectives of this oversight dimension is to oversee sectors and country-specific institutional 
arrangements, exchange information with NCAs on high-priority LSIs and participate in crisis management. For 
more specific information, Ibid. 
706
 The main objectives of this oversight dimension are to prepare methodologies for LSI supervision (e.g. risk-
based prioritization of banks, SREP application) and analyze common sources of risk. For more specific 
information, Ibid. 
707
 See European Central Bank, Public hearing on the draft ECB SSM Framework Regulation (19 February 2014). 
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less significant institutions.708 The scope of the ECB’s oversight over phase one of 
NCA supervisory process over individual less significant institutions varies and is 
related to the specific status of a given institution. Notwithstanding the above, the 
NCAs are obliged to submit annual reports to the ECB, in which they specify the 
activities undertaken on all less supervised entities in the aggregated manner.709 
Secondly, the NCAs shall also notify the ECB about deterioration of the financial 
situation of any less significant entity, especially if this may result in a need for 
public financial support.710 However, for those less significant institutions which are 
considered as “high-priority” ones, the oversight over the phase one of NCA 
supervisory process is more intensified.711 The ECB may request at any time 
information on the performance of supervisory activities targeting high-priority less 
significant institutions.712 The NCAs are requested to ex-ante notify to the ECB any 
“material”713 supervisory procedures concerning high priority institutions. They 
consist of the removal of bank management board members, the appointment of 
special manager and those procedures which have a significant impact on a 
                                                          
708
 See Informal interview with B (09 November 2015, 28 June 2016) in Annex. 
709
 The NCAs reporting requirements are laid down in Articles 99-100 of SSM Framework Regulation. 
710
 See Article 96 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
711
 The ECB determines the scope of supervisory information to be notified by NCAs for which less significant 
supervised entities, in particular taking into account their risk situation and potential impact on the domestic 
financial system (See Article 97 of the SSM Framework Regulation). Based on this authorization, the ECB 
requested to classify their supervised entities into three categories: low, medium and high-priority one. In each 
jurisdiction, there should be at least three high-priority institutions. As of March 2016, 93 LSIs were on the high-
priority list (see https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/hplsi.en.html). 
712
 See Article 97 (3) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
713
 The materiality status of a supervisory procedure is related to the priority rank of the LSI subject to this 
procedure. The ECB has decided to consider all supervisory procedures related to high-priority LSIs as material. 
See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681), p. 42.  
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supervised entity.714 In addition, the NCAs should also notify the ECB those 
supervisory procedures which they consider material,715 and those which may 
negatively affect the SSM reputation.716  
The ECB is empowered to express its views on “material” supervisory procedures 
recommending appropriate course of action and initiate follow-up action.717 For the 
purpose of receiving and assessing such notifications, the ECB established a dedicate 
framework consisting of country-specific desks (Country Desks) and Central 
Notification Point (CNP)718 managed by one of the ECB’s intermediate structures.719 
Furthermore, the ECB’s oversight over the conduct of day-to-day NCA supervision 
also takes place through a range of informal policy instruments, such as a permanent 
Senior Management Network (SMN). This administrative platform groups ECB and 
NCAs managers responsible for LSI supervision who should regularly meet (at least 
on a quarterly basis) to discuss “overarching topics emerging from day-to-day LSI 
supervision”.720 Its role is also to assist the Supervisory Board in the fulfilment of its 
tasks related to oversight and LSI supervision. The SMN is supported by a dedicated 
                                                          
714
 See Article 97(2)(a)(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
715
 See Article 97 (4)(a) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
716
 See Article 97 (4)(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
717
 In total, until December 2016, the CNP received and assessed a total of 179 ex-ante notifications from NCAs, of 
which 141 were notifications of material draft decisions or procedures relating covering a wide range of 
supervisory issues (e.g. capital, liquidity and governance), and 38 were related to the deterioration of the 
financial situation of the LSI. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying 
the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism established pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, COM(2017) 591 final SWD(2017) 336 final. 
718
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681), p.42. Also, the 
functioning of the notifications framework was explained by an ECB official during a bilateral meeting (Informal 
interview with A (13 November 2015, 12 January 2016, 15 July 2016) in Annex). 
719
 To be precise, the Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision III, which is responsible for SSM Indirect 
Supervision. 
720
 See European Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n. n.658), p. 66-67. 
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secretariat which coordinates daily communication and workflows between the ECB 
and NCAs concerning LSI supervision.721 The ECB also organizes bilateral country 
visits and peer-to-peer reviews which allow ECB management to discuss with their 
NCA counterparts country-specific matters concerning its oversight. 
Last but not least, the organization of supervisory workflows on the common 
procedures is another relevant channel for intense administrative interactions 
between the ECB and NCAs. As already pointed out, the common procedures are 
carried out mix of advisory and decisive roles for both national and EU authorities 
and are regarded as an example of a “mixed banking supervisory process in the 
SSM”.722 Although they are not formally subjected to SSM Indirect Supervision 
arrangements, nevertheless the daily-work of national supervisors who prepare the 
draft ECB supervisory decision on matters pertaining to common procedures is 
monitored by their counterparts based at the ECB who are responsible for the 
assessment and review of the draft decisions submitted by the NCAs.723 
(ii) Adoption of supervisory decisions on less significant institutions (phase two of 
the supervisory process) 
Following the principle of differentiated supervision in the SSM, supervisory 
decision-making on less significant institutions is carried out at the NCA level in 
accordance with relevant national administrative procedures. There exists however 
no uniform administrative practice across the NCAs concerning the adoption of 
                                                          
721
 See Informal interview with A (13 November 2015, 12 January 2016, 15 July 2016) in Annex. 
722
 See supra n.527. 
723
 For more details on the division of work between the ECB and NCAs on common procedures, see the 
subsection 6.3.4(iii). 
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supervisory measures. In some SSM jurisdictions supervisory measures resulting 
from day-to-day supervisory activities do not necessarily need to be imposed as 
formal supervisory decisions. In this context, Germany and Austria can be given as 
examples of jurisdiction where the NCAs tend to rely on supervisory dialogue and 
persuasion to communicate their supervisory expectations in order to avoid the 
formal issuance of a SREP decision requiring a supervised entity, for example, to 
hold additional own funds.724 On the other hand, due to strong administrative 
traditions of administrative interventionism, countries like France prefer to conclude 
annual supervisory process by issuing formal individual decisions.  
The ECB’s oversight over the adoption of supervisory decisions by NCAs is primarily 
limited to the use of two instruments that are also widely used in the phase of the 
NCA supervisory process: notifications and annual reporting. The NCAs are 
requested to ex-ante notify to the ECB their willingness to adopt ‘material’ 
supervisory decisions concerning LSIs725 under the conditions as their obligation to 
report on the initiation of ‘material’ supervisory procedures.726 Similarly, the ECB is 
empowered to express its views on ‘material’ supervisory draft decisions and may 
recommends specific changes or amendments, which are however not binding upon 
the NCA concerned. In addition, the NCAs report to the ECB on annual basis on all 
supervisory decisions adopted.727 More importantly, the ECB may issue binding acts 
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such as regulations, guidelines and general instructions that may specify the ways 
how the NCAs adopt their supervisory decisions in relation to NCAs.728 
(iii) Enforcement of supervisory measures on less significant institutions (optional 
phase three of the supervisory process) 
The enforcement of supervisory measures addressed to less significant institutions 
rests solely on the Member States’ administrative apparatus and is subject to 
national enforcement rules and proceedings. The NCAs verify whether credit 
institutions adopted proposed supervisory measures. In the positive scenario case, 
the follow-up will be limited to a monitoring of a credit institution’s situation. 
However, in the negative scenario case when a supervised entity is not willing or able 
to comply with a foreseen measure, the NCAs have recourse a number of sanctioning 
and enforcement instruments which intend to ensure that the supervisory judgment 
expressed by a supervisory decision is followed. In particular, the CRDIV framework 
empowers the NCAs use a range of punitive measures to address non-compliance 
which include pecuniary and non-pecuniary sanctions as well as a possibility of 
market exclusion.729 In the framework of their reporting obligations, the NCAs are 
also expected report to ECB on the administrative sanctions imposed on an annual 
basis. Furthermore, the NCAs may also make use of other sanctioning powers are 
made available to them by national legislators and which are not provided by the 
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CRDIV. This may notably include such public law instruments that impact on civil, 
company or penal law.730 
 
Figure 8 Phases of the supervisory process 
6.5. Jurisdictional outreach of the SSM  
The fourth element of the organisational design of EU multilevel administration is 
related to its jurisdictional outreach. Within the EU constitutional and 
administrative order, there may exist a plurality of regulatory arrangements 
applicable to either all EU Member States or to a subset of EU Member States only. 
The SSM Regulation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States (de iure applicability).731 However, it is legally effective only in the Member 
States whose currency is the euro (de facto applicability) unless other Member States 
voluntary opt-in to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Therefore, the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism can been perceived as a continuation of a trend 
initiated by the Maastricht Treaty which started the first comprehensive experiment 
on differentiated integration by the establishing of the Economic and Monetary 
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Union732 whose supranationalized “M” pillar is applicable only to Member States 
using the single currency. This experiment was to be initially of temporary nature 
due to the explicit Treaty obligation to introduce the euro as the legal tender in 
remaining Member States.733 It was nonetheless petrified by the Lisbon Treaty which 
constitutionalized the permanent differentiation between “Members States whose 
currency is the euro” (euro area Member States) 734 and “Member States with 
derogation” (non-euro area Member States).735 The creation of the SSM adds another 
layer to this differentiation736 by introducing three categories of Member States in 
the context of Banking Union: the euro area, the non-euro area participating 
Member States and the non-participating Member States.  
Although the deeper rationale for the Banking Union is cross-border banking in the 
Single Market737, the SSM as its first and crucial pillar was constructed on the basis of 
the Treaty provisions governing monetary union, and not the Single Market738 which 
limits its compulsory applicability to euro area Member States.739 However, the SSM 
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 See Chiara Zilioli and Martin Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart Pub Limited, 2001), p. 133. 
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may also have the effect on those non-euro area Member States whose domestic 
banking sectors are dominated either by branches or subsidiaries of credit 
institutions headquartered in one of euro area participating Member States.740 In 
these cases, the SSM’s influence on domestic supervisory processes may be 
significant since the supervision of banking groups on a consolidated basis is listed 
among the core activities of the SSM’s prudential supervisors.741 For these reasons 
and with an objective to foster the integrity of the Single Market for banking 
services,742 the SSM Regulation provides non-euro area Member States with an 
option of voluntary opt-in to the SSM by concluding a close cooperation agreement 
with the ECB.743 To provide a more comprehensive picture of the jurisdictional 
outreach of the SSM on the Single Market for banking services, the following 
sections will analyze the status of Member States (i) which are obliged to participate 
in the SSM (euro area participating member States), (ii) which voluntarily decide to 
opt-in to SSM (the non-euro area participating Member States) and (iii) which 
decide to opt-out from the SSM (the non-participating Member States). 
6.5.1. Applicability to euro-area participating Member States 
The legal obligations of an individual Member State to participate in the SSM hinges 
upon the use of the euro as its currency. For these reasons, the SSM Framework 
Regulation specifically distinguishes between a group of euro area participating 
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 Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or'SSM', Part One of the Banking Union’ (above, n.407), p. 61. 
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Member States and the non-euro-area participating Member States.744 For the 
former Member States, the ECB is automatically considered as responsible for the 
supervision of significant institutions operating within their domestic banking 
jurisdictions. Supervisory decisions issued by the ECB are binding and directly 
applicable to supervised entities addressed by them without a need for national 
transposition. They also enjoy the primacy over national supervisory legislation and 
measures.745 The National Competent Authorities (NCAs) of participating Member 
States became integral parts of the SSM’s supranational administrative system, while 
remaining in the same time units of national public administration (“dédoublement 
fonctionnel”).746 Within the SSM, they are responsible for the exercise of the ECB 
supervisory tasks in relation to ‘less significant’ entities. The NCAs cannot be either 
suspended or excluded from the participation in the SSM as long as their Member 
States maintain the status of a Member State whose currency is the euro. The 
transfer of supervisory tasks to the ECB is permanent and irrevocable unless the SSM 
Regulation is changed by the Council in the same procedure applied to its adoption.  
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Since the SSM is integrally related to the single currency, a possibility of leaving the 
mechanism is connected to the specific Treaty provisions on the Economic and 
Monetary Union which provide no possibility for euro area Member States to exit 
from the euro area or be excluded from this group of Member States. The only 
possibility to leave the euro zone is foreseen by Article 50(1) of the TEU which lays 
down a special procedure for withdrawal from the EU. Any national unilateral 
withdrawal from the obligations stipulated by SSM supervisory legislation would 
therefore have to be deemed as infringement of the Treaties and secondary law by a 
Member State (or its administrative apparatus) that subject to the infringement 
proceedings before the CJEU.  
6.5.2. Applicability to non-euro area participating Member States 
Unlike euro area Member States which are legally obliged to participate in the SSM, 
the non-euro area Member States may decide to become parts to the arrangement 
on a voluntary basis. For this purpose, a special procedure of “close cooperation” is 
foreseen in Article 7 of the SSM Regulation. This arrangement constitutes another 
interesting example of an interaction between the EU legal framework and 
intergovernmental and contractual elements747 whose proliferation may be observed 
in the context of the adoption of EU anti-crisis measures. 
The establishment of close cooperation between the ECB and a non-participating 
Member States allows extending the applicability of the SSM and the scope of the 
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ECB’s exclusive supervisory competence beyond the euro area’s core. By these 
means, ECB can assume supervisory responsibilities in non-euro area Member 
States, although in a looser fashion than in euro area Member States. Crucially, the 
ECB cannot impose directly binding supervisory measures beyond the euro area 
because the ECB legal acts, such as regulations and decisions, are not directly 
applicable to non-euro area Member States.748 As a result, the ECB’s supervision over 
significant institutions headquartered in the non-euro area participating Member 
States needs to be carried out by ways of instructions, requests and guidelines to the 
NCAs in close cooperation, and by ways of general instructions on matters 
pertaining to LSI supervision. This indicates at a somewhat incomplete and 
imperfect fashion of the SSM operation when extended beyond the euro area 
jurisdictions.. 
The “close cooperation” procedure is initiated by a non-participating Member State 
which notifies to the ECB and EBA its willingness to become a part to the SSM. From 
then onwards, it becomes a “requesting Member State”.749 In its application, this 
Member State is obliged to make a number of commitments, including: 
(i) to ensure that its NCA will follow all the instructions, guidelines or 
requests issued by the ECB;750 
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(ii) to provide all information on the supervised entities incorporated in its 
jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive assessment 
exercise;751 
(iii) to provide all requested data to the ECB for the finalization of its 
preparatory activities;752 
(iv) to adopt national legislation which ensures that legal acts adopted by the 
ECB are binding and enforceable in its jurisdiction;753  
(v) to ensure that any measure requested by the ECB will be adopted by its 
NCA;754 as well as  
(vi) to provide a copy of the draft relevant national legislation as well as an 
their English translations with a request for the ECB opinion on those 
issues.755 
The ECB reviews the application in the light of the foregoing requirements and 
adopts a decision establishing close cooperation with a requesting Member State in 
case it fulfills all the requirements.756 A requesting Member State is obliged to 
maintain close cooperation for at least three years and only after it may request its 
termination by the ECB having provided reasoned grounds.757 The ECB, on the other 
hand, may suspend or terminate close cooperation when a Member State in close 
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cooperation ceases to fulfill its contractual commitments made in the application 
after having sent a prior warning to a non-compliant NCA in close cooperation.758  
Furthermore, close cooperation may be suspended or terminated also in situations, 
in which a Member State in close cooperation either formulates a reasoned 
disagreement with an objection to a supervisory decision adopted by the Governing 
Council,759 or a reasoned disagreement with a draft supervisory decision issued by 
the Supervisory Board.760 These possibilities result from the fact that non-euro area 
participating Member States are not present in the Governing Council, whose 
membership is restricted only to high-level experts (central bankers) originating 
from euro area Member States. By this token they cannot fully benefit from all the 
decision-making mechanisms provided for euro area participating Member States.761  
When the Governing Council confirms its objection, the relevant NCA in close 
cooperation may notify that it will not be bound by this decision.762 Upon the receipt 
of such a notification, the ECB shall consider a possibility of suspension or 
termination of the close cooperation with the Member State concerned while taking 
into account (i) integrity of the SSM,763 (ii) adverse effect on the fiscal 
responsibilities in EU Member States (including in the Member State in question),764 
(iii) progress in the adoption of supervisory measures by the NCAs of that state 
                                                          
758
 See supra n. 750-752. 
759
 See Article 7(7) of the SSM Regulation. 
760
 See Article 7(8) of the SSM Regulation. 
761
 See Recital (43) of the SSM Regulation. 
762
 See supra n. 759. 
763
 See Article (7)(7)(a) of the SSM Regulation. 
764
 See Article (7)(7)(a)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
227 
 
which are equally effective to the rejected ECB supervisory decision and do not 
impose more favorable treatment of supervised entities within its jurisdiction.765  
Where a Member State in close cooperation disagrees with a draft decision of the 
Supervisory Board, it is obliged to inform the Governing Council of its reasoned 
disagreement.766 The Governing Council shall consider the reasons presented by that 
Member State and explain in writing its decision. As a last resort measure, the 
Member State concerned may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation 
with immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision.  
In a situation, in which a non-euro area Member State terminates the close 
cooperation agreement with the ECB, it is allowed to enter into a new one only after 
the period of three years.767 It follows that close cooperation can be regarded as 
flexible and dynamics administrative arrangements allowing repeatedly opt-in and 
opt-out from supranational supervisory regime. The possibility to challenge ECB’s 
supervisory decisions by Member States in close cooperation may create problems of 
commitment to high supervisory standards in its jurisdiction.768 It remains to be 
seen whether such an institutional design would allow reaping welfare benefits in 
the form of more attractive financing costs for credit institutions operating in the 
“close cooperation” jurisdictions.  
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Until now, Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania were the only non-euro area Member 
States which have informally inquired about entering into a close cooperation 
agreement769 while the United Kingdom and Sweden definitely excluded such a 
possibility. Central and eastern EU Member States have adopted the “wait and see” 
approach, with the Czech Republic being the most skeptical about its possible 
participating in the SSM.770  
6.5.3. Applicability to non-participating Member States 
The SSM’s limited territorial applicability does not imply that it remains in a 
“splendid isolation” from supervisory authorities of those EU Member States which 
do not form part of this administrative arrangement. The SSM Regulation imposes 
on the ECB, which has the ultimate responsibility for the SSM overall functioning, 
obligations to cooperate closely the competent authorities of non-participating 
Member States, especially in the colleges of supervisors.771 To achieve this objective, 
the ECB shall conclude memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the competent 
authorities of EU Member States which remain outside of the SSM.772 Those 
documents should lay down the framework for cooperation and supervision of cross-
border banking groups. In particular, they should clarify the consultations related to 
the ECB supervisory decisions which may have effects on subsidiaries or branches of 
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euro area headquartered banking groups which operate outside of the SSM as well as 
cooperation arrangements in crisis situations, including early warning mechanisms.  
The content of MoUs shall be reviewed on regular basis and include the modalities 
of cooperation in the performance of supervisory tasks.773 In addition, the ECB is 
obliged to conclude MoUs with the competent authorities of those non-participating 
Member States which are home jurisdictions for at least one “globally systemic 
important institution”.774 Furthermore, the ECB also maintains international 
relations with regard to the conduct of the SSM specific tasks.775 In particular, it may 
establish contact and enter into contractual administrative arrangements with 
supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries as well as 
international organizations and financial fora.776 
6.6. Preliminary observations as regards the first structural 
condition affecting formal top-down compliance expectation 
In order to dissect the organisational design of the SSM, this chapter analyzed the 
formal systemic position of the ECB within the SSM by concentrating of the four 
core elements: its constitutional foundations, the distribution of supervisory 
responsibilities between the ECB and NCAs therein, the modalities of administrative 
interactions between the ECB and NCAs in respect to the conduct of operational 
supervision, and its territorial applicability.  
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The analysis has revealed that the SSM supervisory system as whole cannot be 
classified as falling purely under one of the identified models of EU administration. 
This is the consequence of the principle of differentiated supervision, which sets two 
distinct multilevel arrangements within the SSM: the subsystem of SSM Direct and 
Indirect Supervision respectively. On the one hand, the constitutional foundations 
and territorial applicability of the SSM have a universal dimension and are common 
to both subsystems. On the other hand, the distribution of supervisory 
responsibilities between the ECB and NCAs and the modalities of administrative 
interactions between the ECB and NCAs in respect to the conduct of operational 
supervision display some particular features with regard to the subsystem of SSM 
Direct and Indirect Supervision respectively. 
The constitutional foundations, on which the ECB as the higher level actor is based, 
set a scope of intrusiveness of administrative measures (depth) that can be adopted 
vis-à-vis third parties (including lower level actors) within the SSM. The territorial 
applicability of the SSM supervisory system sets the outreach of its jurisdiction in the 
EU (width). Both elements have an external dimension (vis-à-vis actors not 
pertaining to the SSM multilevel administrative regime such as financial market 
participants) and an internal dimension (vis-à-vis actors pertaining to the multilevel 
administrative regime such as the NCAs) influencing the systemic position of the 
ECB in the SSM as a whole. Another of the institutional elements, namely, the 
distribution of supervisory responsibilities and the modalities of administrative 
interactions in the SSM are more of an internal dimension, which greatly influences 
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the position of the ECB and its corresponding shadow of hierarchy specifically with 
respect to the lower level actors (JST/NCAs) in the corresponding SSM supervisory 
subsystems. Due to the variation introduced by the latter two elements, both 
subsystems can be isolated from each other and presented as different models of EU 
administration in accordance with the typology developed in chapter three.  
6.6.1. Organization of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
The subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision can be classified as an example of EU 
centripetal multilevel administration which, however, is limited in its jurisdictional 
outreach and does not cover by default the entire EU. Within this subsystem, the 
higher level actor (the ECB) formally enjoys a strong systemic position and casts a 
long shadow of hierarchy vis-à-vis lower level actors, but these features may be 
undermined as regards its jurisdiction over non-euro area participating Member 
States due to the constitutional limitations concerning the applicability of ECB acts 
beyond the euro area. This finding is based on the following considerations.  
Firstly, SSM Direct Supervision, as a part of the SSM multilevel supervisory system, is 
founded on the direct constitutional mandate laid down in Article 127(6) of the 
TFEU which allows the conferring upon the ECB specific tasks relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions. The Treaties provide solid legal 
underpinnings for the conduct of these tasks as they empower the ECB to adopt 
binding acts upon to which produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties with a view to 
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exercise the Union’s competences conferred upon it.777 With regard to the conditions 
for the application and enforcement of these legal acts, the ECB’s measures binding 
the individuals are not explicitly required to bring about the “approximation effect” 
which would be required in the context of measures adopted within supranational 
regulatory regimes created under Article 114 of the TFEU.778  
Secondly, Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation attributes to the ECB the responsibility 
to carry out directly all SSM supervisory tasks in relation to significant supervised 
entities. SSM supervisory tasks cover key areas of prudential supervision over credit 
institutions and only a small number other prudential tasks have been left within the 
competence of the NCAs. To effectively carry out these tasks, the ECB has been 
vested with decision-making authority in the areas of authorisations, approvals, 
investigations, early supervisory interventions and sanctioning. The ECB may also 
adopt regulations only to the extent necessary to organize or specify the 
arrangements for the carrying out of these tasks.779 Both third parties (i.e. supervised 
entities) and the NCAs can be addresses of these legal acts. Early practice indicated 
that the ECB has interpreted its regulatory competences in a rather broad manner, 
which however has recently raised some concerns from the European Parliament 
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and Council with regard to the separation between regulatory and supervisory 
powers within the European legislative framework.780 
Thirdly, the administrative relations between the ECB and NCAs are based on the 
principle cooperation in good faith781 and far-reaching mutual assistance duties in 
the system of SSM Direct Supervision. The NCAs are obliged to put their resources at 
the ECB’s disposal by appointing their staff members to Joint Supervisory Teams, 
responsible for operational supervision of significant institutions. The ECB is 
responsible for the establishment, composition and leadership of the JSTs which are 
always managed and chaired by an ECB-originating coordinator.782 The NCAs need 
also to appoint JST sub-coordinators from their supervisory staff who assist JST 
Coordinators with regard to the organization and coordination of the tasks in the 
JSTs. All JST members, including those appointed by the NCA, are obliged to follow 
the instructions given by an ECB-originating JST Coordinator.783 In addition, the ECB 
may further shape the administrative interactions with the JSTs and the NCAs by 
issuing instructions to the NCAs as a whole. These instructions may concern the 
scope of NCA assistance obligations when performing its supervisory tasks (for 
example, with respect to the preparation and implementation of any supervisory 
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act).784 An ECB instruction to an NCA may request make use of their powers, under 
and in accordance with the conditions set out in national law.785  
Fourthly, SSM Direct Supervision, seen as an EU multilevel centripetal 
administrative arrangement, does not cover the entire EU. Rather its compulsory 
applicability is limited to only euro area Member States. This limitation imposes a 
constraint on the systemic position of the ECB in the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision, especially where non-euro area Participating Member States decide to 
join the SSM on a voluntary basis. Because acts of the ECB are not binding upon 
non-euro area Member States, the exercise of supervisory powers by the ECB in 
those jurisdictions will hinge upon the implementation by the respective NCAs. 
Similarly, the ECB as a higher level actor will have limited possibilities to issue 
instructions, addressed both to NCA supervisory staff via an ECB-based JST 
Coordinator and the NCA as a whole.  
6.6.2. Organization of the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
The subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision can be classified as an example of EU 
intervention-based multilevel administration, where the higher level actor (the ECB) 
formally enjoys a semi-strong systemic position and casts a shorter shadow of 
hierarchy786 vis-à-vis lower level actors in the comparison to the subsystem of SSM 
Direct Supervision. This finding is based on the following considerations.  
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Similarly to the subsystem of Direct Supervision, SSM Indirect Supervision is 
founded on a direct constitutional mandate laid down in Article 127(6) of the TFEU 
which allows conferring upon the ECB specific tasks relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and, also, is limited in its jurisdictional outreach 
and does not cover the entire EU by default. What however distinguishes the 
subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision from the former, is the allocation of 
responsibilities therein and the modalities of administrative interactions between 
the ECB and NCAs.  
Firstly, Article 6(6) of the SSM Regulation attributes to the NCA the responsibility to 
carry out directly the bulk of SSM supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB in 
relation to less significant supervised entities. The regime set therein allocates to the 
NCAs the responsibility to carry out tasks in seven out of nine SSM supervisory areas 
listed in the Article 4(1) of the SSM Regulation787 and the authority to adopt all 
relevant supervisory decisions with regard to credit institutions considered less 
significant. The purpose of this regime “is to enable decentralised implementation 
under the SSM of the ECB competence by the national authorities, under the control 
of the ECB, in respect of the less significant institutions and in respect of the tasks 
listed in Article 4(1)(b) and (d) to (i) of the Basic [SSM] Regulation”.788 As a higher 
level actor in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, the ECB is responsible for 
                                                          
787
 With exception of the tasks of (i) granting and (ii) withdrawing of authorization of a credit institution (Article 
4(1)(a) of the SSM Regulation) and (iii) assessing changes in the shareholder structure of a supervised institution 
(Article (4)(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation) (“common procedures”). 
788
 See Judgment of 16 May 2017, Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European 
Central Bank ("L-Bank") EU:T:2017:337, para 63. 
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exercising the oversight over the functioning of the system,789 but is not allowed 
directly to exercise its supervisory powers on LSIs in addition to NCAs, with the 
exception of investigations. Neither can the ECB instruct the NCAs regarding their 
supervisory decisions on individual entities. In its oversight capacity, the ECB may 
only request from the NCAs information (either ad-hoc or on continuous basis) 
related to the performance of their supervisory tasks on LSIs,790 and make use of 
investigatory powers vis-à-vis LSIs conferred upon it by the SSM Regulation.791 
Secondly, although the administrative relations between the ECB and NCAs in the 
subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision are also based on the principle of cooperation 
in good faith,792 NCA assistance is based more on relations of information793 than 
hierarchical subordination which does not exclude a possibility of supranational 
intervention by the ECB. The NCAs as the lower level actors remain responsible for 
day-to-day supervision and can autonomously adopt supervisory decisions vis-à-vis 
LSIs. The ECB’s influence in the NCA supervisory process regarding LSIs has an 
indirect dimension and is limited and primarily rests on the issuance of regulations, 
guidelines and general instructions and the NCAs’ ex-ante notifications on certain 
supervisory procedures and decisions. The possibility of ECB direct intervention is 
limited to exceptional situations when the supervision of one or more LSIs needs to 
                                                          
789
 See Article 6(5)(c) of the SSM Regulation. 
790
 See Article 6(5)(e) of the SSM Regulation. 
791
 See Article 6(5)(d) of the SSM Regulation. 
792
 See Article 6(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
793
 See European Central Bank, Public hearing on the draft ECB SSM Framework Regulation (above, n.707). 
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be taken over by the ECB from NCAs in order to ensure the consistent application of 
high supervisory standards.794  
                                                          
794
 See Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Operational design of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism 
7.1. Introductory remarks 
This chapter analyses the operational design of multilevel supervisory subsystems 
pertaining to the SSM with a view to measure the formal capacity of internal 
mechanisms that the bureaucratic principal – the ECB (supervisory apparatus) may 
use to align possibly heterogeneous preferences and objectives of its bureaucratic 
agent the - NCAs (supervisory apparatus), and to reduce the ambiguities of their 
essentially incomplete agency contract. This exercise is a part of the second phase of 
testing of the Enforcement and Management hypotheses on the formal top-down 
compliance expectations in the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. 
These hypotheses offer different explanations as regard the formal top-bottom 
compliance expectation: whereas the Enforcement approach highlights the 
importance of the formal capacity for control, the Management approach 
accentuates the relevance of the formal capacity for cooperation in the relations 
between the principal and the agent. 
It starts with mapping both supervisory subsystems in terms of Principal-Agent 
relations between collective units of EU public administration (section two, III.7.2). 
In order to proceed to the second phase of testing of the Enforcement Hypothesis, 
the next section applies the traditional and conservative Principal-Agent perspective 
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to investigate the formal capacity of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) to control the 
actions of undertaken by the NCA (supervisory apparatus) (section three, III.7.3). It 
focuses on the identification and assessment of ex-ante and ex-post control 
mechanisms at the disposal of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) to monitor and steer 
the action of the NCA (supervisory apparatus) within the subsystem of SSM Direct 
and Indirect Supervision and takes into account their range (forward-
looking/backward looking dimension), intrusiveness (direct/indirect dimension), 
origin (embedded in rules of law/practice), and whether they have been actually 
activated. 
Subsequently, the more recent and liberal Principal-Agent perspective is applied to 
study of the SSM supervisory subsystems in order to move to the second step of in 
testing of the Management Hypothesis (section four, III.7.4). The aim of this section 
is to gauge the formal capacity for cooperation between the ECB and NCA 
(supervisory apparatuses) within the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision. To this end, this section will focus on whether any informal structures 
for cooperation between ECB and NCAs supervisory apparatus have been 
established; and (ii) whether there are any tangible outcomes of that cooperation 
aiming at reducing the ambiguities of the agency contract between the ECB and 
NCAs (supervisory apparatuses) and clarifying contractual expectations of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus), such as system-wide policy stances, guides and 
methodologies on certain aspects of the Union’s policies on prudential supervision of 
credit institutions. 
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Section five presents the outcomes of the assessment of the capacity for control and 
cooperation within respective SSM supervisory subsystems, both from the traditional 
and liberal Principal-Agent perspective (section five, III.7.5). This exercise will 
provide insights into the structure of the second condition which is expected to 
affect the formal top-down compliance expectations within the SSM; and supported 
by the findings of chapter five, will constitute the basis to formulate conclusions on 
the EH and MH hypotheses’ testing exercise in chapter seven.  
7.2. Application of the Principal-Agent framework to this study  
A brief presentation of the main Principal-Agent tenants and various applications in 
chapter four proved the general suitability of this analytical approach to study 
compliance issues in multilevel context. However, in order draw a Principal-Agent 
relation, it is firstly required to present a “Principal-Agent proof” by identifying two 
distinguishable actors, whose relations are hierarchy or dependency-oriented, and 
the respective agency contract that between them.795 
To this end, this section would like to highlight two specific theoretical accounts 
from Principal-Agent review, offered by section three of chapter four, that provide 
solid basis to construct a Principal-Agent relationship between the Union and 
Member States administration, in particular as regards the SSM (subsection one). In 
the next stage, this section maps Principal-Agent relations with respect to the 
subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. In doing so, it identifies the 
                                                          
795
 See Delreux and Adriaensen, ‘Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the 
European Union’ (above, n.272). 
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principal, the agent and the agency contract transferring tasks and responsibilities 
from the former to the latter (subsection two). It also looks at information 
asymmetries and complexity of the contract. Following the assumptions of 
traditional and conservative Principal-Agent perspective, this section also recognizes 
heterogeneity of preferences between the principal and the agent in the SSM 
(subsection three). 
7.2.1. EU administrative system seen as a Principal-Agent relation 
Although the overwhelming majority of the Principal-Agent applications consider 
elected policymakers (majoritarian institutions) as the principals and the 
supranational, international and national bureaucratic actors (non-majoritarian 
institutions) as their agents, section three of chapter four clearly indicates that a 
growing number of Principal-Agent contributions has successfully extended this 
framework to study other existing politico-administrative dynamics. It is noted that 
top-down relationships between the EU and its Member States remain rather under-
researched.796 There exist two specific accounts, one coming from the political 
science literature and other from economics, which support the validity of such an 
approach to the SSM involving a Union-level principal and a Member State-level 
agent.  
The first belongs to Jonas Tallberg who almost twenty years ago developed a 
Principal-Supervisor-Agent model to capture the relations between the Member 
State governments (multiple principals), the Commission and the Court 
                                                          
796
 See supra n.327.  
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(supervisors) and individual member states (multiple agents) in the area of EU law 
enforcement.797 He considers them as a two-level Principal-Agent relationship: 
between the national and the supranational level, which is the decisional phase of 
European integration (with a transfer of sovereignty taking place); and between the 
supranational and national level, which constitutes the post-decisional phase of 
European integration (the exercise of transferred sovereignty). The second account, 
which is already mentioned above, is a recent joint work by Elena Carletti, Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia and Robert Marquez who perceive multilevel systems of centralized 
supervision consisting of central and local supervisors in terms of a Principal-Agent 
relation.798 They assume that the central supervisor heavily relies on the supervisory 
information collected by the local supervisor and this may create agency problems. 
It therefore follows that there seem to be no impediments to apply the Principal-
Agent-oriented lens to model to the relations between the Union and Member State 
administration, provided that the “Principal-Agent proof” can be identified. This 
would be in line with a remark made by Terry Moe who notes that “the whole of 
politics is structured by a chain of Principal-Agent relationships, from citizen to 
politician, from politician to bureaucratic superior, from bureaucratic superior to 
bureaucratic subordinate”.799  
                                                          
797
 See Tallberg, Making states comply: the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the 
enforcement of the internal market (above, n. 367). 
798
 See Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, and Robert Marquez, ‘Supervisory incentives in a banking union’ 
(2016). 
799
 See supra n. 2535.  
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7.2.2. SSM administrative system seen from the Principal-Agent perspective 
In the light of the discussion in the previous section, the remainder of this chapter is 
underpinned by the assumption that the interactions between the ECB and NCA 
(supervisory apparatuses) operating in a respective SSM subsystem can be modelled 
as Principal-Agent relations between the bureaucratic superior as a whole (the 
principal) and the bureaucratic subordinate as a whole (the agent). These relations 
take place in the post-decisional phase of European integration, namely after the 
transfer of the competence from the Member States to the Union. Following the 
differentiation between the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision, 
different business areas and apparatuses of the ECB and NCAs will be identified as 
the bureaucratic principals and bureaucratic agents in the respective SSM 
supervisory systems.800 One caveat is however is in order. In order to reduce 
complexity and highlight the focus of this study on EU administration, the Principal-
Agent relations are constructed exclusively between the ECB and NCA supervisory 
apparatuses considered as bureaucrats (civil servants) by virtue of having a 
standardized employment or civil service relation with either the ECB or NCAs. This 
implies that civil servants who were politically nominated; or sit in decision-making 
bodies of either ECB or NCAs; or have a special non-standardized employment 
contract due to their more high-level and political profile will not pertain to 
bureaucratic Principal-Agent relationship as constructed in the present chapter. 
                                                          
800
 In order to reduce complexity, the Principal-Agent relation is constructed solely between ECB and NCA 
(supervisory apparatus) who can be considered as bureaucrats (civil servants).  
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(i) Mapping a Principal-Agent relation in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
The SSM Regulation confers upon the ECB exclusive competence to carry out a 
number of supervisory tasks (SSM supervisory tasks) over credit institutions 
operating in the Banking Union.801 According to Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation, 
the ECB is directly responsible for the conduct of these tasks with respect to 
supervision of significant institutions,802 and for the adoption of formal supervisory 
decisions resulting from its direct supervisory activities on those institutions. The 
ECB does not however conduct its supervisory tasks relying solely on its own internal 
supervisory resources, functionally separated from its central banking arm.803  
For the purpose of direct supervision over significant institutions, the ECB 
establishes dedicated structures, Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs),804 which to a lesser 
extent consist of ECB staff (mainly located in Frankfurt) and predominantly of NCA 
staff.805 The ECB’s reliance on the NCA resources is justified in functional terms since 
“national supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the 
                                                          
801
 See supra n. 436-444. 
802
 Direct supervision covers also the issuance of so-called “operational acts”, which are non-formal requests to 
supervised entities to take certain action. These non-formal requests to supervised entities constitute the 
overwhelming majority of acts addressed to supervised entities, and formal binding supervisory decisions are 
only issued where a supervised entity does not comply with the operational acts, except for where it is legally 
required, or imposes legal obligations on supervised entities affecting their fundamental rights (SREP decisions, 
imposition of Pillar 2 capital or liquidity requirements or other measures under Article 16(2) of the SSM 
Regulation). See also Informal interview with C (29 January 2016, 21 October 2016) and F (26 October 2016) in 
Annex.  
803
 See Article 1 of ‘Decision of the ECB of 17 September 2014 on the implementation of separation between the 
monetary policy and supervision functions of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/39)’, in OJ L 300, 18.10.2014. 
804
 See Article 3(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
805
 As part of the initial staffing process, the ratio of 25 % ECB supervisory staff and 75% NCA supervisory staff 
was set as a target for JSTs composition, however not in a formalized form. See supra n. 13 and n. 642.  
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supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, 
organisational and cultural specificities”.806 
From the administrative perspective, the JSTs do not form an integral part of the 
ECB, but constitute an external, inter-institutional structure. This is due to that fact 
that NCA supervisory staff assigned to the JST continues to have an employment, or 
civil service, relationship with the respective NCA and their primary reporting lines 
also remain within that NCA. Under Article 3(2) of the SSM Framework Regulation, 
the JSTs are mandated by the ECB to carry out key SSM supervisory tasks on its 
behalf.807 It therefore follows that the foregoing provision can be regarded as setting 
the core features of the “agency contract” between the ECB and NCAs that further 
clarifies the nature and the scope of NCA assistance obligations to the ECB in respect 
to the supervision of significant institutions.808 The foregoing institutional 
characteristics allow drawing a Principal-Agent bureaucratic relation between the 
ECB’s supervisory arm and the NCA/JSTs within the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision since the “Principal-Agent” proof (i.e. identification of two 
distinguishable actors and of the agency contract between them) has been 
presented.  
                                                          
806
 See Recital (37) of the SSM Regulation. 
807
 The JST are be responsible for the execution of the annual supervisory programme for the respective credit 
institution; i.e. it will work in form of a virtual team (in one or more locations) on tasks of banking supervision, 
exchanging information, drafting documents, assessing findings, preparing inspections, etc. 
808
 Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation sets a general rule that the NCAs shall be responsible for assisting the ECB 
where appropriate and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the ECB for the tasks 
conferred on it by this Regulation.  
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Within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, the bureaucratic principal is 
assumed to be represented by the ECB apparatus pertaining to the ECB’s supervisory 
arm responsible for the supervision of significant institutions. This covers the 
following “operational” business areas: the ECB’s Directorate General Micro-
Prudential Supervision I and II (DG-MSI and DG-MSII) which host ECB supervisory 
apparatus in fifteen divisions809; the ECB’s Directorate General Micro-Prudential 
Supervision IV (DG-MSIV) whose ten specialized divisions are responsible for 
horizontal support for DG-MSI and DG-MSII; and the Directorate Secretariat to the 
Supervisory Board (DSSB) which prepares draft supervisory decisions.810  
                                                          
809
 Including ECB supervisory apparatus forming part of the Joint Supervisory Teams (“core JST”). 
810
 In order to reduce analytical complexity, the ECB Supervisory Board and ECB-based representatives in the 
Supervisory Board are not considered as forming a part of the bureaucratic principal. This is due to the fact that 
they do not have standardized civil service contracts with the ECB as all ECB staff members, and by this token, 
cannot be considered as pertaining to ECB bureaucratic apparatus. The ECB Supervisory Board could be however 
perceived as a collective (“political”) principal of ECB supervisory apparatus. This Principal-Agent relation is 
however out of scope of this study.  
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Figure 9 Bureaucratic principal in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
On the other hand, the bureaucratic agent in the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision is represented by the JSTs, and more specifically by the NCA supervisory 
apparatus of participating Member States that has been assigned to them811 and 
functionally separated from the supervision of less significant institutions.812 The 
circumstance the NCA supervisory apparatus dominates the JSTs (in aggregated 
terms) justifies considering them as indeed separate actors within the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision. In addition, NCA supervisory apparatus, which is affiliated 
                                                          
811
 This includes NCA supervisors and NCA sub-coordinators. It is noted that the initial target for JST staffing 
consisted of the ratio 25% of ECB supervisory staff and 75% supervisory staff. See supra n. 805. 
812
 In most NCAs, there exists a functional separation between NCA staff, who form JSTs and are responsible for 
supervision of significant institutions, and NCA staff, who are responsible for supervision of less significant 
institutions. One of interviewees pointed out at much higher workload on the NCA’s arm responsible for 
supervision of significant institutions which introduces somewhat unequal division of labour between JST and 
non-JST supervisors, see also Informal interview with K (17 January 2016) in Annex. 
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in their horizontal business areas supporting both NCA JST and non-JST function,813 
can be also considered as pertaining to the bureaucratic agent.814  
 
Figure 10 Bureaucratic agent in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
(ii) Mapping a Principal-Agent relation in the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision 
As noted above, the SSM Regulation confers upon the ECB exclusive competence to 
carry out a number of supervisory tasks (SSM supervisory tasks) over credit 
institutions operating in the Banking Union.815 However, Article 6(6) of the SSM 
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 Notably including NCA on-site inspections, legal and audit services.  
814
 In order to reduce analytical complexity, the heads of NCA (as well as members of an NCA management 
board) are not considered as forming a part of the bureaucratic agent. This is due to the fact that they are usually 
nominated by government and/or parliament and do not have standardized civil service contracts with the NCAs 
as other NCA staff members. By this token, they should not be considered as pertaining to NCA bureaucracy but 
rather as its political/technocratic leaders. The head of the NCA could be however perceived either as forming a 
part of a collective principal, the ECB Supervisory Board, whose agents is ECB supervisory apparatus. She/he 
could be also perceived as an agent of national government (elected policy-makers). These Principal-Agent 
relations are however out of scope of this study. 
815
 See supra n.801. 
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Regulation attributes to the NCAs direct responsibility to exercise the ECB’s 
exclusive competence to carry out seven out of nine SSM supervisory tasks with 
respect to less significant institutions,816 and empowers them to adopt all relevant 
supervisory decisions on them. As noted by the Court, the sole purpose of Article 
6(6) of the SSM Regulation “is to enable decentralised implementation under the 
SSM of the ECB competence by the national authorities, under the control of the 
ECB, in respect of the less significant institutions and in respect of the tasks listed in 
Article 4(1)(b) and (d) to (i) of the Basic [SSM] Regulation”.817 Therefore, the ECB 
does not carry out direct supervision of less significant institutions on its own, but – 
as in the case of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision - takes recourse to the 
NCAs resources for functional reasons.818 Consequently, Article 6(6) of the SSM 
Regulation can be regarded as setting the core features of the “agency contract” 
between the ECB and NCAs that delineates the scope of NCA assistance obligations 
to the ECB in respect to supervision of less significant institutions. The foregoing 
institutional characteristics allow drawing a Principal-Agent bureaucratic relation 
between the ECB’s supervisory arm and the NCAs within the subsystem of SSM 
Indirect Supervision since the “Principal-Agent” proof (i.e. identification of two 
distinguishable actors and of the agency contract between them) has been 
presented.  
                                                          
816
 With exception of the tasks of (i) granting and (ii) withdrawing of authorization of a credit institution (Article 
4(1)(a) of the SSM Regulation) and (iii) assessing changes in the shareholder structure of a supervised institution 
(Article (4)(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation) (“common procedures”). 
817
 See supra n.788, para 63. 
818
 See supra n. 636. 
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Within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, the bureaucratic principal is 
assumed to be represented by the ECB apparatus pertaining to the ECB’s supervisory 
arm responsible for the oversight over supervision of less significant institutions by 
the NCAs. This covers the following “operational” business areas: the ECB’s 
Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision III (DG-MSIII) which hosts ECB 
supervisory apparatus in three divisions responsible for different dimensions of 
supervisory oversight. It is supported by the Directorate Secretariat to the 
Supervisory Board (DSSB) which prepares draft supervisory decisions.819  
 
Figure 11 Bureaucratic principal in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
 
                                                          
819
 In order to reduce analytical complexity, the ECB Supervisory Board and ECB-based representatives in the 
Supervisory Board are not considered as forming a part of the bureaucratic principal. This is due to the fact that 
they do not have standardized civil service contracts with the ECB as all ECB staff members, and by this token, 
cannot be considered as pertaining to ECB bureaucratic apparatus. The ECB Supervisory Board could be however 
perceived as a collective principal of ECB supervisory apparatus. This Principal-Agent relation is however out of 
scope of this study.  
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On the other hand, the bureaucratic agent in the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision is assumed to be represented by NCA supervisory apparatus of 
participating Member States that has not been assigned to the Joint Supervisory 
Teams and is responsible for the supervision of less significant institutions.820 This 
also includes supervisory apparatus affiliated in NCA horizontal business areas 
(including on-site inspections, legal services) which supports both NCA JST and non-
JST function.821  
 
Figure 12 Bureaucratic agent in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
                                                          
820
 In most NCAs, there exists a functional separation between NCA staff, which forms JSTs and is responsible for 
supervision of significant institutions, and NCA staff, which is responsible for supervision of less significant 
institutions. See Informal interview with A (13 November 2015, 12 January 2016, 15 July 2016) in Annex. 
821
 In order to reduce analytical complexity, the head of NCA management and top NCA management are not 
considered as forming a part of the bureaucratic agent. This is due to the fact that they are usually nominated by 
government and/or parliament and do not have standardized civil service contracts with the NCAs as other NCA 
staff members. By this token, they should not be considered as pertaining to NCA bureaucracy but rather as its 
political/technocratic leaders. The head of the NCA could be however perceived either as forming a part of a 
collective principal, the ECB Supervisory Board, whose agents is ECB supervisory apparatus. She/he could be also 
perceived as an agent of national government (elected policy-makers). These Principal-Agent relations are 
however out of scope of this study. 
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7.2.3. Heterogeneity of preferences within SSM on Union’s policies related to 
prudential supervision of credit institutions 
In addition to the identification of the “Principal-Agent proof”, traditional and 
conservative perspectives on Principal-Agent relations require to demonstrate that 
the principal and the agent as rational actors are expected to display inherently 
diverging preferences. These preferences are assumed to be rather static and not 
prone to change over time. On the other hand, more recent and liberal Principal-
Agent applications consider the preferences of the principal and the agents as a 
variable rather than a necessary condition to apply the model to a particular 
situation.822 In particular, where Principal-Agent environment is characterized by 
high complexity of policy-making, preference formation is considered to be a 
dynamic process. By reducing its informational advantage, the agent is expected to 
better inform the principal about its preferences. The principal, in turn, is expected 
to take them into account when forming its preferences.  
Since traditional and conservative Principal-Agent approach is used to test the 
Enforcement hypothesis, it is necessary to demonstrate that the preferences of the 
ECB and NCA (supervisory apparatuses) are likely to be originally heterogeneous. 
Before undertaking this exercise, one caveat is in order. It needs to be emphasized 
that the assumptions regarding preferences of the principal and the agent may not 
                                                          
822
 See Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, ‘Principal-agent models: an expansion?’, Journal of public 
administration research and theory 8, no. 2 (1998): pp. 173–202; Anne Rasmussen, ‘EU conciliation delegates: 
Responsible or runaway agents?’, West European Politics 28, no. 5 (2005): pp. 1015–1034; Manfred Elsig, 
‘European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and informal decision -
making’, Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 6 (2010): pp. 781–798; Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt, ‘Variation 
in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): pp. 403–419; Johan Adriaensen, National Administrations in EU Trade Policy: 
Maintaining the Capacity to Control (Springer, 2016). 
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necessarily reflect the state of things as they actually exist, but rather only a situation 
where “conditions in the world approximate the conditions assumed in the model, 
observed behaviours and outcomes can be expected to approximate predicted 
behaviours and outcomes”.823 Therefore, following the advice given by Gary King, 
Robert Keohane and Sidney Zerba, one should consider the conditions assumed in 
the model as solely abstracting the “right” features of the reality they represent.824 
The Principal-Agent framework is largely about efficient allocation of tasks and 
responsibilities between the parties to the agency contract which is driven by a 
desire to multiply the principal’s gains and benefits in highly complex policy areas.825 
Based on the rational choice underpinnings of the Principal-Agent approach, it is 
argued that ECB and NCA (supervisory apparatuses) are likely to display diverging 
policy preferences and objectives concerning Union’s policies related to prudential 
supervision of credit institutions when interacting in the subsystems of SSM Direct 
and Indirect Supervision.  
(i) The preferences and objectives of the ECB-principal 
In line with rational choice underpinnings of the institutional analysis offered by this 
dissertation, the ECB Banking Supervision is considered to act as self-utility 
maximizer826 when pursuing its objective of “contributing to the safety and 
                                                          
823
 See Ostrom Elinor, Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge, 1990), p. 183. 
824
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative 
research (Princeton university press, 1994), p. 49. 
825
 See supra n.256. 
826
 See supra n. 261. 
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soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the 
Union and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and 
integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a 
view to preventing regulatory arbitrage.”827 To achieve these objectives, the ECB is 
likely to initially display the “integrationist” preference across different supervisory 
policy fields in order to promote “ever closer (Banking) Union”,828 understood in 
terms of “ensuring the consistent application of the Single Rulebook to credit 
institutions”,829 and harmonizing supervisory practices to ensure level playing field 
for all banks operating in the Banking Union’s jurisdictions.830 
Such an ECB stance on its policy preferences and objectives in the SSM can be 
explained by the assumption that it leads to its institutional self-aggrandizement831 
in relation to Member States’ administration, which is in line with the rational 
choice expectations concerning the behaviour of higher level actors operating in a 
multilevel (federal) context.832 Under the assumption that a unit of supranational 
                                                          
827
 See Article 1(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
828
 See Preamble to TEU, on the somewhat ambiguous meaning of ‘ever closer Union’, see for example Simon 
Glendinning and Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, Ever Closer Union: Report of the hearing held on 15th April, 2016, LSE 
European Institute, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/Hearing-10---Ever-Closer-Union-
REPORT.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017. 
829
 See Recital (87) of the SSM Regulation. 
830
 Between February 2014 and December 2017, the formulation “ensuring/fostering the level playing field” across 
institutions headquartered in the Banking Union has appeared more than 100 times in official communication of 
the ECB supervisory apparatus, see the official website of the ECB’s supervisory function (ECB Banking 
Supervision) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches (accessed on 01 December 2017).   
831
 See R. Daniel Kelemen assumes that this is the key preference of both federal (supranational) and state 
(national) actors operating in a multilevel setting. See R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘The structure and dynamics of EU 
federalism’, Comparative Political Studies 36, 1-2 (2003): pp. 184–208. In this context, self-aggrandizement is 
understood as a desire to increase the power and prestige of supranational administrative apparatus. 
832
 On a near consensus in the literature on EU integration regarding generally pro-integrationist preferences of 
supranational institutions, see for example Tallberg, European governance and supranational institutions: making 
states comply (above, n. 252); Pollack, ‘The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the 
European’ (above, n. 375); Laura Cram, ‘The Politics of EU Policy-Making: Conceptual Lenses and the Integration 
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administration (such as the ECB Banking Supervision) is a collective actor,833 its 
preference can be also ascribed to its bureaucratic apparatus834 whose career 
opportunities depend on the strength of their allegiance and loyalty to the hiring 
institution.835 
(ii) The preferences and objectives of the NCA-agent 
In line with rational choice underpinnings of the institutional analysis offered by this 
dissertation, the NCA is considered to act as self-utility maximizer in the same 
manner as the ECB’s supervisory function (ECB Banking Supervision).836 Unlike the 
latter, the NCA as a part of national administration have jurisdiction-specific 
objectives in ensuring to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system and are expected to promote domestic interests (like 
for example economic growth). To achieve these objectives, the NCA is likely to 
display initially the “home-biased” (particularist) preference across different 
supervisory fields in order to minimize adjustment costs of their domestic banking 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Process’, LondonINew York: Routledge (1997); Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 
1996); George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (Cambridge Univ Press, 1995); Charles Grant, Delors: 
Inside the house that Jacques built (Nicholas Brealey London, 1994). 
833
 See  Benz, ‘European public administration as a multilevel administration: a conceptual framework’ (above, n. 
166), p. 42. 
834
 On the loyalties of supranational officials, see also Cris Shore, Building Europe: The cultural politics of 
European integration (Routledge, 2013); Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Supranational activists or intergovernmental agents? 
Explaining the orientations of senior Commission officials toward European integration’, Comparative Political 
Studies 32, no. 4 (1999): pp. 435–463. 
835
 On the motivations on bureaucrats participating in politico-administrative processes, see notably Gordon 
Tullock, The politics of bureaucracy (Public Affairs Pr, 1965); Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, ‘The 
industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets’, Journal of 
Political Economy 96, no. 1 (1988): pp. 132–163; Terry M. Moe, ‘Politics and the Theory of Organization’, Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization 7, special issue (1991): pp. 106–129. 
836
 See supra n. 826826. 
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sector.837 This can be understood in terms of widening flexibility and “room for 
manoeuvre” in the application of the Union’s supervisory policies in its home 
jurisdiction.  
Such a preference is expected to preserve the prominence of NCA institutional status 
both in domestic jurisdictions and in relation to ECB Banking Supervision seen as a 
higher level actor,838 and would in line with the rational choice expectations 
concerning the behaviour of lower level actors operating in a multilevel (federal) 
context. Under the assumption that a unit of national administration (such as the 
NCA) is a collective actor,839 its preference can be also ascribed to its bureaucratic 
apparatus840 whose career opportunities depend on the strength of their allegiance 
and loyalty to the hiring institution.841 
                                                          
837
 See, indicatively, David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, The Political Economy of European Banking Union 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, ‘The comparative political economy of Basel 
III in Europe’, Policy and Society 35, no. 3 (2016): pp. 205–214; Domenico Lombardi and Manuela Moschella, 
‘Domestic preferences and European banking supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’, West European Politics 39, no. 3 (2016): pp. 462–482; Aneta B. Spendzharova and Ismail Emre 
Bayram, ‘Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects Sweden and the Baltic 
States’, West European Politics 39, no. 3 (2016): pp. 565–584; David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, ‘Internationalised 
banking, alternative banks and the Single Supervisory Mechanism’, West European Politics 39, no. 3 (2016): pp. 
438–461. 
838
 On national supervisors home-biased supervisory perspective, see (for example) Nicolas Véron, ‘Europe's 
Banking Union’, The New International Financial System: Analyzing the Cumulative Impact of Regulatory Reform 
48 (2015): p. 131; Javier Bilbao-Ubillos, The Economic Crisis and Governance in the European Union: a critical 
assessment (Routledge, 2013), p.33; Howarth, Quaglia and Gren, ‘Supranational banking supervision in Europe: 
The construction of a credible watchdog’ (above, n.394). 
839
 As noted by Tobias Tröger, national supervisors “will discharge their duties in a way that allows them to 
acquire favourable reputation among their peers, among the general public and in the media”, see Tröger, ‘The 
Single Supervisory Mechanism–Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary Assessment of the New 
Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement’ (above, n.396), p. 476. 
840
 On the loyalties of supranational officials, see also Shore, Building Europe: The cultural politics of European 
integration (above, n. 941); Hooghe, ‘Supranational activists or intergovernmental agents? Explaining the 
orientations of senior Commission officials toward European integration’ (above, n.834). See also Informal 
interview with F (25 October 2016) and G (10 March 2017) in Annex. 
841
 This is due to the fact advancement of their future carrier in administration, politics or private sector make 
them prone to promoting the interests of those who offer most desirable career path in a long term, see supra n. 
584. However, as Michelle Cini notes, “the appointment of temporary staff encourages an intermingling of 
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7.3. The formal capacity for control in the SSM 
According to the Enforcement approach, the assessment of the formal capacity of 
the ECB (supervisory apparatus) to control the NCA (supervisory apparatus) in the 
SSM constitutes the second phase of determining the expectation for formal top-
down compliance therein. The formal capacity of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) to 
control the NCA (supervisory apparatus) within the subsystems of SSM Direct and 
Indirect Supervision can be measured by employing traditional and conservative 
Principal-Agent perspective on their relations. This perspective advocates that 
higher levels of the agent’s compliance can be achieved where the principal has 
adequate control mechanisms at its disposal.  
These mechanisms consist of ex-ante and the ex-post controls, which ideally should 
be are backed by the principal’s recourse to coercion or constraint. In other words, 
they are binding upon the agents and can be enforced (either directly or indirectly) 
by the principal against them. They may cover a variety of aspects relating to the 
Principal-Agent interactions. The ex-ante devices can address the ambiguities of the 
incomplete agency contract, such as establishing additional rules of law defining the 
scope and modalities of the agency, formulation of performance expectations, 
applicable procedural requirements, internal ordinances, and manuals. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
national and European administrators which itself has the potential to provoke a sort of process of 
Europeanisation at the national and subnational levels”, see Michelle Cini, The European Commission: 
leadership, organisation, and culture in the EU administration (Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 121. On the 
possibilities of national officials loyalty shifts, see also Jarle Trondal, ‘The parallel administration of the European 
Commission: National officials in European clothes?’ (2003); Jarle Trondal, ‘Beyond the EU membership-non-
membership dichotomy? Supranational identities among national EU decision-makers’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 9, no. 3 (2002): pp. 468–487; Jeffrey Lewis, ‘The methods of community in EU decision-making and 
administrative rivalry in the Council's infrastructure’, Journal of European Public Policy 7, no. 2 (2000): pp. 261–
289. 
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legally binding instruments adopted by the ECB (supervisory apparatus) in a view of 
clarifying in advance the internal functioning of the respective SSM supervisory 
subsystems can be considered as a particular type of ex-ante controls. The ex-post 
controls represent backward-looking perspective allowing the ECB to react (through 
steering or intervention) to undesired activities of the JSTs/NCAs can be classified as 
the ex-post procedures. In addition, they could be regarded as “police patrols” if they 
are centralized and can be directly used by the ECB or as “fire alarms” if they are of 
decentralized and indirect nature. 
This section will identify and assess formal ex-ante and ex-post controls which the 
bureaucratic principal (ECB supervisory apparatus) has over its bureaucratic agent 
(NCA supervisory apparatus) with respect to the subsystem of SSM Direct (III.7.3.1) 
and Indirect Supervision (III.7.3.2). While carrying out their credibility assessment, it 
will take into account their range (forward-looking/backward looking dimension) 
intrusiveness (direct/indirect dimension), origin (embedded in rules of law/practice) 
and whether they have been actually activated.  
7.3.1. The ECB’s control mechanisms in the system of SSM Direct Supervision 
The formal ex-ante controls842 
Legally binding instruments adopted by the ECB in a view of clarifying in advance 
the internal functioning of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision can be regarded 
                                                          
842
 The selection was based on the analysis whether these measures introduce specific rules of law which have a 
substantial impact on the national supervisory apparatus (NCAs) and which it is bound to observe. As noted by 
one interviewee, the design of the SSM rests primarily on binding rules of law rather than non-binding rules of 
practice. See Informal interview with M (08 November 2016) in Annex. 
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as particularly relevant ex-ante controls aiming to clarify the ambiguities of the 
assistance contract between the ECB (supervisory apparatus) and NCA (supervisory 
apparatus) in the JSTs. These acts may not only affect the regulatory environment in 
which significant supervised entities operate, but also normatively frame or reframe 
various aspects of interactions between the ECB and NCAs and their supervisory 
apparatuses in the SSM. Moreover, they may are regarded as further stipulating 
technical rules of law, which supranational and national supervisory apparatus is 
always bound to observe.  
The ECB may develop such rules that are binding upon the NCA when carrying out 
prudential supervision over significant institutions. As provided by the SSM 
Regulation, the ECB can adopt Regulations843 and Decisions844 which however need 
to comply with the Single Rulebook legislation.845 Furthermore, the ECB can issue 
instructions to the NCAs of participating Member States when carrying out 
                                                          
843
 A Regulation is a legal act of general applicability, binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States without the need for implementation in national law, see Article 288(2) of the TFEU. However, Article 4(3) 
of the SSM Regulation limits adoption to the extent necessary in order to organize or specify the modalities for 
carrying out its supervisory tasks.  
844
 A Decision is an act with a specific scope of application (the addressees), binding in its entirety for those to 
whom it is addressed, see Article 288(4) of the TFEU. There can also be Decisions without addressees, also 
referred to as “general Decisions” which have general applicability. It is noted that general decisions (or decisions 
without addressees) are specifically mentioned in art. 288 TFEU: “A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A 
decision that specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them”. This paragraph refers also to 
the possibility of issuing decisions without addressees (or general decisions) that will be legally binding and have 
general applicability. 
845
 In particular, when adopting supervisory acts, the ECB must apply all relevant Union law and, where the 
Union law is in the form of directives, the national legislation transposing those directives. The acts of the ECB 
are also subject to binding regulatory and implementing technical standards developed by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and adopted by the Commission. 
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supervision of significant institutions.846 Similarly, ECB-based coordinators of JSTs 
may issue instructions to NCA supervisory staff.847  
In this respect, the ECB has adopted a number of legal acts relating to the 
supervision of significant institutions which touch upon the relations of its 
supervisory apparatus with their NCA counterparts, and more broadly, with the 
NCAs as a whole. Among them, the following instruments should be mentioned: (i) 
the SSM Framework Regulation,848 (ii) the Decision ECB/2014/29,849 (iii) the 
Regulation ECB/2015/13,850 (iv) the Regulation ECB/2016/4,851 (v) the Decision 
ECB/2016/40,852 as well as (v) the Decision ECB/2014/5853 regulating the interactions 
with those Member States which decided to opt-in to the SSM. All these legal acts 
can be regarded as the ex-ante controls in a sense that they clarify complement the 
SSM Regulation - the basic and high-level act governing the functioning of the 
subsystem of SSM Direct (and Indirect) Supervision.  
                                                          
846
 See Article 9(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
847
 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. It needs to be pointed out that the issue of whether or not 
such instructions would be enforced vis-à-vis individual NCA staff members is problematic, mainly due to the 
lack of employment/civil service relationship between the ECB and NCA supervisory staff assigned to the JSTs. 
848
 See ‘Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework 
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities (ECB/2014/17): SSM Framework Regulation’ 
(above, n.74). 
849
 See ‘Decision of the ECB of 2 July 2014 on the provision to the European Central Bank of supervisory data 
reported to the national competent authorities by the supervised entities pursuant to Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 (ECB/2014/29)’ (above, n.74). 
850
 See ‘Regulation (EU) 2015/534 of the ECB of 17 March 2015 on reporting of supervisory financial information 
(ECB/2015/13)’ (above, n.74). 
851
 See ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the ECB of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available 
in Union law (ECB/2016/4)’ (above, n.74). 
852
 See ‘Decision (EU) 2017/933 of the ECB of 16 November 2016 on a general framework for delegating decision-
making powers for legal instruments related to supervisory tasks (ECB/2016/40)’ (above, n.74). 
853
 See ‘Decision of the ECB of 31 January 2014 on the close cooperation with the national competent authorities of 
participating Member States whose currency is not the euro (ECB/2014/5)’ (above, n.74). 
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(i) The SSM Framework Regulation854 
The SSM Framework Regulation is an act issued by the ECB which can be considered 
as instituting a range of the ex-ante controls which frame the interactions between 
the supranational and national apparatus in various aspects of the SSM. It lays down 
the specific arrangements governing the structures and the ways of the supervision 
of significant855 (SSM Direct Supervision) and less significant institutions856 (SSM 
Indirect Supervision), supervision of the consolidated basis857, supplementary 
supervision858 and the passporting issues.859 It also sets out the operational principles 
governing the interactions of the ECB and NCAs860 and their respective supervisory 
apparatuses, due process861 and reporting of breaches of supervisory legislation.862 In 
the context of the supervision of significant institutions, it introduces the concept of 
Joint Supervisory Teams (JST) for each supervised entity and lays down their 
composition and leadership. The JST overwhelmingly consist of local experts from 
the NCAs of participating Member States working under the overall coordination of 
the ECB coordinator which ensures that “JSTs take a European perspective”.863 
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 See supra n.848. 
855
 See Part II, Title 1, Chapter 1 of the SSM Framework Regulation. The importance of the SSM Framework 
Regulation as a mechanism to fill-in the SSM agency contract was additionally emphasized in the data 
triangulation stage, see notably Informal interview with N (03 March 2017) in Annex. 
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 See Part II, Title 1, Chapter 2 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part II, Title 2 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part II, Title 4 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part II, Title 3 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part III, Title 1 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part III, Title 2 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Part III, Title 3 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Danièle Nouy, Launch of the SSM – what will change in banking supervision and what are the imminent 
impacts on the banking sector?, Speech at the Third FIN-FSA Conference on EU Regulation and Supervision 
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Furthermore, the SSM Framework Regulation also stipulates the specific 
methodology for the assessment of the significance of institutions864 which is of a 
crucial importance to delineate the scope of EU Direct and Indirect Supervision 
within the SSM. This activity can be regarded a crucial exercise since it enables to 
determine which of the around 4,500 individual credit institutions in the euro area 
will be deemed significant.865 It also sets the scope of the direct supranational 
supervision by allocating them to one of the applicable SSM administrative sub-
arrangement.  
Lastly, the SSM Framework Regulation also clarifies the management of common 
procedures,866 further develops the close cooperation arrangements for non-euro 
area participating Member States which join the SSM and regulates the exercise of 
supranational supervisory competence related to the imposition of administrative 
penalties, information requests, general investigations and on-site inspections.  
(ii) Decision ECB/2014/29 (on the provision of supervisory data)867 
The SSM Regulation obliges the ECB and NCAs to cooperate in good faith and 
exchange the information.868 It also requires the NCAs to provide the ECB directly 
with all information necessary for the purposes of carrying out its supervisory tasks 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(Helsinki, 5 June), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2014/html/se140605.en.html, 
accessed 20 February 2017. 
864
 See Part IV of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
865
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmar2016.en.pdf?e6209395b9450c2655f04a4e24ffa463, 
accessed 01 December 2017, p. 49. 
866
 This aspect is addressed subsequently in subsection 7.3.2(ii). 
867
 See supra n. 849. 
868
 See Article 6(2), first sentence of the SSM Regulation. 
263 
 
as well as well to grant the access to the information reported by the institutions.869 
As instructed by the SSM Framework Regulation, this information shall be provided 
in a timely and accurate manner and include input stemming from the NCAs’ 
verifications and onsite activities.870 Furthermore, in situations where the ECB 
directly obtains information on credit institutions, it is also obliged to forward this 
information to the NCA(s) concerned in order to enable them to carry out their 
assistance role871 and their tasks related to prudential supervision.872 In this context, 
the ECB Decision on the provision of supervisory data can be regarded as an ex ante 
control since it organizes the processes relating to collection and quality review of 
data reported by both NCAs and supervised entities. Notably, it sets the specific 
remittance dates,873 details of data quality checks to be performed by NCAs before 
submission,874 qualitative information requirements,875 and specifications of the 
transmission formats.876  
(iii) Regulation ECB/2015/13 (on reporting of supervisory financial information)877 
This Regulation complements the ECB Decision on the provision of supervisory data 
by further specifying the requirements concerning the reporting of supervisory 
financial information on significant (and less significant) entities by the NCAs. 
                                                          
869
 See Article 6(2), second sentence of the SSM Regulation. 
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 See Article 21(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Article 21(2) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
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 See Article 3 of the Decision ECB/2014/29. 
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 See supra n. 850. 
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Under the Single Rulebook legislation, supervisory financial reporting (FINREP) is 
only mandatory for institutions applying International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) at the consolidated level. In this context, the Commission 
Implementing Regulation878 is not intended to be the unique source of regular 
standardized information to be used in day-to-day supervision. Although it provides 
for maximum harmonization of supervisory information in key areas, it does not 
cover the entire spectrum of supervisors´ needs concerning regular reporting. For 
these reasons, the competent authorities have options to extend financial reporting 
obligations to other supervised entities.879 
The ECB Regulation broadens the regular reporting of supervisory financial 
information to specific institutions applying international accounting standards 
(IFRS)880 and the obligation to report supervisory financial information (FINREP) on 
a consolidated basis to credit institutions applying national accounting frameworks 
(nGAAP).881 Regarding significant supervised entities, it regulates the transmission of 
supervisory information to the ECB by the NCAs on significant supervised groups 
and subgroups which apply international accounting standards (IFRS), significant 
supervised groups and subgroups subjected to national accounting frameworks 
(nGAAP), significant supervised entities, branches established in a participating 
Member State by a credit institution established in a non-participating Member 
                                                          
878
 See ‘Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 of 16 April 2014 laying down implementing 
technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions according to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council’, in OJ L 191, 28.6.2014. 
879
 See, for example, Article 99(3)(6) of the CRR. 
880
 See Article 99(3) of the CRR. 
881
 See Article 99(6) of the CRR. 
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State, as well as significant supervised groups regarding subsidiaries established in a 
non-participating Member State or a third country. Depending on the institutions’ 
accounting regime, it requires them to make use of specific reporting templates 
attached to the Commission Implementing Regulation. As such, it can be regarded 
as another ex-ante procedure which pinpoints the exchange of information between 
supranational and national supervisory apparatus.  
(iv) Regulation ECB/2016/4 (on the exercise of options and national discretions)882 
The key pieces of the Single Rulebook – the CRR and CRDIV - provide competent 
(supervisory) authorities and Member States’ legislatures with the possibility to 
choose how (an option) and whether (a discretion) to apply certain prudential 
requirements to credit institutions.883 Overall, there exist around 150 such 
provisions, of which some are granted to Member States and other to competent 
authorities.884 Some of these are applied in a general manner to the entire banking 
sector and some are applied following a case-by-case assessment of the particular 
status and characteristics of specific institutions. In order to ensure consistent 
treatment of all credit institutions subjected to the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision, the ECB issued a Regulation which adopts a common approach to the 
exercise of general options and national discretions which are in the remit of 
                                                          
882
 See supra n 851. 
883
 Such room for maneuver was given by the EU legislators partly to facilitate the transition to a new regulatory 
regime (Basel III) and to accommodate existing diverging regulatory and supervisory approaches in EU Member 
States. See supra n. 489-490 and n.838. 
884
 See European Central Bank, Public consultation on a draft Regulation and Guide on exercise of options and 
discretions available in Union law, Explanatory memorandum (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/pub_con_explanatory_me
morandum_options_discretions.en.pdf?bf95087a9a34cd3d654446e5bb462c8a, accessed 20 February 2017, p. 3. 
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supervisory competence and which are applied in a general manner to the entire 
banking sector.885 
The scope of generally applicable options and national discretions varies. They 
concern different aspects of supervisory activities such as defining treatments in the 
capital requirements, large exposures and liquidity framework. There are also 
transitional options and national discretions which allows for smoother transition 
towards the new definition of own funds for banks.886 This Regulation sets the 
approach which the JST should follow when exercising specific options and national 
discretions which are of general nature. By this token, it can be regarded as an 
example of the principal’s ex ante procedure. 
(v) Decision ECB/2016/40 (on a general framework for delegating decision-
making powers)887 
Early experience of the functioning of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
proved that there was a stringent operational need to increase the engagement the 
ECB supervisory apparatus in supervisory decision-making, especially as regards 
routine executive supervisory measures.888 To improve operational efficiency of SSM 
Direct Supervision, a dedicated (internal) delegation framework allowing for the 
transfer of decision-making authority directly to the ECB supervisory apparatus 
                                                          
885
 See European Central Bank, Public consultation on the draft Regulation and Guide of the European Central 
Bank on the exercise of options and discretions in Union law: Questions and Answers (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/pub_con_options_discreti
ons_qa.en.pdf?82fb798092138f9e4a00719a06ee26c1, accessed 27 February 2017. 
886
 See European Central Bank, Public consultation on on a draft Regulation and Guide on exercise of options and 
discretions available in Union law, p. 4. 
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 See supra n. 852. 
888
 See Recital (1) of the Decision ECB/2016/40. 
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(without the necessity to initiate the non-objection procedure) has been developed. 
In this respect, the Decision ECB/2016/40 sets a general framework on the delegation 
of clearly defined decision-making from the Governing Council to heads of ECB 
supervisory working units. It also sets outs in detail the scope of the matter to be 
delegated and the conditions on the basis of which such powers may be exercised.889  
On that basis, the Governing Council subsequently transferred its decision-making 
authority with respect to classifying a supervised entity as significant (the Decision 
ECB/2016/41),890 and assessing the fitness and propriety of management boards of 
significant institutions (the Decision ECB/2016/42).891 Despite of some legal concerns 
whether such “internal delegation” of formal decision-making supervisory authority 
within the ECB was permissible,892 it was recognized by the Court that “the powers 
conferred on an institution include the right to delegate, in compliance with the 
requirements of the Treaty, a certain number of powers which fall under those 
powers, subject to conditions to be determined by the institution.”893 By this token, 
internal delegation framework can be seen as the reinforcement of the ECB 
supervisory apparatus direct ex ante control over draft decision proposals submitted 
by the NCA/JST supervisory apparatus in certain areas of supervision.  
                                                          
889
 See Article 4 of the Decision ECB/2016/40. 
890
 See ‘Decision (EU) 2017/934 of the ECB of 16 November 2016 on the delegation of decisions on the significance 
of supervised entities (ECB/2016/41)’, in OJ L 141, 1.6.2017. 
891
 See ‘Decision (EU) 2017/935 of the ECB of 16 November 2016 on delegation of the power to adopt fit and proper 
decisions and the assessment of fit and proper requirements (ECB/2016/42)’, in OJ L 141, 1.6.2017. 
892
 See Council, Opinion of the Legal Service: Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 14752/12 JUR 
527 (Brussels, October), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14752-2012-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
893
 See Judgment of 26 May 2005, Case C-301/02 P Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank 
EU:C:2005:306, paras 41-42.  
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(vi) Decision ECB/2014/5 (on close cooperation)894 
This particular ECB legal act can be considered as a supplement to the general 
regime regulating the close cooperation arrangement. The general rules on close 
cooperation are laid down in the Article 7 of the SSM Regulation and further 
developed by the Part Nine of the SSM Framework Regulation. In this regard, the 
ECB Decision stipulates the procedural aspects relating to requests by non-
participating Member States to opt-in the SSM and the assessment of these requests 
by the ECB. By these token, it can be regarded as another example of a specific ex 
ante control set out by the principal with respect to its future agents (the NCAs of 
the non-euro area Participating Member States). 
The ex-post formal controls 
The SSM Regulation, and the subsequent supplementary legal and non-legal acts 
adopted by the ECB (the principal), provide for a range of instruments which can be 
used to monitor and react to actions and performance of the Joint Supervisory 
Teams (the agents) from a back-ward looking perspective, and more generally of the 
NCAs. From the Principal-Agent perspective, these features allow classifying them as 
the principal’s ex post procedures. In this context, the following ex post controls can 
be identified within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision: (i) ECB’s horizontal 
and specialized services, (ii) feedback process on performance of JST staff originating 
from NCAs, (iii) information requests to the NCAs, and (iv) issuance of supervisory 
instructions to JST staff and NCAs. 
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 See supra n. 853. 
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(vii) ECB’s horizontal and specialized supervisory services 
To ensure that Union’s supervisory policies are applied in consistent manner across 
the JSTs, ten horizontal and specialized divisions have been set-up in the ECB 
Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision IV (DG-MSIV). These business 
areas cover, such areas of prudential supervision as: risk analysis, supervisory 
planning, on-site inspections, internal models used by supervised institutions, 
compliance with applicable prudential requirements, authorisations, crisis 
management, supervisory quality assurance as well as supervisory policies, 
methodologies and standards.895 
Among them, the Supervisory Quality Assurance Division (SPQ) is responsible for 
ensuring the consistent application of highest supervisory practices across the JSTs. 
It prepares quality assurance reports which evaluate inter alia JSTs’ compliance with 
the common methodological framework and common supervisory practices. In case 
where any inconsistency of supervisory activities carried undertaken by a JST with 
common supervisory practices is detected, SPQ may issue a set of supervisory 
recommendations for that particular JST.  
The Supervisory Policies Division (SPO) is mainly responsible for development draft 
ECB supervisory policies on significant institutions and ensuring their consistency 
with the Single Rulebook. It also monitors the application of these policies by the 
                                                          
895
 The Enforcement and Sanctions Division, which is also one of DG-MSIV horizontal divisions, is not analyzed 
here as an ex-post mechanism since it responsible for imposing sanctioning directly on credit institutions, and 
not the NCA/JSTs.  
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JSTs and provides authoritative interpretations in case inconsistency is detected 
across the JSTs.  
The Methodology and Standards Development Division (MSD) ensures the 
harmonized application of the supervisory methodologies and common standards 
across the JSTs. It collects feedback on the functioning of existing methodologies 
from the JSTs and other business lines and evaluates whether they should be further 
improved or clarified. It is also in charge of reviews and amendments of the SSM 
Supervisory Manual, which develops the SSM supervisory model.  
The Planning and Coordination of Supervisory Examination Programmes Division 
(PSC) is responsible for monitoring of annual supervisory planning process carried 
out by the JSTs on each significant supervised entity. It also receives the draft SEPs 
from all the JSTs, verifies them and consolidates them into a single consolidated 
supervisory plan for the SSM. 
The Centralized On-site Inspections Division (COI) organizes, oversees and 
coordinates all on-site inspection missions for significant institutions with the 
relevant JSTs. It appoints heads of mission, monitors the mission’s progress and 
performs consistency checks of the inspection reports prepared by heads of mission. 
In addition, COI develops and updated the on-site inspection methodologies.  
The Authorisations Division (AUT) is responsible for the verification from a Union 
law perspective of draft supervisory decisions which originate from the JSTs (or the 
NCAs), and relate to the authorisation of credit institutions, the acquisitions of 
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qualifying holdings in the bank’s shareholder structure, the withdrawal of 
authorisations of credit institutions, the fit and proper assessments of the bank’s 
managers and key function holders.  
The Internal Models Division (IMD) is responsible for harmonizing and ensuring the 
consistency of methodologies and processes related to the review of internal models 
for the calculation of minimum capital requirements (Pillar One capital) across the 
JSTs. It reviews the JST supervisory decisions on calculations of the own funds 
requirements for individual significant institutions.  
The Crisis Management Division (CRM) performs a variety of crisis-related 
functions. Importantly, in the area of the crisis prevention, it double-checks the 
quality of recovery plans submitted by significant institutions to their respective JSTs 
and ensures their consistency across the SSM. It also ensures comparability and a 
level playing field during the implementation of early intervention measures. In the 
area of crisis management, it supports the JSTs and coordinates ad hoc Crisis 
Management Groups (CMGs). 
The Risk Analysis Division (RIA) verifies the assessments of risks and vulnerabilities 
of individual significant credit institutions conducted by the JSTs from a systemic 
perspective which focuses on a wider range of institutions aggregated by size, origin, 
business model, governance or specific risks. For these purposes, it also takes a 
cross-JST approach to analyze quantitative aspects of SREP decisions on significant 
institutions, including RAS outcomes, business models and individual risk areas. 
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All these business areas interact closely with the JSTs by defining and implementing 
harmonized methodologies and standards, offering technical support and assistance 
on methodological issues and helping them to refine their approach.896 Given their 
centralized and direct nature, they can be regarded as the “police-patrols” that allow 
the ECB supervisory apparatus to engage in detailed vigilance of the following 
supervisory activities conducted by all members of JSTs (and NCAs as a whole).897 
(viii) Feedback process on the performance of JST staff originating from NCAs 
The Joint Supervisory Teams are responsible for supervision of significant 
institutions and consist of supranational and national supervisory apparatus, which 
works under the leadership of an ECB-based JST Coordinator. The JST Coordinator is 
supported by sub coordinators designated by the NCAs, who are responsible for 
clearly defined thematic or geographic areas of supervision and manage the JST 
members employed by their home NCAs.  
As regards the assessment of supervisory performance, the NCAs are solely 
responsible for the evaluation of their staff pertaining to a JST, and the ECB is solely 
responsible for the evaluation of its staff pertaining to the same JST.898 It follows that 
the overall role of ECB supervisory apparatus in the assessment of NCA supervisory 
apparatus assigned to the JST is very limited and the NCAs retain full responsibility 
                                                          
896
 See European Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n.658), p. 18. 
897
 Responsibilities of the abovementioned horizontal and specialized divisions belonging t0 DG-MSIV  were 
primarily based on the analysis of business areas descriptions provided in the regular ECB vacancy notices, see 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/careers/vacancies/html/index.en.html  
898
 See Recital (4) of ‘Decision (EU) 2017/274 of the ECB of 10 February 2017 laying down the principles for 
providing performance feedback to national competent authority sub-coordinators (ECB/2017/6)’, in OJ L 40, 
17.2.2017. 
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for their employees’ performance appraisals, some may even be prevented by 
national legislation from using the ECB’s performance feedback.899 Therefore, 
national JSTs’ sub coordinators, who are usually direct managers of NCA supervisors 
assigned to the JSTs, play crucial role in ensuring the effective functioning of the 
JSTs.900 
For that reasons, the ECB has developed a mechanism providing ex post feedback on 
performance of NCA supervisory apparatus in the JSTs which may serve as input in 
the internal appraisal systems of the NCAs. Within this framework, a JST 
Coordinator assesses NCA JST Sub-coordinators and other NCA supervisors’ 
professional knowledge, communication skills, cooperation and collaboration, 
determination in achieving objectives, judgement and intrusiveness, breadth of 
awareness and being forward-looking, acting objectively with integrity and 
independence and management of SSM teams.901 However, it remains entirely at the 
discretion of the NCA whether or not to use any feedback provided by a JST 
Coordinator, and whether to include it in the NCA’s own staff reports. The findings 
of the assessment are subsequently reported to the Supervisory Board.902 Given its 
centralized and direct nature, this feedback mechanism can be regarded as the 
principal’s “police-patrol” which allows the supranational supervisory apparatus to 
                                                          
899
 See European Court of Auditors, Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed 
(above, n.14), para 145. 
900
 It was noted by some interviewees that conflicts between JST Coordinators and sub coordinators may more 
occur frequently in JSTs responsible for supervision of global significant institutions, see Informal interview with 
C (229 January 2016, 21 October 2016) and N (03 November 2016) in Annex. 
901
 See Annex II (List of competencies particularly relevant for staff working in the SSM) attached to the ‘Decision 
(EU) 2017/274 of the ECB of 10 February 2017 laying down the principles for providing performance feedback to 
national competent authority sub-coordinators (ECB/2017/6)’ (above, n.898). 
902
 See Article 3 of the Decision ECB/2017/6, supra n. 898.  
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engage in detailed vigilance of national supervisory apparatus performance in the 
last supervisory cycle. 
(ix) Information requests to NCAs (as a whole) 
In addition to the ECB’s power to receive directly, or have direct access to 
information reported by supervised entities; the ECB supervisory apparatus may 
request the NCA supervisory apparatus to provide supervisory information on an on-
going basis and in a timely and accurate manner concerning supervised entities 
established in the participating Member State, including information stemming from 
the NCAs’ verification and on-site activities.  
Such requests can be made informally by means of so-called “operational acts” (by 
JST Coordinators or at DG level) without the formal involvement of the Supervisory 
Board, or Governing Council of the ECB. Despite their initial non-binding nature, 
they may be enforced by converting them into formal and binding acts such as 
instructions, in cases where NCA supervisory apparatus does not provide requested 
information.903 Such a conversion requires however the initiation of the formal, non-
objection decision-making procedure at the ECB. Given their centralized and direct 
nature, information requests to NCAs can be considered as the principal’s “police-
patrol” which allows the ECB supranational supervisory apparatus to reduce its 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis the NCA national supervisory apparatus. 
                                                          
903
 The issuance of instructions by the ECB (supervisory apparatus) as a mechanism of ex-post control is further 
analyzed in the subsequent point (x). 
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(x) Issuance of supervisory instructions to JST staff and NCAs 
The issuance of internal supervisory instructions to the NCA supervisory apparatus 
pertaining to a JST, and supervisory instructions to the NCAs (as a whole) can be 
considered as example of a more escalated ex ante controls. As noted above,904 a JST 
Coordinator is responsible for organizing the work of JSTs. For these purposes, (s)he 
may steer internal JST workflows by issuing supervisory instructions to other JST 
members regarding their tasks and activities.905 In principle, JST Coordinators’ 
instructions have precedence over the instructions given by JST national sub 
coordinators to respective national supervisory apparatus.906  
Furthermore, the ECB may also issue formal and legally binding supervisory 
instructions to NCAs (as a whole) for the purpose of carrying out its supervisory 
tasks.907 They allow for a very detailed legal prescription or rectification of the 
addressee’s expected, and they are always to be addressed to one or more NCAs.908 
In addition, the ECB may instruct those NCAs to make use of their residual powers 
where the SSM Regulation does not confer such powers on the ECB.909 Early 
evidence indicates that on several occasions the ECB made use of this ex-post control 
                                                          
904
 See supra point (viii)(Feedback process on performance of JST staff originating from NCAs). 
905
 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
906
 See Article 6(2) of the SSM Framework Regulation. It was recommended by one interviewee to distinguish 
between the less intrusive (operational) powers of instruction assigned to JST Coordinator, and formal ECB 
instructions to NCAs, see Informal interview with F (25 October 2016) and N (03 March 2017) in Annex. 
907
 See Article 132 of the TFEU. 
908
 See Zilioli and Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (above, n.732), p. 108. 
909
 See Article 9(1), third sentence of the SSM Regulation. 
276 
 
although not extensively.910 Given its centralized and direct nature, the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) power to issue supervisory instructions to the NCA 
(supervisory apparatus) can be regarded as an example the principal’s intrusive 
“police-patrols” which allow influencing the behaviour of its agents. 
 
Figure 13 Capacity for control within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
7.3.2. The ECB’s control mechanisms in the system of SSM Indirect Supervision 
The ex-ante formal controls911 
As pointed out above, the SSM Regulation can be regarded as a basic agency contract 
between the ECB and the NCAs (supervisory apparatuses) which lays down the 
                                                          
910
 For example, in 2015 the ECB issued 13 instructions to NCA concerning the supervision of significant banks. 
See European Court of Auditors, Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed 
(above, n.14), p. 28 (table 2).  
911
 The selection was based on the analysis whether these measures introduce specific rules of law which have a 
substantial impact on the national supervisory apparatus (NCAs) and which it is bound to observe. As noted by 
one interviewee, the design of the SSM rests primarily on binding rules of law rather than non-binding rules of 
practice. See Informal interview with M (08 November 2016) in Annex. 
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general principles of functioning of two administrative sub-arrangements governing 
prudential supervision in the SSM: the subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision. In the context of the latter, the SSM Regulation provides the ECB with 
an opportunity to set up in advance the expectations concerning the supervision 
carried out by the NCAs over less significant institutions using a range of monitoring 
mechanisms provided by law. 
Furthermore, within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, the ECB may issue 
binding legal instruments such regulations, guidelines or general instructions 
addressed to the NCAs on the performance of their supervisory tasks vis-à-vis less 
significant institutions.912 These acts may not only affect the regulatory environment 
in which less significant supervised entities operate, but also model the 
administrative interactions between the ECB and NCAs. In the latter context, they 
may be regarded as rules of law which national supervisory apparatus responsible for 
the supervision of less significant institutions is always bound to observe.  
It was already pointed out that the ECB has adopted a number of legal acts setting 
the operational aspects of the supervision in the SSM, which are applicable both to 
the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. They notably include the 
SSM Framework Regulation913 and other supplementary legal instruments adopted 
by the ECB.914  
                                                          
912
 See Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM Regulation (excluding however those related to the common procedures). 
913
 See supra n. 848. 
914
 See supra n. 849-853. 
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All of these ex-ante controls are also applicable to the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision. In particular, the SSM Framework Regulation further develops a 
number of supervisory processes and procedures in respect to the subsystem of SSM 
Indirect Supervision which could be classified as the ex-ante controls from the 
Principal-Agent perspective. They include (i) NCA notification requirements and (ii) 
the “common procedures” regime.915 Both mechanisms constitute the basic ex ante 
controls within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. In addition, this 
subsection will also cover one of very few binding legal acts adopted by the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) addressed to the NCA (supervisory apparatus), namely (iii) 
the Guideline ECB/2017/9 on the exercise of options and discretions available in 
Union law by national competent authorities in relation to less significant 
institutions.916 From the Principal-Agent perspective, this Guideline can be 
considered as an ex ante control set by the principal to steer the agent’s actions in 
the key areas of their responsibilities set by the agency contract.  
(i) Central Notification Point (CNP) 
The SSM Framework Regulation sets for the NCAs a very general requirement to 
report on an ex-ante basis to the ECB on any “material” supervisory procedures and 
                                                          
915
 It is noted that common procedures regime (supervisory tasks related to granting and withdrawal of licenses, 
acquisitions of qualifying holdings) applies both to the subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. 
However, due to much more prominent role of NCA supervisory apparatus in the exercise of these tasks, it 
appears more plausible to classify it as being closer to the subsystem of Indirect Supervision from the operational 
point of view.  
916
 See ‘Guideline (EU) 2017/697 of the ECB of 4 April 2017 on the exercise of options and discretions available in 
Union law by national competent authorities in relation to less significant institutions (ECB/2017/9)’ (above, 
n.74). 
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decisions concerning LSIs.917 In addition, the ECB should be informed by the NCA 
about any financial deterioration of banks under their supervisory scope.918 The SSM 
Framework Regulation does not however provide any specific procedure provided 
which would stipulate how these notifications should be carried out by the NCAs. 
According to the understanding presented by the ECB supervisory apparatus,919 
these ex-ante notifications could be perceived as a “catch-up” mechanism helping 
the ECB to exercise its oversight function in respect to the planned supervisory 
activities on LSIs.  
In order to set up modalities for NCA ex-ante notification obligations, the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) developed a special mechanism - Central Notification Point 
(CNP) – that is used by the NCA (supervisory apparatus) to submit their 
notifications. The CNP is a core element of day-to-day cooperation between the ECB 
and NCAs in respect of the supervision over less significant institutions. After a 
receipt of a notification, the ECB may decide to provide views the draft “material” 
decisions and procedures and request further supervisory assessment of them. 
Crucially, the CNP allows the ECB supervisory apparatus to compare and review 
practices applied by the NCA supervisory apparatus with respect to their conformity 
with the SSM’s common supervisory standards.920 
                                                          
917
 See Article 97 and 98 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
918
 See Article 96 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
919
 See European Central Bank, Public hearing on the draft ECB SSM Framework Regulation (above, n.707). 
920
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 (above, n.865),p. 29.  
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In line with the principle of proportionality which governs the supervision in the 
SSM,921 the scope of NCAs’ ex-ante notification obligations is related the priority 
status of credit institutions under their jurisdictions which reflects their systemic 
importance. The NCAs are obliged to ex-ante report draft supervisory procedures 
and decisions only in respect to LSIs classified as “high-priority” ones in accordance 
with a dedicated prioritisation framework developed by the ECB (for “material 
procedures and decisions”).922 It remains within the NCAs’ discretion whether they 
consider it relevant to notify the ECB of decisions and procedures regarding LSIs 
classified as “low” or “medium-priority”. Similarly, it is up for the NCAs whether or 
not to ex-ante report on procedures which they consider “material”, or which may 
negatively affect the reputation of the SSM.923 In any case, the NCAs should however 
always report on any rapid and significant deterioration in the financial situation of 
an LSI in order to allow for early risk mitigation.924 Until December 2016, the CNP 
received and assessed a total of 179 ex-ante notifications from NCAs, of which 141 
were notifications of material draft decisions or procedures relating covering a wide 
range of supervisory issues (e.g. capital, liquidity and governance), and 38 were 
related to the deterioration of the financial situation of the LSI.925 
                                                          
921
 See European Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n.658), p. 8 (Supervisory Principle 7). 
922
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 (above, n.865), p. 29.  
923
 See Articles 97(4) and 98(3) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
924
 See European Central Bank, Report LSI supervision within the SSM, November 2017, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.reportlsisupervision2017.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017, p. 17. 
925
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (above, n. 717), p. 47. 
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Notification requirements can be perceived as a mechanism of the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) ex ante control over the NCA (supervisory apparatus) actions. However, it 
needs to be pointed out that the wide of scope flexibility left to the NCA concerning 
which of their procedures and decisions should be submitted926 may not necessarily 
provide the principal with the full picture of the actions undertaken by its agents.   
(ii) Common procedures regime 
As the guardianship of access to the banking market is the crucial step in the 
supervisory process, the SSM Regulation and the SSM Framework Regulation sets a 
special supervisory regime (knows as “common procedures”) to govern the “birth, 
maturity and death” of both significant and less significant institutions. The 
common procedures apply to the conduct of supervisory activities related to (i) 
granting of a bank license to entities willing to operate on the banking markets 
(“authorisations”),927 (ii) managing the exit of credit institutions from banking 
markets irrespective of a cause (“withdrawals of authorisations”)928 and (iii) 
approving significant changes in banks’ shareholding structures (“acquisitions of 
qualifying holdings”).929 The most of common procedures fall within the third of the 
abovementioned activities. In 2016, the ECB adopted approved 142 qualifying 
holdings’ applications which mostly related to internal reorganizations of credit 
                                                          
926
 Crucially there are no common binding criteria to define the “materiality” of draft NCA procedures and 
decisions. Thus, each NCA (agent) may have different understanding as to what constitutes a material 
supervisory decision or procedure. See, also, European Central Bank, Report LSI supervision within the SSM 
(above, n.924), p. 17. 
927
 See Article 4(a) of the SSM Regulation: “to authorize credit institutions and to withdraw authorizations of 
credit institutions subject to Article 14”. 
928
 Ibid. 
929
 See Article 4(c) of the SSM Regulation: “to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying 
holdings in credit institutions, except in the case of a bank resolution, and subject to Article 15”. 
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institutions (e.g. intra-group consolidations), often reflecting cost-cutting policies.930 
In comparison, granting and withdrawal of bank licenses concerned 24 and 42 of 
common procedures in 2016 respectively.931 
Within the common procedures regime, the NCA supervisory apparatus prepares 
draft supervisory decisions and submits them to the ECB which adopts formal 
supervisory decision in a non-objective procedure. Moreover, the ECB supervisory 
apparatus is also responsible for the verification of supervisory assessments 
undertaken at NCA level. In doing, ECB-based supervisors apply criteria defined in 
relevant Union law (including the CRDIV). From the Principal-Agent perspective, 
the common procedures can be perceived as mechanisms of the ECB ex-ante control 
over NCA supervisory assessment concerning the fulfillment of the common criteria 
governing the entry (both of natural932 and legal persons933) into to EU banking 
Single Market as well as controlling the way-out.  
(iii) ECB Guideline on the exercise of options and national discretions on less 
significant institutions 
Article 6(5)(a) of the SSM Regulation provides that the ECB may create new rules of 
law which the NCAs and its supervisory apparatus responsible for the supervision of 
less significant institutions is always bound to observe (regulations, general 
                                                          
930
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 (above, n.865), p. 36. 
931
 Ibid. It is noted that such a high number of withdrawals of bank licenses was triggered by (non-voluntary) 
liquidation or resolution of the institutions concerned (all of which were LSIs). 
932
 As regards the assessment of the reputation of the acquirers and new bank managers in the context of 
qualifying holding procedures; and the assessment of the fitness and propriety of the proposed bank 
management in the context of granting a license and the approval of qualifying holding procedures. 
933
 As regards, for example, appropriate funding, viability and sustainability of the business strategy both in the 
context of context of granting a license. 
283 
 
instructions, guidelines). This possibility has not been however extensively used by 
the ECB in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, but the ECB decided to 
exceptionally bind the NCA supervisory apparatus in respect to the harmonized 
exercise of a number options and national discretions (ONDs) provided in Union law 
in respect to LSIs.  
The ECB’s legislative action aiming to harmonize the exercise of ONDs initially 
concerned the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision.934 However, to ensure level 
playing field significant and less significant institutions operating in the Banking 
Union, it was subsequently decided to extend the harmonization of the ONDs’ 
exercise also to the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. This was necessary in 
order to ensure that the SSM as a whole operates in homogenous935 and “effective 
and consistent way” as required by law.936  
For these purposes, the ECB adopted a binding Guideline (and a non-binding 
Recommendation) addressed to the NCAs, which set common criteria for the 
exercise of general and case-by-case ONDs by the NCA (supervisory apparatus) in 
their respective supervisory jurisdictions. These legal acts, in particular the 
Guideline, adapt the binding rules developed in the ECB Regulation on the exercise 
                                                          
934
 In this respect, see point (iv) in subsection 7.3.1. which classifies the Regulation ECB/2016/4 (on the exercise of 
options and national discretions) as an example of ex-ante control within the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision. 
935
 As pointed out the ECB’s Guide to Banking Supervision, homogeneity is one of the supervisory principles 
underpinning the functioning of the SSM. More specifically, “it requires that supervisory principle and 
procedures are applied to credit institutions across all participating Member States in an appropriately 
harmonized way to ensure consistency of supervisory actions in order to avoid distortions in treatment and 
fragmentation. This principle supports the SSM as a single system of supervision.” See European Central Bank, 
Guide to banking supervision (above, n.658), p. 7 (Supervisory Principle 3). 
936
 See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
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of options and national discretions in relation to significant institutions to the 
supervision of less significant ones. In some instances the ECB Guideline allows for a 
different approach to LSI which reflects the principle of proportionality, reflecting 
systemic importance and risk profile of the credit institutions under supervision.937 
Therefore, similarly like the ECB Regulation on the exercise of options and national 
discretions in relation to significant institutions,938 the ECB Guideline to NCAs on 
the exercise of options and national discretions on less significant institutions can be 
considered as an example of the ECB’s ex ante control over the NCAs setting a 
binding framework for the exercise of options and national discretions that are of 
general nature. 
The ex-post formal controls939 
The SSM Regulation, and the subsequent supplementary legal acts adopted by the 
ECB, provide for a number of instruments which are used to monitor and react to 
supervisory activities on less significant institutions carried out by the NCAs (the 
agent). From the Principal-Agent perspective, these features allow classifying them 
as the principal’s ex post procedures. In this context, the following ex post controls 
can be identified within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision: (i) NCA 
reporting obligations, (ii) NCA staff relocations; and (iii) the takeover by the ECB of 
direct responsibility from the NCAs for the supervision of one or more LSIs. 
                                                          
937
 See European Central Bank, Public consultation on a draft Guideline and Recommendation of the ECB on the 
exercise of options and discretions available in Union law for less significant institutions (above, n. 495), p. 4. 
938
 See supra point (iv) in subsection 7.3.1. 
939
 The selection was based on the analysis whether these measures introduce specific rules of law which have a 
substantial impact on the national supervisory apparatus (NCAs) and which it is bound to observe. 
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(iv) NCA reporting obligations 
The SSM Framework Regulation obliges the NCAs to report to the ECB on a regular 
basis on the measures they have taken and on their decentralized implementation of 
the ECB’s in relation to LSIs.940 Irrespective of the above-mentioned obligation, the 
NCA are required to submit an annual report on their supervisory activities 
concerning less significant institutions in line with the requirements set by the 
ECB.941 Receiving regular reports from the NCAs may serve for the ECB as a basis for 
the evaluation their supervisory performance in the comparative perspective, also 
allowing for the identification of top performing and outlying NCAs. Furthermore, 
this exercise allows DG-MSIII as the bureaucratic principal to draw cross-country 
comparisons concerning domestic supervisory approaches (including SREP 
application, frequency of interactions with supervised entities, average durations of 
on-site inspections and a number of supervisory decisions taken), to assess the 
degree of supervisory convergence across the NCAs and therefore better prioritize 
the oversight tasks.942 In addition, the NCA are also obliged to report to the ECB on 
administrative penalties imposed on LSIs,943 ad hoc changes to the list of LSIs,944 and 
on those credit institutions which may potentially fulfill significance criteria945 and, 
thus migrate to the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. All of these ex-post 
reporting obligations, and especially NCA annual reports on their supervisory 
                                                          
940
 See Article 99 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
941
 See Article 100 of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
942
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681), p. 42-43. 
943
 See Article 135 of the Framework Regulation. 
944
 See Article 49 of the Framework Regulation. 
945
 See Articles 52 et seq. of the Framework Regulation. 
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activities, may be considered as an insightful ex post control, which contributes to 
the performance assessment of the NCA (supervisory apparatus) by the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus). 
(v) NCA staff relocations 
The SSM Regulation provides the ECB with an option to require as appropriate that 
supervisory teams of national competent authorities taking supervisory actions 
regarding a supervised entity also involve staff from national competent authorities 
of other participating Member States.946 Given the vagueness of this provision, one 
may imagine that the ECB would use this horizontal mobility mechanism, in such 
situations where it may suspect that the NCA (supervisory apparatus) does not exert 
the expected effort when carry out the ECB’s exclusive supervisory tasks in relation 
to LSIs, but simultaneously there is no need to activate more escalated control 
measures.  
In such a case, the ECB could request one NCA (for instance, an NCA famous for its 
tough supervisory approach) to put at its disposal a number of supervisors which 
would be delegated to another NCA as technical advisors or observers. In these 
capacities, they could assist supervisors in that NCA in the conduct of their tasks and 
report to the ECB on overall performance and supervisory practice. By activating this 
mechanism, the ECB (supervisory apparatus) would acquire a decentralized source 
of information on the ways how the supervisory apparatus of a given NCA carries out 
its supervisory responsibilities under the agency contract governing the subsystem of 
                                                          
946
 See Article 31(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
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SSM Indirect Supervision. Given its indirect and decentralized nature, it may be 
considered in terms of a particular variation of a “fire-alarm”, which could be used in 
the environments of multiple agents who may compete among each other for the 
recognition of their principal. 
(vi) Takeover of LSI supervision 
A possibility of takeover by the ECB of direct responsibility from the NCAs for the 
supervision of one or more LSIs947 can be regarded as the most intrusive ex post 
control over supervisory activities carried out by the NCA (supervisory apparatus). 
As recognized by the ECB, it is a “disciplinary device that plays a helpful role in 
ensuring that the right incentives remain in place at the local level”, which could be 
activated when “there are concerns that national supervisors are not adequately 
controlling risks within their local banks”.948 The takeover effectively shifts power 
balance between the ECB and NCAs by means of direct intervention into the NCA 
scope of responsibilities as legislatively set by the SSM Regulation, and under certain 
circumstances could be received as a vote of ECB’s non-confidence in the supervisory 
capabilities of the NCA concerned.  
The SSM regulatory framework describes this highly intrusive mechanism in 
exceptionally vague terms, which leaves a lot of discretion as regards possible 
circumstances for its justifying its activation. According to Article 6(5)(b) of the SSM 
                                                          
947
 See Article 6 (5)(b) of the SSM Regulation. 
948
 See Pentti Hakkarainen, Banking union in 2017 – How to supervise a €27tn banking sector?, Speech at the CIRSF 
Annual International Conference (Lisbon, 2017), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170601.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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Regulation, the “takeover procedure” is activated where the ECB determines a need 
to “ensure consistent application of high supervisory standards”. The wording of this 
clause is very broad, but some further guidance is provided in the SSM Framework 
Regulation, which stipulates a non-exhaustive list of possible reasons for its 
activation. The list covers criteria which related to both the LSI concerned and the 
NCA responsible for the supervision of that LSI.949 
The first group of criteria (LSI-specific) includes inter alia such legally defined 
triggers as an LSI’s proximity to the significance criteria,950 its interconnectedness,951 
its cross-border activities,952 and being a recipient of indirect ESM assistance.953 The 
materialization of these circumstances can be easily measured in quantitative terms, 
thereby constraining the use of supervisory discretion. The significance criteria are 
clearly defined in the SSM Regulation.954 The question of a bank’s 
interconnectedness is more ambiguous, but still useful benchmarks are provided by 
the Single Rulebook legislation. These include the participation of a bank in question 
in institutional protection schemes;955 the existence of interconnections between 
credit institutions based on common or shared personnel, facilities and systems; 
capital, funding or liquidity arrangements; existing or contingent credit exposures; 
cross-guarantee agreements, cross-collateral arrangements, cross-default provisions 
                                                          
949
 See Article 67(2) of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
950
 See Article 67(2)(a) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
951
 See Article 67(2)(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
952
 Particularly, when an LSI concerned has subsidiaries in non-participating Member States and in third 
countries. See Article 67(2)(c) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
953
 See Article 67(2)(f) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
954
 See Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation; see also supra n. 428-432. 
955
 See Recital (14) of the BRRD. 
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and cross-affiliate netting arrangements; or risk transfers and back-to-back trading 
arrangements; and service level agreements.956 The ESM indirect assistance criterion 
relates to situations, in which a participating Member State is a recipient of direct 
financial assistance and makes it available for its domestic banking sector through a 
dedicated national scheme or a specific purpose vehicle.  
The second group of criteria (NCA-specific) includes such legally defined triggers as 
NCA’s non-compliance with ECB instructions,957 and non-compliance with relevant 
Union law.958 This group of takeover triggers is much all-encompassing and of 
political sensitivity. It remains however unclear how potential non-compliance could 
be detected since the ECB does not have competences to monitor of NCA’s 
compliance with Union law in areas outside of ECB’s scope of competence (e.g. 
consumer protection, prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering and terrorist financing). Similarly, it is also not entirely 
straightforward whether non-compliance with binding regulatory and implementing 
technical standards developed by the EBA and adopted by the Commission as well as 
Union law of soft nature (for example EBA or ECB Guidelines or Recommendations) 
would also fall within this criterion.959  
                                                          
956
 See Annex Section B (15) of the BRRD. 
957
 See Article 67(2)(d) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
958
 See Article 67(2)(e) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
959
 It is noted that the reference is made to acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of the SSM 
Regulation. The EBA’s Binding Technical Standards and Guidelines are mentioned in the second first 
subparagraph of that Article. 
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Given a potential reputational damage for the NCA, which directly supervises the LSI 
being considered for a takeover, and of the SSM as a whole, this ex post control is 
likely only to be activated at the ECB’s initiative only in extreme situations (systemic 
LSI crisis threating other jurisdictions). It should be considered as a rather “nuclear 
option”, to be used if all other less escalated measures failed, especially given that its 
activation may produce potentially negative and unintended consequences, such as 
adverse impact on the NCA/SSM reputation, negative market reactions and potential 
distortions on EU interbank markets. 
 
Figure 14 Capacity for control within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
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7.4. The formal capacity for cooperation in the SSM 
In line with the Management approach, the assessment of the capacity for 
cooperation between the ECB and NCAs (supervisory apparatuses) in SSM 
constitutes the second phase of determining the expectation for formal top-down 
compliance therein. The formal capacity for cooperation between the ECB and NCAs 
(supervisory apparatuses) within the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision can be measured by employing recent and more liberal Principal-Agent 
perspective on their relations.  
The liberal Principal-Agent perspective assumes that the agents have a general 
propensity to comply with their contractual obligations vis-à-vis their principal. 
Rather than from the lack of effective control by the principal, the agents’ lower level 
of compliance stems from an essential incompleteness of their agency contract with 
the principal. In addition, when embedded in environments characterized by high 
policy-making complexity, the agents have incentives to reduce their informational 
advantage over the principal in order to increase certainty as to the principal’s 
contractual expectations. This perspective advocates that higher levels of the agent’s 
compliance can be achieved where the principal establishes routine, non-
confrontational and informal mechanisms for cooperation with its agent(s) which 
aim at systematic reduction the ambiguities of their agency contract and on-going 
clarification contractual expectations of the principal vis-à-vis its agent(s). 
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These mechanisms consist of structured forms of voluntary cooperation (networks, 
working groups, drafting teams) bringing the principal and agents together and 
allowing for informal deliberations on the principal’s expectations and the agents’ 
obligations stemming from the agency contract. These deliberations may cover a 
variety of aspects relating to the Principal-Agent contact framed by the SSM 
Regulation. They are reflected in behavioural and non-binding rules of practice, from 
which the agents may not depart without giving reasons to the principal. They can 
also take form of the principal’s recommendations, guidance, compendia of best 
practices and methodologies, or other form of technical and expert assistance with 
aim to clarify or interpret ambiguities stemming from respective provisions of the 
SSM Regulation, or the subsequent legal acts governing the ECB-NCA relations 
which were adopted on its basis. 
This section will identify and assess structured forms of voluntary cooperation 
between the bureaucratic principal (ECB supervisory apparatus) and bureaucratic 
agent (NCA supervisory apparatus) with respect to the subsystems of SSM Direct 
(III.6.4.1) and Indirect Supervision (III.6.4.2). While carrying out their credibility 
assessment, it will take into account whether there are any platforms (i.e. permanent 
or ad hoc networks, working groups, drafting teams or other fora) that bring ECB 
and NCAs supervisory apparatuses together within the respective supervisory 
subsystem; and (ii) whether there are any tangible outcomes of that cooperation 
aiming at reducing the ambiguities of the agency contract between the ECB and 
NCAs (supervisory apparatuses); and clarifying contractual expectations of the ECB 
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(supervisory apparatus) related to different areas of the Union’s policies on 
prudential supervision of credit institutions.  
7.4.1. Framework for the Principal-Agent cooperation within the system of SSM 
Direct Supervision 
This subsection identifies three structured dimensions of informal cooperation 
between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses with respect to the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision. It presents, indicatively, outcomes of their deliberations, 
which may be regarded as significantly contributing to the reduction of the 
incomplete nature of the agency contract underpinning the functioning of the 
subsystem of the SSM Direct Supervision.  
Informal structures for the ECB and NCA supervisory cooperation 
(i) Preparatory Task Force on Supervision 
In the SSM Regulation, the Member States set only general rules governing the 
agency contract between the ECB and NCA applicable to the subsystem of SSM 
Direct and Indirect Supervision and left operational aspects to be further specified. 
Given the high complexity of supervision as a policy field, the liberal Principal-Agent 
perspective on the SSM would suggest that the ECB and NCA supervisory 
apparatuses had mutual interest in clarifying their respective contractual obligations 
set by the Member States in the SSM Regulation. This mutual interest is 
underpinned by the assumption that both of the actors would reap gains from 
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exchanging information and preferences in order better adapt to the new context.960 
In addition, the ECB‘s lack of practical experience in day-to-day supervision was a 
factor which was further contributing to the initial information asymmetry in its 
relations with the NCAs in the SSM.  
For these reasons, the ECB supervisory apparatus had strong incentives to engage in 
close collaboration with the NCAs already at the very early stage in order to build the 
ECB institutional capacity to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by the SSM 
Regulation. In doing so, it initiated and managed SSM technical preparatory work 
carried out together with the National Central Banks and National Competent 
Authorities in a dedicated temporary Task Force on Supervision.961 The Task Force 
was divided into five work streams which brought together ECB and national experts 
to focus respectively on (i) an initial mapping of the euro area banking system,962 (ii) 
the SSM legal framework,963 (iii) the development of a supervisory model for the 
SSM,964 (iv) the development of a supervisory reporting framework for the SSM,965 
and (v) the initial preparation of the comprehensive assessment of the credit 
                                                          
960
 In addition, it needs to be noted that the ECB‘s lack of practical experience in supervision was a factor further 
increasing information asymmetry between the principal and the agent in the SSM. See, in this context, supra n. 
314-315. 
961
 See European Central Bank, SSM Quarterly Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (above, n.646, p. 3. 
962
 Work Stream One (WSI) was mandated to create a mapping of the euro area banking system, consisting in a 
catalogue comprising all supervised entities falling within the scope of the SSM and including the internal 
structure and composition of all euro area banking groups. 
963
 Work Stream Two (WSII) was a legal group composed by ECB representatives and NCAs representatives 
mandated to develop a draft of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
964
 Work Stream 3 (WSIII) was in charge of developing the Supervisory Model of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), including all processes, procedures as well as the methodology for the supervision of 
significant and less significant institutions. 
965
 Work Stream 4 (WSIV) was mandated to review the existing supervisory reporting models with a specific 
focus on the granularity of the information, the frequency of data and the delivery lags, the coverage in terms of 
institutions, the level of consolidation (group level vs. solo) of the available information. 
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institutions.966 The Task Force on Supervision can be regarded as the first step to the 
establishment of a community of practice between supranational and national 
supervisory apparatus.967 
(ii) DG-MSIV supervisory networks  
Mirroring to some extent the concept of the Joint Supervisory Teams968 and building 
upon the informal collaboration processes within the preparatory Task Force on 
Supervision, the ECB decided to establish permanent networks pooling together ECB 
and NCA supervisory apparatus have been established to support the functioning of 
the ECB’s centralized horizontal and specialized services localized in the DG-MSIV. 
Contrary to the JSTs these networks are of informal and non-hierarchical dimension. 
Nevertheless, they operate in the shadow of hierarchy since they are always chaired 
by a head of ECB’s horizontal or specialized division.969 
The main objective behind their creation was to develop informal communication 
lines and discussions platforms by the ECB supervisory apparatus (the bureaucratic 
principal) with NCA supervisory apparatus (the bureaucratic agent) that would allow 
                                                          
966
 Work Stream 5 (WS5) was mandated to develop the processes and methodologies for the comprehensive 
assessment of credit instituted subjected to EU Direct Supervision. 
967
 As noted by Danièle Nouy, supranational and national supervisory apparatus worked hand-in glove: about 800 
supervisors with expertise and experience in the field of regulation and supervision from the public and private 
sector cooperate with the national supervisors, who directly supervise the remaining 3,500 banks and implement 
the supervisory guidance and best practices agreed to on the European level. See Danièle Nouy, European 
Banking Supervision: Levelling the playing field, Speech at Corporate Program Roundtable organised by the 
Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150911.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. See also Informal interview with A (13 November 2015, 12 January 2016, 15 July 2016) in Annex. 
968
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014, 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssmar2014.en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017 , p. 23. 
969
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (above, n. 717), p. 32. 
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combining the specific in-depth knowledge of national supervisors with the broad-
ranging experience of the ECB staff related to the supervision of significant 
institutions.970 This fits neatly into the concept of the ECB supervisory apparatus as 
the principal as a manager who establishes problem-solving and collaborative 
processes involving its agents in deliberations aiming to clarify mutual obligations 
set in their incomplete agency contract. In turn, tor the NCA supervisory apparatus 
as the agent, these networks are main tool to influence policy stances on horizontal 
areas of supervision, as the most important issues and stances of the ECB and NCAs 
are discussed in these structures.971 
Since each of DG-MSIV horizontal divisions hosts a network, there exists an informal 
structure for cooperation in areas of risk analysis, supervisory planning, on-site 
inspections, internal models used by supervised institutions, compliance with 
applicable prudential requirements, authorisations, crisis management, supervisory 
quality assurance as well as supervisory policies, methodologies and standards.972 
These networks gather supranational and national experts specialized on certain 
topics that work together on common issues, and contribute to the operational 
                                                          
970
 See Danièle Nouy, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Memorial Lecture, Speech by Chair of the Supervisory Board of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150626.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017; European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014 (above, n.968), p. 53.  
971
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (above, n. 717), p. 32. See also Informal interview with D (31 August 
2016) in Annex. 
972
 Ibid., p. 31.  
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singleness of the SSM.973 They serve as vehicles for information sharing, exchange of 
experiences, establishment of common work ethos and goals. Furthermore, they are 
expected to ensure best practices, high standards and consistent adoption of the 
Union’s supervisory policies,974 and ultimately contribute to the development of 
common supervisory culture.975 
Given their informal and non-hierarchical dimension, supervisory networks hosted 
by the DG-MSIV can be considered as primary example of the use of “carrot” 
(managerial) strategies in promoting higher levels of compliance of the agents within 
the framework of SSM Direct Supervision. These networks are not part of the 
principal’s monitoring mechanism, but rather they contribute to supervisory 
capacity building across the SSM as well as to the on-going interpretation and 
clarification of the Union’s supervisory policies on a daily basis. In doing so, they are 
primary channels through which a community of permanently linked ECB and NCA 
supervisors gradually promotes the construction of European supervisory culture.  
                                                          
973
 See Ignazio Angeloni, The SSM and international supervisory cooperation, Remarks at at the Symposium on 
“Building the Financial System of the 21st Century: an Agenda for Europe and the US” (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150417.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
974
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014 (above, n.968), p. 55. See also 
Informal interview with D (31 August 2016) in Annex. 
975
 See Danièle Nouy, The European banking landscape – initial conclusions after four months of joint banking 
supervision and the main challenges ahead, Speech at the SZ Finance Day 2015 (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150317.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017; see also Danièle Nouy, Presentation of the first ECB annual report on supervisory activities by the 
Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 
Introductory remarks (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150331.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017; see also Informal interview with D (31 August 2016) in Annex. It was however noted by one 
interviewee that the EBA remains the sole EU authority which has a task of driving supervisory convergence in 
the EU, see Informal interview with J (09 November 2016) in Annex. 
298 
 
(iii) Other fora 
The third dimension of informal cooperation between the ECB and NCA supervisory 
apparatuses can be captured by establishing of ad hoc project-based working groups 
and drafting teams. These groups are established by the Supervisory Board to focus 
on specific horizontal issues and support the work of DG-MSIV horizontal divisions 
and the deliberations of network experts hosted by them.976 From the beginning of 
the SSM operations, a number of such working groups consisting of ECB and NCAs 
supervisory experts have been established to deal with different supervisory 
problems and inconsistencies.  
In 2015, the ECB set up temporary structures to carry out preparatory work on the 
exercise of options and discretions in EU law; the SREP methodology and a 
consistent supervisory approach towards supervised institutions with high levels of 
non-performing loans.977 It should be noted that, unlike supervisory networks, the 
working groups are not necessarily always chaired by an ECB staff member (the 
bureaucratic principal). In the case non-performing loans, a dedicated work stream 
was led by a high-level representative of the Irish NCA, because it was explicitly 
acknowledged that Ireland had a strong and well-established technical expertise in 
dealing with non-performing exposures.978 
                                                          
976
 See Informal interview with D (31 August 2016) in Annex. 
977
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmar2015.en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017, p. 12; see 
also Informal interview with I (12 August 2015, 21 October 2016) in Annex. 
978
 See Danièle Nouy and Sabine Lautenschläger, Introductory statement to the press conference on the ECB 
Annual Report on supervisory activities 2015 (with Q&A) (2016), 
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Given their informal and non-hierarchical dimension, working groups and drafting 
teams, led by a representative of either the ECB or an NCA, can be regarded as 
another example of the ECB’s managerial approach to promote voluntary compliance 
of the NCA supervisory apparatus with the agreed stances. Rather than being 
structures of the ECB’s control, they contribute to supervisory capacity building 
across the SSM, as well as to the on-going interpretation and clarification of the 
Union’s supervisory policies on a daily basis. In particular, the structure of the 
working group deadline with the issues on non-performing loans confirms that by 
assuming the leadership of an important work stream the NCA supervisory 
apparatus (the bureaucratic agent) is willing to put its unique knowledge at the 
disposal of the ECB supervisory apparatus (the bureaucratic principal) which 
considerably reduced its informational advantage over the latter.  
Key outcomes of deliberations between the ECB-NCA supervisory apparatuses 
(iv) Supervisory Manual 
One of the most remarkable policy products resulting from informal cooperation 
between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses is the Supervisory Manual (SM). 
The SM lays down a harmonized SSM approach for the supervision of significant 
institutions that the members of the JSTs are expected to consistently apply to all of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se160323.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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their supervisory activities. In doing so, it “provides hundreds of supervisors across 
Europe with a common set of work procedures and practices”.979 
The key part of the SM is dedicated to the SSM Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SSM SREP).980 Apart of this, it also covers off-site and on-site reviews, risk 
assessments and model validations.981 In addition, it describes the procedures for 
cooperation within the SSM and with authorities outside the SSM,982 and contains a 
number of annexes with detailed supervisory methodologies, notably including the 
methodology for the on-site inspections which sets objectives, techniques and 
outputs for on-site inspections.983 
The first version of the Manual was developed by a dedicated work stream of the 
preparatory Task Force on Supervision which had been mandated with the 
development of a common supervisory model for the SSM.984 It was submitted to the 
                                                          
979
 See Danièle Nouy, European banking supervision after year one: what lies ahead?, Speech at Handelsblatt 
conference – European banking supervision (Frankfurt am Main, 2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se151110.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017.  
980
 See European Central Bank, SSM Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, 2014/1, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmqr20141en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017, p. 8. 
981
 See Danièle Nouy, Toward the European Banking Union: achievements and challenges, Speech at the OeNB 
Economics Conference (Vienna, 2014), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2014/html/se140512_1.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
982
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681), pp. 77-78. 
983
 See European Central Bank, SSM Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, 2014/2, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmqr20142en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017, p. 14. 
984
 See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmqr20141en.pdf European Central Bank, SSM 
Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation 
(above, n. 980) , p. 8. 
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Supervisory Board for the approval already in January 2014,985 which decided that the 
Supervisory Manual would be a non-binding “internal SSM staff document”. Rather 
than rules of law, it constitutes rules of practice from which both the JSTs may not 
depart without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment of all credit institutions. As a “living document”, the Manual is subject to 
regular joint reviews by the ECB and NCA supervisors under auspices of 
Methodology and Standards Development Division and its expert network.986 To 
promote the transparency of the SSM supervisory model, a shorter “Guide to 
banking supervision” was published which introduces the public to the main 
principles governing the prudential supervision in the SSM.987 From the perspective 
of the management school of compliance, the SM can be perceived as an example of 
the provision of basic technical and know-how assistance to the bureaucratic agents 
(the NCA/JSTs) which aims to increase their capabilities to carry complex tasks for 
their bureaucratic principal (the ECB).  
(iv) Methodology for the Comprehensive Assessment  
The SSM Regulation obliges the ECB to carry out a comprehensive assessment (CA) 
of credit institutions which are about to become significant.988 This exercise aims to 
overcome the legacy problems of banks by reviewing and possibly repairing bank’s 
balance sheet in order to reduce uncertainty over their solvency prior to handover of 
                                                          
985
 See European Central Bank, SSM Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (above, n. 980), p. 15. 
986
 Nouy, European banking supervision after year one: what lies ahead? (above, n.979). 
987
 See European Central Bank, Guide to banking supervision (above, n.658). 
988
 See Art. 6(4) of the SSM Regulation: “comprehensive assessment by the ECB, including a balance-sheet 
assessment, of that credit institution”. 
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supervisory responsibility to the ECB.989 It consists of two phases: Asset Quality 
Review (AQR) and Stress Testing (ST). In October 2013, the ECB announced that the 
comprehensive assessment would cover around 130 institutions holding 
approximately 85% of euro area bank assets in 19 BU Member States and would be 
exercised jointly by ECB and national supervisors before the SSM start (“first 
comprehensive assessment”).990  
However, the SSM supervisory legislation neither stipulates the detailed process nor 
the methodology of the comprehensive assessment. To set the modalities of the 
comprehensive assessment, the ECB decided to take recourse to the NCAs’ long-
lasting experience and know-how in day-to-day supervision and established a 
dedicated work stream in the preparatory Task Force on Supervision.991 The initial 
work carried out by this work stream was subsequently continued by the 
Comprehensive Assessment Steering Committee (CASC) consisting of four ECB and 
eight NCA high-level experts supported by two technical sub-structures. It resulted 
in the development of detailed methodologies to conduct asset quality review and 
stress tests complemented, where necessary, by supervisory risk assessment 
intended to cross-check the AQR and ST results. 
                                                          
989
 See Danièle Nouy, First ordinary hearing in 2015 of the Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board at the European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Introductory remarks (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150625.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
990
 See European Central Bank, Note Comprehensive Assessment, October 2013, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/notecomprehensiveassessment201310en.pdf, accessed 01 December 
2017. For some of NCAs, the first comprehensive assessment was extremely resource consuming, see Informal 
interview with K (17 January 2016) in Annex. 
991
 See European Central Bank, SSM Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (above, n. 980), p. 5. 
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To perform the asset quality review, the work stream and CASC substructures 
formulated a set of uniform methodologies and harmonized definitions, including 
EBA-formulated criteria for non-performing exposures and forbearance reporting.992 
This toolbox was codified in a special manual designed to guide national supervisors’ 
ground work through the complexities of the AQR.993 The stress testing stage 
comprised of the base and the adverse stress test scenario conducted according to 
the EBA EU-wide Stress Test Methodology 2014.994 In order to assure the quality of 
the stress test outcomes and integrate both stages of the CA exercise, a special stress 
test manual was also developed by the ECB and NCA supervisory experts.995 In the 
course of the exercise, these common methodologies and procedures were 
universally used by both supranational and national supervisory apparatus to 
examine more than 800 individual portfolios, analyze approximately 120,000 debtors, 
revalue over 5,000 securities 170,000 collateral items on banks’ balance sheets and to 
challenge over 850 provisioning and CVA models.996 In 2015, these methodologies 
were also employed to review balance sheets of another nine credit institutions 
(“second comprehensive assessment”), including four which became significant in 
January 2016.  
                                                          
992
 See EBA Final draft Implementing Technical Standards on supervisory reporting on forbearance and non-
performing exposures under article 99(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 [EBA/ITS/2013/03/rev1]. 
993
 See European Central Bank, Asset Quality Review, Phase 2 Manual (2014), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/assetqualityreviewphase2manual201403en.pdf, accessed 01 December 
2017. 
994
 See European Banking Authority, Methodological note EU‐wide Stress Test 2014, Version 2.0 (2014), 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/669262/Methodological+Note.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017. 
995
 See European Central Bank, Comprehensive Assessment Stress Test Manual (2014), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/castmanual201408en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017. 
996
 See European Central Bank, Aggregated Report on Comprehensive Assessment (2014), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/aggregatereportonthecomprehensiveassessment201410.
en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017. 
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Following the Euro Summit of July 2015,997 granting the ESM financial assistance for 
Greece was made conditional upon another comprehensive assessment carried out 
by the ECB covering four significant Greek banks (“third [Greek] comprehensive 
assessment”). For this purpose, the comprehensive assessment methodology 
developed in 2014 was also applied. However the criteria for base and adverse stress 
test scenarios were calibrated.998 In 2016, the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatus 
again made use of these methodologies to assess four new significant credit 
institutions (“fourth comprehensive assessment”).999  
These methodologies, subsequently codified in technical manuals, can be regarded 
as the ECB supervisory apparatus managerial instruments providing its NCA 
supervisory apparatus with technical assistance and know-how to execute the 
comprehensive assessment “close to the ground” by supplying them with centrally 
developed data requirements and methodology.1000 Until the present day, they were 
used to scrutinize balance sheets of more than 140 credit institutions operating in 
the Banking Union. 
                                                          
997
 See Euro Group, Euro Summit Statement, SN 4070/15 (2015). 
998
 See European Central Bank, Aggregated Report on Greek Comprehensive Assessment (2015), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/aggregatereportonthecomprehensiveassessmentexsum
201510.en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017. 
999
 See European Central Bank, ECB concludes comprehensive assessment of four banks (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/sr161104.en.html, accessed 01 December 
2017. 
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 See European Central Bank, SSM Quartely Report: Progress in the operational implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (above, n. 980), p. 13. 
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(v) Guide to JSTs on the exercise of options and national discretions 
In January 2015, the preparatory work on the harmonization of options and national 
discretions (ONDs) concerning significant institutions was undertaken by a special 
high working group consisting of ECB and NCA senior supervisory experts.1001 It 
resulted in the issuance of an ECB Regulation and an ECB Guide. The ECB 
Regulation covered the exercise of so-called general ONDs vis-à-vis significant 
institutions and was classified as the ECB’s ex ante control due to its binding 
character on the NCA supervisory apparatus.1002 The second element of the package 
– the ECB Guideline on the exercise of options and national discretions formulates 
non-binding policy stances on the exercise of the so-called “case-by-case” ONDs vis-
à-vis significant institutions.1003 Whereas the first item of the package can be 
regarded as stipulating rules of law which the administration is always bound to 
observe, the second item establishes rules of practice from which the administration 
may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons.  
Since the overall scope of the ONDs that are applicable on a case-by-case basis is 
broader than the scope of the general ones, it means that the majority of policy 
recommendations for the JSTs can be considered in terms of non-binding rules of 
practice rather than binding rules of law. They cover policy recommendations in 
such areas of prudential supervision as: granting waivers on liquidity and capital 
                                                          
1001
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681) European Central 
Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014 (above, n.968), p. 12. See also Informal interview with H 
(10 October 2016) in Annex. 
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 See supra point (iv) in subsection 0. 
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 See European Central Bank, ECB Guide on options and discretions available in Union law (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/ecb_guide_options_discre
tions.en.pdf?59277660d00228705435a3ab8627afe7, accessed 01 December 2017. 
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requirements at solo level, development of common specifications or preferential 
treatments for liquidity requirements. The members of JSTs are expected to use 
them as guidance when assessing individual requests and/or decisions involving the 
exercise of an option or discretion.1004 In this sense, the Guide significantly 
contributes to the reduction of the agency contract’s incompleteness as regards the 
ways for the exercise of case-by-case ONDs by the JSTs. Given the predominantly 
non-binding nature of policy recommendations on ONDs for significant institutions, 
this harmonization project can be considered as an example of the use of managerial 
strategies by the ECB supervisory apparatus to increase the level of compliance of 
NCA supervisory apparatus (in the JSTs) with respect to the exercise of the majority 
of the ONDs provided by Union law in relation to significant institutions.  
(vi) Guidance on non-performing loans (NPLs) 
The subsequent comprehensive assessment exercises revealed that many EU credit 
institutions still have high amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs) on their balance 
sheets. NPLs are a type of assets which do not generate income and they require 
provisioning. They also limit the ability of banks to provide loans to the economy 
because they remain on the banks’ balance sheets. It is therefore in the interests of 
both the banks and the economy to reduce the amount of NPLs. However, over last 
the past few years there have been diverging supervisory approaches and practices 
towards NPL across national jurisdictions. This diversity can be manifested by the 
                                                          
1004
 Ibid., para 2.2. See also Informal interview with I (13 August, 21 October 2016) in Annex. 
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fact that across the euro area, the percentage of banks’ balance sheet made up of 
NPLs ranges from 1% to nearly 50%.1005 
Therefore, the main aim of publishing the ECB guidance on NPLs is to ensure a 
level-playing field and also make transparent the expectations towards significant 
institutions. Although it is primarily addressed to significant institutions, 
nevertheless this guidance also serves the JSTs as a common yardstick for evaluating 
banks’ handling of NPLs as part of the regular supervisory dialogue.1006 In particular, 
it contains qualitative supervisory expectations on how to define and implement 
appropriate quantitative policies and targets to address the issue of NPLs by 
individual credit institutions.1007 It is of a non-binding character, although the ECB 
expects it to be “considered very seriously”.1008 To develop this guidance, a dedicated 
working stream (NPL Task Force) consisting of supervisory experts from the ECB 
and eight national supervisory authorities conducted a comprehensive stocktaking 
of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks concerning NPL related 
issues.1009The task force was led by the Central Bank of Ireland.1010 
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 See Julie Dickson, Dealing with diversity – the European banking sector, Speech at the 17th Handelsblatt 
Annual Conference on European Banking Regulation (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se161128.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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 See European Central Bank, ECB launches public consultation on guidance to banks on non-performing loans, 
12 September 2016, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/sr160912.en.html, 
accessed 01 December 2017. 
1007
 See European Central Bank, FAQs on the NPL guidance (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl/npl_faq.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Bank, Stocktake of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks related to NPLs (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl/stock_taking.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017, fn. 1. 
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Given its non-binding nature, this guidance project can be considered as an example 
of the use of managerial strategies by the ECB supervisory apparatus to set uniform 
expectations of the NCA/JST supervisory apparatus towards supervised entities. 
However, the issue of NPLs depends not only on bank supervisors, but also on the 
national legal and judicial systems which may constrain the speedy resolution of 
NPLs. The guidance can be thus regarded as a set of particular rules of practice 
bringing more transparency and rule clarification regarding the treatment of high 
levels of NPLs across significant institutions. 
(vii) Guide to JSTs on fit and proper assessments 
Fit and proper supervision refers to the supervisory assessment of whether the 
bank’s management (i.a. board members and key function holders) is capable of 
running the bank. This aspect of prudential supervision does not only impact the 
safety and soundness of the institution, but also banking sector in general since it 
reinforces the trust of the public at large in those who take key decisions related to 
the financial sector of the euro area.1011 The European supervisory legislation provides 
a set of criteria to conduct such assessments, which include: (i) reputation, (ii) 
experience, (iii) conflict of interest and independence of mind, (iv) time 
commitment, and (v) collective suitability of the management body.1012 However, 
since fit and proper regime is based on the principle of minimum harmonization, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1010
 See supra n.978. 
1011
 See European Central Bank, Draft guide to fit and proper assessments (2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/fap/fap_guide.en.pdf, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
1012
 See Article 91 of the CRDIV. 
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there exist numerous divergences in national transpositions across national 
jurisdictions.1013 Indeed, the criteria laid down in the CRDIV governing the 
assessment of the suitability of the management body, notably including on 
reputation and the number of directorships, are interpreted differently in the 
national laws.1014 For instance, some NCAs make use of questionnaires to be 
answered by the candidates. In other jurisdictions, interviews are used as tools to 
assess the suitability of new members of the board. In addition, the national 
timelines for conducting the assessment also differ greatly.1015 As a result, there 
might be a situation where the same natural or legal person is assessed for similar 
positions in different member states with a different outcome due to the applicable 
criteria.1016 This unnecessarily complicates the work of a single supervisor and also 
hampers the consistency of the JST approaches to significant institutions which deal 
with credit institutions headquartered in different national jurisdictions. Ultimately, 
these regulatory differences are also a great obstacle to the Single Market, they also 
increase operational costs and overall bureaucracy.1017 
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 See Julie Dickson, The relevance of the supervision of behaviour and culture to the SSM, Speeh at the 
conference "Looking forward: effective supervision of behaviour and culture at financial institutions" in the 
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Speech at Banking and Corporate Evening of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Regional Office in Bavaria (Munich, 
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To reduce ambiguities regarding national interpretations of rules on fit and proper 
assessments, the network of authorisation experts hosted by DG-MSIV’s 
Authorisation Division has established a number of work stream which developed 
common policies regarding the fit and proper criteria, practices and processes 
applicable to significant institutions.1018 Through those collaborative processes, the 
ECB and NCA authorisation experts developed various policy stances on different 
aspects of fit and proper assessments, including the collective suitability of the board 
as a whole.1019 The aggregated outcome of their work has been codified in a Guide to 
fit and proper assessments1020 which is dedicated to the JSTs. Although the JSTs are 
not legally bound by the Guide, it nevertheless establishes a set of specific rules of 
practice from which the agents’ cannot depart without providing a justification. A 
degree of supervisory judgment, the principle of proportionality and a case-by-case 
approach are necessary features of fit and proper assessments conducted by the 
JSTs.1021 Thus, the Guide can be considered as an example of the use of managerial 
strategies by the ECB supervisory apparatus to ensure consistent interpretation of 
rules governing the entry into Single Market of new entities (both natural and legal 
persons).  
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Figure 15 Capacity for cooperation within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
7.4.2. Framework for the Principal-Agent cooperation within the system of SSM 
Indirect Supervision 
This subsection identifies three structured dimensions of informal cooperation 
between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses with respect to the subsystem of 
SSM Indirect Supervision and presents, indicatively, outcomes of their deliberations, 
which can be regarded as significantly contributing to the reduction of the 
incomplete nature of the agency contract underpinning the functioning of the 
subsystem of the SSM Indirect Supervision.  
Informal structures for the ECB and NCA supervisory cooperation 
(i) Senior Management Network 
The Senior Management Network (SMN) is a permanent network pooling together 
the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatus. Its main role is to assist the Supervisory 
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Board of the SSM in the fulfilment of its tasks regarding the supervision of less 
significant institutions in the SSM and the ECB’s oversight function over the NCAs. 
The SMN comprises of senior management responsible for LSI supervision from all 
NCAs and DG-MSIII. It is intended to act as a sounding board for central proposals 
and a platform for discussing overarching topics emerging from day-to-day LSI 
supervision by NCAs.1022 Although the SMN is of informal and non-hierarchical 
dimension, it nevertheless operates in the shadow of hierarchy since it is always 
chaired by Director General of DGMSIII, or his representative. The SMN meetings 
take place on a quarterly basis, in the form of a physical meeting based on the 
agenda prepared by the SMN secretariat hosted by DG-MSIII.1023 In addition, 
teleconferences addressing specific technical topics can be also organized on an ad-
hoc basis.  
Given its informal and non-hierarchical dimension, the SMN can be considered as 
the primary example of the use of problem-solving (managerial) strategy in 
promoting the compliance of the NCA supervisory apparatus. Rather than being the 
ECB’s monitoring mechanism, it is a platform facilitation on-going and informal 
interactions between the bureaucratic principal and agent in the framework of SSM 
Indirect Supervision. It contributes to the reduction of uncertainty accompanying 
the incomplete agency contract setting the SSM’s functioning, and clarifies the ECB’s 
                                                          
1022
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014 (above, n.968) p. 66. 
1023
 See supra n. 720. 
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expectations relating to the application of Union’s prudential policies on credit 
institutions to less significant institutions.  
(ii) Working Group on High Supervisory Standards 
The technical Working Group on High Supervisory Standards (WG-HSS) is a 
permanent SMN substructure, which gathers ECB and NCA senior supervisory 
experts and is chaired by DG-MSIII’s officials at managerial level. It is tasked with 
identification of areas for regulatory action concerning supervisory harmonization 
and presenting proposals for discussion to be held at the SMN level.1024 For these 
purposes, the WG-HSS conducts the benchmarking of best supervisory practices 
among NCAs and initiates the work on the formulation of joint supervisory 
standards (JSS) covering different aspects of prudential supervision to be used by 
NCAs.1025 The WG-HSS meetings are held on a monthly basis as teleconferences 
whereas its physical meetings occur on a quarterly basis.1026 
Given its informal and non-hierarchical dimension, the WG-HSS hosted by the 
DGMSIII can be considered as another example of the use of problem-solving 
(managerial) strategies in promoting the compliance of the NCA supervisory 
apparatus within the framework of SSM Indirect Supervision. Similarly to the SMN, 
it fosters supervisory capacity building across the SSM as well as to the on-going 
interpretation and clarification of the Union’s supervisory policies on a daily basis at 
the senior expert level.  
                                                          
1024
 See Informal interview with B (09 November 2015, 28 June 2016) in Annex.  
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 See European Central Bank, Report LSI supervision within the SSM (above, n.924), p. 14. 
1026
 See Informal interview with B (09 November 2015, 28 June 2016) and with G (10 March 2017) in Annex. 
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(iii) Other fora 
Similarly like in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, the third dimension of 
intensive collaboration between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses can be 
captured in the establishment of ad hoc project-based working groups and drafting 
teams. These structures are established by the Working Group on High Supervisory 
Standards to focus on specific policy issues concerning the supervision of less 
significant institutions each of those dealing with one or few similar supervisory 
issues which require more consistent approach across the NCAs. Drafting teams may 
be led by a DG-MSIII or an NCA representative Since I is up to the NCA to decide 
whether they have interest in taking part in the work of such drafting teams or 
project-based working groups, their composition may vary depending on the 
deliberated supervisory issue. The NCA participation usually depends on individual 
technical capacities, expertise and the supervisory issue at stake, and therefore there 
may exist drafting teams consisting of only a few of NCA representatives.1027 
Since the start of the SSM operations, a number of such ECB-NCA joint projects have 
been launched by the ECB to deal with different supervisory issues. In 2015, the ECB 
established drafting teams to formulate harmonized practices on annual supervisory 
planning by the NCAs and on the application of simplified obligations for recovery 
planning to non-systemic less significant institutions1028 by the NCA supervisory 
                                                          
1027
 See Informal interview with B (09 November 2015, 28 June 2016). On the issue of NCA capacities, see also 
(comparatively) Informal interview with J (09 November 2016) in Annex. 
1028
 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) grants national competent authorities the discretion to 
apply simplified obligations. See Article 4 of the BRRD.  
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apparatus.1029 In addition, the ECB and NCAs formulated a common approach to the 
recognition of institutional protection schemes, which are of particular importance 
to Germany, Austria and Spain.1030 In 2016, intensive cooperation between the ECB 
and NCA supervisory apparatus in different informal drafting teams continued and 
resulted in the formulation of common supervisory approaches for the conduct of 
on-site inspections at LSIs by the NCAs, the supervision of car financing institutions 
(CFIs).1031 Dedicated ECB-NCAs drafting teams were also instituted to develop a 
crisis management cooperation framework between the ECB and the NCAs, common 
methodology for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) for LSIs and 
licensing of LSIs with FinTech business models.1032 Given their informal and non-
hierarchical dimension, drafting teams and project-based working groups led by a 
representative of either ECB, or NCA supervisory apparatus can be regarded as 
another problem-solving mechanism employed by the ECB supervisory apparatus to 
further clarify its supervisory expectations from the NCAs on key areas of prudential 
supervision. Seen from this perspective, they serve as informal structures designed to 
the reduction of the incompleteness of the agency contract underpinning the 
functioning of the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
                                                          
1029
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2015 (above, n.681), p. 42-43. 
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 Ibid., p. 43.  
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 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 (above, n.865), p. 27-28. 
1032
 Ibid., p. 28.  
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Key outcomes of deliberations between the ECB-NCA supervisory apparatuses  
(iv) Joint Supervisory Standards 
Based on the backward looking information collected from NCA reports, the ECB 
may find out that certain areas of supervision require more harmonized practice to 
improve compatibility of NCA supervisory activities on LSIs.1033 For this purpose, 
DG-MSIII proposed to initiate the development of a compendium of joint 
supervisory standards (JSS) for the NCAs, which would mirror to certain extent the 
SSM Supervisory Manual used to the supervision of significant institutions. The JSS 
are non-binding instruments, which identify high quality and flexible standards for 
NCA supervision designed to take into account regional aspects such as the size, 
business and risk profile of the institution.1034 They may set very granular rules or set 
general principles governing particular area of LSI supervision. The ultimate choice 
regarding the level of JSS granularity depends on the level of consensus among NCAs 
concerning the policies adopted and a degree of flexibility to be left for national 
supervisors.1035 As such, the JSS are considered by the ECB to be a key tool for the 
supervision of less significant institutions.1036 
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The development of a JSS consists of two phases. Once the ECB identified the need 
for a specific, targeted standard related to LSI supervision, the existing regulatory 
framework is analyzed, in particular whether there exist any standards, guidelines, or 
recommendations developed by the ECB in that supervisory field. If the question is 
negative, in the second step SSM-wide best practices are identified and drafting of a 
JSS begins in close cooperation with the NCAs.1037 Up to now, the ECB and NCA 
supervisors developed five JSS and a number of common policy stances on important 
aspects of LSI supervision,1038 all of which are of non-binding nature and, thus, 
constitute rules of practice rather than rules of law. They clarify the expectations of 
the ECB supervisory apparatus vis-à-vis LSI supervision carried out by the NCA 
supervisory apparatus in different supervisory areas. The fact that the ECB has never 
strongly advocated for making the JSS legally binding upon the NCA demonstrated 
problem-solving approach aim to build the NCA capacity to fulfill its supervisory 
expectations rather than imposing strict control on the way how the NCAs exercise 
the ECB’s exclusive competences on LSIs.  
(v) Recommendation ECB/2017/10 on the exercise of options and national 
discretions by NCAs in relation to LSIs1039 
The Recommendation ECB/2017/10 is a particular example of non-binding common 
rules of practice mutually agreed by the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses. As 
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 See European Central Bank, Report LSI supervision within the SSM (above, n.924), p. 14. 
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already noted, initially the ECB decided to harmonize the application of options and 
national discretions (OND) for the banks it directly supervises in the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision. For this purpose, it adopted a binding ECB Regulation1040 
and non-binding ECB Guide1041 which developed policy stances on respectively 
“general” and “case-by-case” ONDs available in Union law. Later, the ECB and NCAs 
agreed to extend these policy stances also to the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision, but taking into account the principle of proportionality. For this 
purpose, the ECB and NCA drafted together a binding Guideline1042 and non-binding 
Recommendation (ECB/2017/10) to the NCAs which formulate common 
specifications for the exercise of some options and discretions available in Union law 
in relation to less significant institution. 
Since policy stances set in the Recommendation ECB/2017/10 are not legally binding 
upon the NCAs, this Recommendation can be regarded constituting rules of practice. 
This rules reflect the ECB’s supervisory expectations from which the NCA 
supervisory apparatus should not depart in an individual case without giving 
reasons, similarly as JST supervisors in respect to the ECB Guide on the exercise of 
options and national discretions vis-à-vis significant institutions.1043 National 
supervisory teams are expected to take them into account when assessing individual 
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requests and/or decisions involving the exercise of an option or discretion. Thus, the 
ECB Recommendation can be considered as an example of the use of managerial 
strategies by the ECB supervisory apparatus to clarify its expectations on how the 
NCAs apply certain “case-by-case” ONDs in relation to less significant institutions. 
(vi) Guide on the recognition of institutional protection schemes  
Institutional protection schemes (IPS) are contractual or statutory liability 
arrangements, which protect their member institutions and ensure that these 
institutions have the liquidity and solvency needed to avoid bankruptcy where 
necessary.1044 The IPSs arrangements are currently recognized in three participating 
Member States: Austria, Germany and Spain.1045 The relevance of the IPSs is 
significant in absolute terms, given that about 50% of credit institutions in the euro 
area are members of an IPS which represents around 10% of the total assets of the 
euro area banking system.1046 In particular, they are however relevant for less 
significant institutions.1047 For instance, in the German banking system four out of 
five institutions belong to such a protection scheme.1048 
                                                          
1044
 See Article 113(7) of the CRR, first paragraph. 
1045
 See European Central Bank, Guide on the approach for the recognition of institutional protection schemes (IPS) 
for prudential purposes (July 2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/institutional_protection_guide.en.pdf?9bfc77665726f90
c0785c8e8ed480173,, accessed 01 December 2017, par. 1.1. 
1046
 Ibid., par. 1.2. 
1047
 See Nouy and Lautenschläger, Introductory statement to the press conference on the ECB Annual Report on 
supervisory activities 2015 (with Q&A) (above, n.978). 
1048
 See Sabine Lautenschläger, European banking supervision – much achieved, but still much to do, Speech at 
Bundesbanksymposium "Dialogue on banking supervision" (Frankfurt am Main, 2016), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se160601.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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For these reasons, it was decided to set up a dedicated drafting teams consisting of 
ECB and NCA supervisory experts who were mandated to develop a common policy 
stance regarding the recognition of such institutional protection schemes for 
prudential purposes.1049 The outcome of joint work is reflected in a Guide setting the 
approach for the recognition of the IPS for prudential supervisory purposes.1050 The 
Guide was designed as a non-binding document, which sets out best practices to be 
followed when assessing individual applications for the prudential permission 
referred to in Article 113(7) of the CRR. Given the non-binding nature of the 
proposed assessment criteria, the Guide on the recognition of the IPS can be 
perceived as an example of setting specific benchmarks by the ECB to ensure that 
the NCA treat the IPS in a consistent manner across the Banking Union.  
 
Figure 16 Capacity for cooperation within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
                                                          
1049
 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2014 (above, n. 968), p. 43. 
1050
 See European Central Bank, Guide on the approach for the recognition of institutional protection schemes (IPS) 
for prudential purposes (above, n.1045). 
Reduction of ECB-NCA agency contract's incompleteness,  
clarification of contractual obligations by development of 
non-binding rules of practice for NCA supervisors 
WG-
HSS 
SMN 
Drafting 
teams 
321 
 
7.5. Preliminary observations as regards the second structural 
condition affecting formal top-down compliance expectation 
In order to gauge the organisational design of the SSM, this chapter analyzed the 
internal mechanisms that the ECB (supervisory apparatus) may employ to align 
possibly heterogeneous preferences and objectives of the NCA (supervisory 
apparatus) and to reduce the ambiguities of their essentially incomplete agency 
contract.  
For the purpose of testing the Enforcement hypothesis, this chapter applied the 
traditional Principal-Agent perspective to look at the formal capacity of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) to control the NCA (supervisory apparatus) in the subsystem 
of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. In doing so, it identified a number of ex-ante 
and ex-post control mechanisms at the disposal of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) 
to monitor and steer the action of the NCA (supervisory apparatus) within the 
subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision. This assessment takes into 
account a number of criteria, including their dimension, intrusiveness, origin and 
actual use and is reflected in subsection 6.5.1(i) for the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision, and in subsection 6.5.2(i) for the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision.  
The Management hypothesis was tested by the application of liberal Principal-Agent 
perspective, which investigated the formal capacity for cooperation between the ECB 
and the NCA (supervisory apparatuses) in the subsystem of SSM Direct and Indirect 
Supervision. In doing so, it focused on whether there exist any routine, non-
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confrontational and informal mechanisms involving the participation of ECB and 
NCA supervisory experts, and whether there are any tangible outcomes of their 
deliberations would could be classified as reducing the ambiguities of the agency 
contract between the ECB and NCAs/JST (supervisory apparatuses), or clarifying 
contractual expectations of the ECB (supervisory apparatus), or providing the 
NCA/JST supervisory apparatus with necessary technical assistance and supervisory 
know-how. This assessment is reflected in subsection 6.5.1(ii) for the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision, and in subsection 6.5.2(ii) for the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision.  
7.5.1. Operational model of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
(i) Insights provided by the Enforcement approach 
The application of the traditional Principal-Agent approach reveals that there exists 
considerable capacity for control of the NCA/JST (supervisory apparatus) by the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. However, the 
use of some of them is far from unproblematic. A number of the ex-ante and the ex-
post controls have been detected and they can be regarded as contributing to the 
reduction of divergence in supervisory approach by individual JST and to the 
alignment of possibly heterogeneous preferences of the NCA supervisory apparatus 
assigned to the JSTs (the bureaucratic agent).  
The ex-ante dimension of the internal control mechanism in the subsystem of SSM 
Direct Supervision has a predominantly legal nature and rests on a number of 
binding acts directly applicable in their entirety in the Participating Member States. 
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These acts can be regarded as framing the scope and modalities of the agency 
contract between the ECB and NCAs which underpins the functioning of the 
subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. They also considerably limit the scope of 
discretion for the agents, which may also adversely affect the JSTs capacity to adapt 
the SSM supervisory approach to credit institutions having very unique business 
models and whose risks cannot be comprehensively captured by standardized SSM 
procedures and processes. However, it does not seem to be the case in the context of 
legal framework governing the exercise of direct supervision of significant 
institutions. Furthermore, the recently developed internal “delegation framework” 
providing for greater direct involvement of the ECB supervisory apparatus in 
decision-making in certain areas of prudential supervision considerably reinforces 
the ex-ante control over the draft proposals submitted by the JST/NCA supervisory 
apparatus. 
The overview of adopted legal acts supplementing the SSM Regulation (the basic 
agency contract) demonstrated that the ECB has a strong capacity for setting ex-ante 
procedures by engaging in regulatory actions. However, in order not to undermine 
the credibility of legal framework governing the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision, the ECB as the bureaucratic principal needs to be mindful that the 
scope of its mandate to set binding rules upon the NCAs (its bureaucratic agents) is 
not unlimited, but possible only “the extent necessary to organize or specify the 
arrangements for the carrying out of the tasks conferred on it by the SSM 
Regulation”. In the context of the ECB-led harmonization of options and national 
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discretions, it was noted by the European Parliament that “the ECB needs to remain 
within its mandate when conducting work on the reduction of options and national 
discretions”.1051 On the occasion of discussion on the ECB’s Addendum to the 
Guidance on non-performing loans,1052 the Council stated the ECB did not have legal 
power to ex-ante request SSM credit institutions to write down new non-performing 
loans completely within two years if they are unsecured, and within seven years if 
they are secured, and to ignore the value of the collateral in the latter case.1053 Both 
the Legal Services of the European Parliament and the Council found that the ECB’s 
regulatory action cannot serve the purpose to set rules in the fields which the 
legislator has, for the time being, decided not to harmonize, even in a form of soft 
law instruments since they non-binding nature does not imply that they are 
automatically devoid of legal effects.1054 This situation is reminiscent of the dispute 
the ECB and the UK government the “location policies” regarding the clearing of 
euro-denominated derivatives.1055 It therefore follows that the ECB’s power to 
substantially modify ex-ante rules governing its agency contract with the NCAs is 
constrained, which itself is not a negative feature as too prescriptive rulebook may 
                                                          
1051
 See European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on Banking Union – Annual Report 2016, 
2016/2247(INI) (Strasbourg, 2017), http://bit.ly/2jaCLUv, accessed 01 December 2017, recital 11. 
1052
 See European Central Bank, Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on nonperforming loans: Prudential 
provisioning backstop for non-performing exposures, October 2017, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl2/ssm.npl_addendum_draft_2017
10.en.pdf, accessed 01 December 2017.  
1053
 See Reuters, EU Council says ECB does not have mandate for its bad loan measures, 27 November 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-banks-npls/eu-council-says-ecb-does-not-have-mandate-for-its-
bad-loan-measures-idUKKBN1DR1G9, accessed 01 December 2017.  
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 See European Parliament, Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on non-performing loans: Competence of 
the ECB to adopt such Addendum (above, n.780); Council, Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on non-
performing loans: Prudential provisioning backstop for non-performing exposures (above, n.780). 
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 This dispute was ultimately settled by the Court in favour of the UK, see Judgment of 4 March 2015, Case T-
496/11 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Central Bank (ECB) ("CCPs location 
policy") EU:T:2015:133. 
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diminish the JSTs’ overall capacity to achieve the expected supervisory outcomes, 
and thus contribute to the agency loss.  
The ex-post dimension of the internal control mechanisms over the NCA supervisory 
apparatus in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision seems to be less prominent 
that the ex-ante dimension. There exist two main tools which can be immediately 
activated by the ECB supervisory apparatus: “police-patrols” mechanisms developed 
by the ECB’s horizontal and specialized services which shall ensure consistency 
between all the JSTs, and “operational acts” that may be directed to the NCA 
supervisory apparatus. Other of the analyzed ex-post controls cannot be immediately 
activated. The issuance of supervisory instructions to NCA JST members by a JST 
Coordinator is constrained by national data protection, employment and civil service 
framework. The ECB supervisory apparatus cannot steer the behaviour of the NCA 
supervisory apparatus where the NCA concerned did not delegate its authority in 
staff matters to the ECB. The NCAs remain effectively free to move or otherwise 
deploy their supervisory staff as they see fit. The only discretion available to the ECB 
supervisory apparatus regarding the NCA supervisory apparatus in JSTs is the power 
to reject an NCA appointment to a JST.1056  
More importantly however, the NCA/JST supervisory apparatus is subject to double 
reporting lines. They report to a JST Coordinator on their JST work, but for any other 
work they report to their NCA line managers. In addition, on all matters of hierarchy 
and human resources, they report exclusively to the NCA management. As noted by 
                                                          
1056
 See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation.  
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the Commission, these “double reporting lines (functional and hierarchical) may 
expose NCA staff in the JST to possible conflicts in terms of staff issues (workload, 
appraisals etc.), and may also interfere with due information sharing.”1057  
Last but not least, the possibility for timely activation of another of ex-ante control 
mechanism, which is the issuance of formal supervisory instructions, remains also 
constrained due to the applicable decision-making procedure at the ECB in 
supervisory matters. A supervisory instruction is adopted by the Governing Council 
on the basis of proposal submitted by the Supervisory Board. Both are collegiate 
bodies consisting of Governors of euro area Member States (the Governing Council) 
and representatives of the NCAs of the participating Member States (the Supervisory 
Board). Since instructions allow for a very detailed legal prescription of the 
addressee’s behaviour and do not leave much space to safeguard its institutional 
autonomy, it is highly unlikely that they could become a regular ex-post tool used by 
the ECB supervisory apparatus.   
(ii) Insights provided by the Management approach 
The application of the liberal Principal-Agent approach reveals that there exists well-
established formal cooperation capacity between the ECB and NCA (supervisory 
apparatus) in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. This capacity is primarily 
reflected in a number of informal supervisory networks bringing together the ECB 
and NCA supervisory experts. These networks operate under the auspices of DG-
                                                          
1057
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (above, n. 717), p. 28. See also Informal interview with F (25 October 
2016) in Annex. 
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MSIV and serve as platforms for discussion and development of new policies and 
procedures related to supervision of significant institutions.1058 Importantly, the 
foundations for supervisory cooperation between the ECB and NCAs in DG-MSIV 
networks were already established prior to the beginning of the SSM operations by 
setting-up the Preparatory Task Force on Supervision, which managed SSM technical 
preparatory work carried out by the ECB together with the NCBs and NCAs of euro 
area Member States. In addition, the formal capacity for cooperation between the 
ECB and NCA supervisors in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision further 
supported by the existence of various working and project-based groups which have 
been jointly developing policy stances applicable to the supervision of significant 
institutions.  
There exist several tangible outcomes of deliberations between ECB and NCA 
supervisors gathered in those informal structures. The most notable example is the 
SSM Supervisory Manual, which was drafted in 2o13-4 by the ECB and NCA 
supervisory apparatus jointly collaborating in the Work Stream 3 (WSIII) of the 
Preparatory Task Force on Supervision, which was in charge of developing the 
supervisory model of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).1059 The Manual is a 
crucial supervisory tool setting a number of rules of practice, which they can use to 
execute their work.1060 Seen from this perspective, it constitutes the indispensable 
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 Ibid. p. 31. 
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 See supra n. 964.  
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 See Danièle Nouy, The Single Supervisory Mechanism after one year: the state of play and the challenges ahead, 
Speech at Banca d’Italia conference “Micro and macroprudential banking supervision in the euro area”, the 
Università Cattolica (Milan, 2015), 
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element to develop a common supervisory approach as it provides hundreds of ECB 
and NCA supervisors across Europe with a common set of work procedures and 
practices to be used then supervising significant credit institutions.1061 Apart from 
the Supervisory Manual, ECB and NCA supervisors informally formulated a range of 
further technical rules of practice addressed to JST members in such supervisory 
areas, as for example: the exercise of options and discretions; treatment of non-
performing loans or fit and proper assessment.  
The above-mentioned findings suggest that the supervisory networks or other forms 
of informal cooperation provide positive results and contributes to the reduction of 
ambiguities governing the agency contract in the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision. They also clarify supervisory expectations of the ECB supervisory 
apparatus in relation to the JST/NCA supervisory apparatus. However, to increase 
levels of transparency as regards rules of practice that the JSTs are expected to apply 
in their supervision of significant institutions, it could be contemplated to make the 
Supervisory Manual public in the same fashion as other products of ECB-NCA 
informal cooperation.1062 It was also observed by a number of representatives of the 
NCA supervisory apparatus that the results of deliberations in networks, which are 
shared by a majority of the members, are not always reflected in the final policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se151124.en.html, accessed 01 
December 2017. 
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 See Nouy, European banking supervision after year one: what lies ahead? (above, n.979). 
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 As also submitted by the European Parliament, see European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on 
Banking Union – Annual Report 2016 (above, n.1051), recital 11.  
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proposals presented by ECB supervisors.1063 Furthermore, ECB supervisors are not 
always willing to thoroughly discuss supervisory issues in the networks before 
submitting them to the attention of the Supervisory Board.1064 This indicates that the 
ECB casts indeed a long shadow of hierarchy within the networks which on some 
occasions may however impede the use of managerial techniques of promoting 
compliance. To ensure that the ECB supervisory apparatus does not use its strong 
hierarchical position to excessively influence, the representatives of the NCA 
supervisory apparatus could become co-chairs of these networks, or at least play 
more significant role in the agenda-setting.  
7.5.2. Operational model of the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision 
(i) Insights provided by the Enforcement approach 
The application of the traditional Principal-Agent approach reveals that there exists 
moderate capacity for control of the NCA (supervisory apparatus) by the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. A number of 
the ex-ante and the ex-post controls have been detected whose role contributes to 
the reduction of divergence in supervisory approach by individual NCAs and to the 
alignment of possibly heterogeneous preferences of the NCA supervisory apparatus 
assigned to the supervision of less significant institutions (the bureaucratic agent).  
                                                          
1063
 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (above, n. 717), p. 32; see also Informal interview with N (03 November 
2016) in Annex.  
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The ex-ante dimension of the internal control mechanism in the subsystem of SSM 
Indirect Supervision rests primarily on the procedures established in the SSM 
Regulation and SSM Framework Regulation, namely common procedures regime 
and NCA ex-ante notifications requirements. Apart of them, there is only one 
binding legal act addressed to the NCAs which targets specifically the subsystem of 
SSM Indirect Supervision: the ECB’s Guideline to the NCAs on the exercise of 
options and national discretions in relation to less significant institutions. It 
therefore follows that there are not too many ex-ante controls which set binding 
rules of law that frame the scope and modalities of the ECB-NCAs agency contract 
underpinning the functioning of the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. 
Consequently, the functioning of this subsystem appears to be far less “legalized” 
than of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. On the one hand, the reliance on 
softer steering instruments leaves more flexibility to both the bureaucratic principal 
and bureaucratic agents to adjust their contractual obligations to the changing 
landscape of European banking sector. On the other hand, leaving the NCAs to 
much flexibility as regards the ways how they shall exercise the ECB’s exclusive 
supervisory competences may result in unintended agency loss on the ECB side. In 
this context, it needs to be pointed out few legally binding obligations on the 
bureaucratic agent’s side may hinder ensuring effective control by the bureaucratic 
principal in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. This is due to the fact that 
the ECB supervisory apparatus responsible for NCA oversight consist of only around 
80 full-time supervisors in comparison to around 1800 full-time NCA supervisors 
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whose compliance needs to be monitored against rather soft and general criteria laid 
down in the JSS.1065 
In this context, the lack of binding criteria to categorize NCA draft supervisory 
decisions and procedures as “material” may be indicated as a specific example which 
additionally decreases the efficiency of the Central Notification Point seen as the 
ECB’s primary mechanism of the ex-ante control. Since the NCA retain discretion in 
qualifying their draft supervisory decisions and procedures as having or not having 
“material” effects on individual less significant supervised entities, it therefore 
follows that the ECB may receive a distorted view on NCA supervisory activities. 
Crucially, the lack of harmonized criteria on “material” supervisory decisions makes 
it difficult for the ECB to aggregate and compare capital-add on decisions by NCAs 
which are still communicated in a non-harmonized way.1066 This issue is also directly 
related to the lack of a common SREP methodology for LSI supervision which could 
be consistently used by the NCAs. It would be welcomed if the current joint ECB-
NCA work on the development of the harmonized SREP for LSIs facilitated in more 
consistent implementation of the SREP across the NCAs, notably in terms of the 
capital requirement definition.1067 
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Moreover, functioning of the common procedures regime is another area where the 
ECB’s ex-ante control capacity may face challenges. This challenge concerns in 
particular common procedures related to licensing cases in particular in the view of 
the upcoming Brexit which may force many UK-based banking groups to apply for a 
license in the Banking Union in order not to lose the access to the Single Market. 
With respect to licensing of new credit institutions, the ECB’s ex-ante control 
capacity over the quality of NCA draft supervisory decisions is constrained by tight 
legal deadlines. According to the SSM Regulation, draft licensing decisions prepared 
by the NCAs are deemed to be adopted unless the ECB objects within 10 working 
days (extendable once in justified cases) after having received the submission from 
the NCA. Since the complex supervisory decision-making process at the ECB is likely 
to consume the most of 10 days available for evaluation of a draft submitted by the 
NCA, it is of utmost importance that the NCAs have proper incentives to informally 
share their working proposal earlier, so that the ECB can initiative its own 
assessment in advance.  
The ex-post dimension of the internal control mechanism appears to be centered on 
the NCAs’ ex post reporting obligations laid down in the SSM Framework 
Regulation, which allow the NCA to take a backward looking perspective at NCA 
supervisory activities conducted in the last supervisory cycle. Reports submitted 
annually by the NCAs may also help the ECB to identify significant variations in 
supervisory approaches used by the NCA which may be a reason to develop joint 
supervisory standards in a certain area of LSI supervision. However, due to different 
333 
 
national supervisory traditions, cross-border comparisons do not always provide 
reliable information on the NCAs’ supervisory activities. For example, some NCAs 
impose capital and liquidity demands (Pillar 2 measures) in a form of formal 
supervisory decisions whereas other communicate them as a part of supervisory 
dialogue without resorting to a formal administrative act.1068 Therefore, unless there 
is harmonized methodology for communicating the results of the SREP for LSIs, 
NCA annual reports will continue to provide a somewhat distorted backward-
looking picture of some of NCAs’ supervisory activities.  
It is highly unlikely that the ECB will use another of its ex-post control which is the 
power to involve staff from one NCA to join an LSI supervisory team of another 
NCA. Under the currently applicable SSM supervisory framework, staff matters 
remain within the NCAs’ exclusive competence and there exists a link of 
subordination, disciplinary power, and confidentiality obligations between national 
supervisors and their NCAs. Additionally, in some Member States, national 
supervisors are also functionaries of the State (Luxembourg, Germany) which further 
constrains the possibility of the ECB’s intervention into their employment relations. 
Therefore, in order to activate the possibility to relocate NCA supervisory staff across 
NCAs, the ECB would have to receive from the NCAs their exclusive rights to 
coordinate the work of their staff and issue binding instructions, which may not be 
possible under certain Member State jurisdictions.  
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 See European Central Bank, Report LSI supervision within the SSM (above, n.924), p. 12; see also Informal 
interview with B (09 November 2015, 28 June 2016) in Annex. 
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Finally, in the absence of any specific dispute resolution mechanism between the 
ECB Banking Supervision and the NCAs, the takeover of LSI supervision clause is the 
ECB’s ex-post reactive measure of last resort to ensure compliance when softer 
means of persuasion (including “naming-and-shaming” options) fail. However, until 
the present day, the ECB has never decided to assume direct supervision of one or 
more LSIs from any of the NCAs. The current supervisory decision-making 
modalities at the ECB require both the endorsement of the Supervisory Board and 
non-objection of the Governing Council for a takeover decision to be adopted.1069 In 
other words, the majority of both NCA representatives in the former would need to 
give their consent for such an action, and the majority of the NCB Governors would 
be required not to object. Since political sensitiveness of such a decision could 
potentially entail reputational and domestic policy consequences, it seems to be 
highly unlikely that the ECB’s would ever on its own initiative activate this 
procedure, unless the NCA concerned explicitly requests the ECB to do so. Yet, as 
noted by one NCA, on several occasions ECB supervisors informally mentioned the 
possibly of taking over of LSI supervision when faced with national opposition 
during meetings of the Supervisory Board.1070 This suggests that the simple threat to 
activate this ex-post control may be equally, or even more, influential then its 
effective use.  
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(ii) Insights provided by the Management approach 
The application of the liberal Principal-Agent approach reveals that there exists 
promising formal cooperation capacity between the ECB and NCA (supervisory 
apparatus) in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. This capacity is mainly 
constructed on two permanent structures for informal cooperation between the ECB 
and NCA supervisory apparatuses: the Senior Management Network (SMN) and 
Working Group on High Supervisory Standards (WG-HSS). These platforms operate 
under the auspices of DG-MSIII and serve as sounding boards for deliberations on 
the overarching topics emerging from day-to-day LSI supervision by NCAs.1071 In 
addition, the formal capacity for cooperation between the ECB and NCA supervisors 
in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision is further supported by the existence of 
various drafting and project-based teams which have been jointly developing joint 
standards and methodologies applicable to the supervision of less significant 
institutions.  
There exist several tangible outcomes of deliberations between ECB and NCA 
supervisors gathered in those informal structures. The most notable example is the 
concept of the compendium of Joint Supervisory Standards which currently consists 
of five completed products. The JSS are considered by the ECB to be a key tool for 
the supervision of less significant institutions.1072 They set a number of rules of 
practice, which NCA supervisors should apply when carrying out their tasks. Seen 
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 See European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 (above, n. 865), p. 27. 
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from this perspective, the JSS constitute an indispensable element to construct a 
common supervisory culture across the entire SSM, so that the smaller and medium-
sized banks can also benefit from harmonization in a longer term.1073 Apart from the 
Joint Supervisory Standards, ECB and NCA supervisors informally formulated a 
range of further rules of practice addressed to the NCAs supervisory with a view to 
provide further technical assistance regarding LSI supervision. This includes the 
development of a Recommendation on the exercise of some options and national 
discretions and the approach to the recognition of institutional protection schemes 
for prudential purposes.  
The above-mentioned findings suggest that the informal cooperation between the 
ECB and NCA supervisory apparatus within the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision resulted in a number of joint projects which contribute to the reduction 
of ambiguities governing the agency contract in the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Indirect. They also clarify supervisory expectations of the ECB supervisory apparatus 
in relation to the NCA supervisory apparatus when discharging their supervisory 
responsibilities vis-à-vis LSIs.  
However, since the approximation of supervisory practices across different NCAs 
and also other domestic stakeholders in the Banking Union is a complicated and 
time-consuming process, it could be considered to increase levels of public 
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transparency on the common supervisory practices agreed between the ECB and 
NCAs. As noted by the European Parliament, the ECB should decide to publish 
performance indicators and metrics set the Joint Supervisory Standard that are used 
for its peer-to-peer assessments of LSI supervision conducted by the NCAs.1074  
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CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 8 
Assessing the capacity for compliance 
within the SSM 
8.1. Introductory remarks 
It has been widely recognized that regulatory regimes characterized by 
multilevelness may be faced with centrifugal challenges and dilemmas at lower 
(national) levels. These contexts generate a question regarding the design of a formal 
institutional framework governing such regimes, especially the extent to which lower 
level actors are sufficiently incentivised to promote their compliance with the policy 
preferences and objectives stipulated by higher level actors. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism is a system of banking supervision consisting of the ECB and NCAs of 
participating Member States, which constitutes the first and crucial pillar of the 
European Banking Union. In this system, supranational and national bureaucratic 
apparatuses are linked together in performance of supervisory tasks conferred upon 
the ECB by the SSM Regulation. These institutional characteristics indicate that the 
institutional design of the SSM is of much more complex nature which essentially 
goes beyond its legal categorization as a “single” mechanism. 
In the light the foregoing, the main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the 
structural conditions which affect the formal top-bottom compliance expectation 
within the SSM. The formal top-bottom compliance expectation was understood as 
the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) formal likelihood to comply with the preferences 
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and objectives of the ECB (supervisory apparatus) concerning the Union’s policies on 
prudential supervision of credit institutions, and to make all the effort to implement 
these preferences and objectives in their own day-to-day supervisory activities.  
For the purpose of this analysis, this dissertation insulates two structural 
(institutional) conditions deemed to affect the formal top-down compliance 
expectations within the SSM: the specific organisational design of the respective 
supervisory subsystem pertaining to the SSM which determines the formal position 
of the ECB and NCAs therein; and the specific operational design of the respective 
supervisory subsystem pertaining to the SSM which provides for formal internal 
mechanisms to address possibly conflicting preferences and objectives of the ECB 
and NCA supervisory apparatuses interacting therein.  
The following sections will synthetize the preliminary observations collected in the 
first and second phase of testing of the “Enforcement” and the “Management” 
hypotheses with respect to the formal top-down compliance expectations within 
supervisory subsystems pertaining to the SSM: SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision.  
8.2 The capacity for compliance within the SSM under the 
Enforcement approach 
According to the “Enforcement” hypothesis, the formal compliance expectation of 
the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) with the preferences and objectives of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) in a multilevel SSM supervisory (sub)system is likely to 
achieve higher levels where there exists a credible ECB control capacity backed by its 
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strong systemic position within that (sub)system. These assumptions with respect to 
the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision were tested in two phases. 
Firstly, chapter five of this dissertation analyzed the specific organisational design of 
both subsystems in order to ascertain the formal position of the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) is strong therein. Secondly, chapter six employed analytical tools offered 
by the traditional Principal-Agent approach to look at the specific operational design 
of both systems in order to assess the capacity to control the NCA supervisory 
(apparatus) by the ECB (supervisory apparatus) therein.1075 The observations are the 
following.  
7.1.1. Formal top-bottom compliance expectation within the subsystem of SSM 
Direct Supervision  
(i) Systemic position of the ECB within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision 
By virtue of being an example of EU centripetal administration, the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision provides for a strong systemic position of the ECB (higher 
level actor) vis-à-vis the NCAs (lower level actors). There are several institutional 
features underpinning the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, which contribute to 
the strength of the ECB in that multilevel regime.  
The ECB’s strong hierarchical position is founded on a direct Treaty-based mandate 
laid down in Article 127(6) of the TFEU. This clause authorizes the Council to confer 
upon the ECB specific tasks relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
                                                          
1075
 From a Principal-Agent perspective, the operational dimension of institutional design is understood as “an 
exercise of choosing from a menu of both ex ante and ex post controls” by the principal to oversee activities of its 
agent, see Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian 
institutions’, West European Politics 25, no. 1 (2002): pp. 1–22 (p. 5).  
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institutions. Moreover, Article 6(4) of the SSM Regulation attributes to the ECB the 
responsibility to carry out directly all SSM supervisory tasks within the subsystem of 
SSM Direct Supervision as well as decision-making authority in the areas of 
authorisations, approvals, investigations, early supervisory interventions and 
sanctioning. The ECB may also adopt regulations only to the extent necessary to 
organize or specify the arrangements for the carrying out of these tasks.1076 Early 
practice has indicated that the ECB’s regulatory competences have been interpreted 
broadly. However, the scope of the ECB’s regulatory action might be more limited in 
the future, especially in fields which lie at the interface of supervision and regulation. 
The recent legal opinions of the European Parliament and the Council, which 
challenge the ECB’s supervisory policies on NPLs, clearly indicate the subtle and 
somewhat illusive nature of the border between both concepts.1077 
In the system of SSM Direct Supervision, the administrative interactions between the 
ECB and NCAs are underpinned by the principle of cooperation in good faith1078 and 
far-reaching mutual assistance duties reflected, for example, in the NCAs’ obligations 
to provide staff resources to the Joint Supervisory Teams. These JST staff members 
may become addressees of instructions issued by a supranational JST Coordinator 
with respect to their supervisory duties falling within the scope of the SSM 
Regulation. The ECB may also issue instructions to the NCA as a whole which may 
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 See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
1077
 See supra n. 1053-1054. 
1078
 See Article 6(2) of the SSM Regulation. 
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target the preparation and implementation of any supervisory act.1079 In addition, the 
ECB may also instruct the NCAs to use their administrative powers, under and in 
accordance with the conditions set out in national law.1080  
The strong systemic position of the ECB within the system of SSM Direct Supervision 
may, however, be put under pressure in the event that Banking Union expands 
beyond the borders of the euro area. As the acts of the ECB are not binding upon 
non-euro area Member States, the exercise of supervisory powers by the ECB in 
those jurisdictions will hinge upon implementation by the respective NCAs. 
Similarly, the ECB as a higher level actor will have limited possibilities to issue 
instructions, addressed both to NCA supervisory staff via an ECB-based JST 
Coordinator and the NCA as a whole.  
(ii) Capacity for control over NCA (supervisory apparatus) by the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision  
The ex-ante and the ex-post controls, which are at the disposal of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus), point out at the existence of a considerable capacity for 
control over the NCA/JST (supervisory apparatus) within the subsystem of SSM 
Direct Supervision. The ex-ante dimension of the internal control mechanism rests 
on a number of binding acts, which are directly applicable in their entirety in the 
participating Member States. They are thus automatically binding upon the NCAs 
without the necessity of further national transposition. These acts can be regarded as 
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 See Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
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 See Article 9(1), third paragraph of the SSM Regulation. 
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clarifying the scope and modalities of agency contract between the ECB and NCAs by 
setting further technical rules of law which govern daily operations of the SSM Direct 
Supervision. The recent development of the internal “delegation framework” which 
provides for a greater direct involvement of the ECB supervisory apparatus in 
decision-making in certain areas of prudential supervision enhances the ECB 
supervisory apparatus’ ex-ante control over the draft supervisory decisions submitted 
by the JST/NCA supervisory apparatus. 
The overview of the instruments issued by the ECB, which complement the basic 
agency contract governing the supervision of significant institutions, displays that 
the ECB has a strong capacity to set new binding obligations for the JST/NCA 
supervisors. This capacity is reflected in the adoption of such acts as: the ECB 
Decision on provision of supervisory data, ECB Regulation on the reporting of 
supervisory financial information, and the ECB Regulation on the exercise of options 
and national discretions. All of these acts impose obligations directly upon the 
JST/NCA supervisors and thereby supplement the agency contract underpinning the 
subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. However, the development of excessively 
prescriptive rules filling-in the existing (largely incomplete) agency contract might 
also adversely affect the JSTs capacity to adapt the SSM supervisory approach where 
supervised entities have particularly innovative business models and whose risks 
cannot be comprehensively captured by the applicable provisions.  
It is equally important that the ECB makes cautious use of its power to shape and 
reshape unilaterally the agency contract governing the subsystem of SSM Direct 
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Supervision in order to avoid accusations on overstepping its mandate. On the 
occasion of setting new and harmonized requirements concerning the provisioning 
of non-performing loans, the Legal Services of both the European Parliament and the 
Council noted that the ECB’s intervention cannot serve the purpose to set rules in 
the areas where the legislator has, for the time being, decided not to harmonize.1081 
Therefore, the ECB needs to be mindful to continue its harmonization effort only in 
those areas of banking supervision which have been explicitly assigned in its 
competence. Otherwise, the JST/NCA apparatus may be reluctant to apply new 
supervisory requirements in their supervisory activities on significant institutions.  
The ex-post dimension of the internal control mechanisms over the NCA supervisory 
apparatus in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision seems to be less prominent 
that the ex-ante dimension. It has primarily a direct and centralized nature (“police-
patrols”) and rests on a number of controls, of which only a few can be immediately 
activated. The basic and easy to activate ex-post control mechanism is encapsulated 
in the ECB’s horizontal and specialized services whose main role is to ensure 
consistency of the JST activities in different areas of prudential supervision. In 
addition, the ECB supervisory apparatus (notably JST Coordinators) may also issue 
“operational acts” on day-to-day supervisory activities, which may be either of an 
internal nature or addressed directly to supervised institutions. The first group 
covers requests directed to the NCA supervisory apparatus. These can be qualified as 
ongoing and ex-post control mechanisms since they are issued without the 
                                                          
1081
 See supra n.1054. 
346 
 
involvement of the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council of the ECB. SSM-
internal “operational” acts are backed by the possibility of issuing supervisory 
instructions to NCA JST members by a JST Coordinator, and ultimately by the 
possibility of adopting formal instructions by the ECB to the NCAs where the NCA 
supervisory apparatus refuses to follow informal requests formulated by the ECB 
supervisory apparatus.  
There exists however a number of constraints which may possibly undermine the 
credibility of instructions seen as “sticks” that can be employed by the bureaucratic 
principal. Firstly, the scope of JST Coordinators action is limited by the applicable 
national data protection, employment and civil service frameworks. JST 
Coordinators cannot issue instructions to the NCA (supervisory apparatus) in the 
matters related to staffing policies, with a notable exception of the power to refuse 
NCA appointments to JSTs.1082 Furthermore, they are unable to receive reports from 
the NCA supervisors on work which is not directly related to the activities of their 
JSTs, possibly be of relevance to the supervision of significant institutions. The 
existence of such independent reporting lines within the JSTs may complicate 
information flows within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, and in doing so 
impede due information sharing.1083  
With regard to formal supervisory instructions addressed to the NCAs by the ECB, 
the current supervisory decision-making modalities at the ECB require for their 
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 See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation.  
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adoption both the endorsement of the Supervisory Board and non-objection of the 
Governing Council of the ECB.1084 Given this somewhat burdensome decision-
making procedure and the fact that instructions usually entail a very detailed legal 
prescription of the addressee’s behaviour and do not leave much space to safeguard 
its institutional autonomy, it is highly unlikely that they will be used as an ex-post 
control on a daily basis. The early evidence, which has indicated a rather modest 
recourse to this instrument by the ECB, supports this observation. However, this is 
not to say that supervisory instructions should be seen as completely ineffective ex-
post controls. As a matter of fact, the sole awareness of the NCAs of the availability 
of this tool may sometimes be equally, or even more, influential then its effective 
use. 
7.1.2. Formal top-bottom compliance expectation within system of SSM Indirect 
Supervision 
(i) Systemic position of the ECB within system of SSM Indirect Supervision 
By virtue of being an example of EU intervention-based administration, the 
subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision provides for a semi-strong systemic position 
of the ECB (higher level actor) vis-à-vis the NCAs (lower level actors). There are 
several institutional features underpinning the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision, which contribute to the relative strength of the ECB in this multilevel 
regime. As within the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, the ECB’s strong 
hierarchical position is founded on a direct Treaty-based mandate laid down in 
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Article 127(6) of the TFEU. This clause authorizes the Council to confer upon the 
ECB specific tasks relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
However, the jurisdictional outreach of a higher level actor in the subsystem of SSM 
Indirect Supervision is limited and does not cover by default the entire EU. What 
however distinguishes the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision from the former, is 
a distinct allocation of responsibilities between the ECB and NCAs therein and 
different modalities of administrative interactions between them.  
In this respect, Article 6(6) of the SSM Regulation attributes to the NCAs the 
responsibility to carry out directly a great number of SSM supervisory tasks 
conferred upon the ECB on less significant institutions. In principle, the ECB is only 
responsible for exercising the oversight over the functioning of the system,1085 and 
cannot instruct the NCAs with regard to their supervisory decisions on individual 
institutions. This legislative attribution points out at a decentralized nature of the 
exercise of the ECB’s supervisory competences in the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision. The ECB may however decide to “exercise directly itself all the relevant 
powers for one or more less significant credit institutions”1086 where the consistency 
of high supervisory standards needs to be ensured.  
Due to the application of the decentralization principle to the supervision of LSIs, as 
also recently confirmed by the Court,1087 the regular administrative interactions 
between the ECB and NCAs in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision are 
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structured in terms of relations of information than hierarchical subordination.1088 
The ECB’s influence over NCA supervisory processes is largely restricted to the 
issuance of regulations, guidelines and general instructions, and to the receipt of 
NCAs’ ex-ante notifications on certain supervisory procedures and decisions. These 
limitations decrease the systemic position of the ECB as a higher level actor within 
the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, and place the ECB in a somewhat weaker 
systemic position when compared to its position vis-à-vis the NCAs within the 
subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. Nevertheless, it is still possible to consider the 
ECB’s position therein as “semi-strong” in that the ECB is authorized to change 
unilaterally initial power balance vis-à-vis the NCAs by deciding to take over from 
them direct supervision of one or more LSIs.  
(ii) Capacity for control over NCA (supervisory apparatus) by the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision  
The ex-ante and the ex-post controls, which are at the disposal of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus), demonstrate the existence of a moderate capacity for control 
over the NCA (supervisory apparatus) within the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision. The ex-ante dimension of the internal control mechanism rests mainly 
on binding mechanisms established in the SSM Regulation and SSM Framework 
Regulation, and in particular the common procedures regime and NCA ex-ante 
notifications requirements. In addition, the ECB’s Guideline to the NCAs on the 
exercise of some options and national discretions in relation to LSIs is the only 
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binding public act adopted by the ECB which targets specifically the subsystem of 
SSM Indirect Supervision.  
It therefore appears that the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision is far less 
“legalized” than the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. This circumstance has 
several institutional implications, which affect the relations between the ECB and 
NCA supervisory apparatuses in that subsystem. The reliance on softer and 
managerial steering instruments, such as Joint Supervisory Standards, leaves more 
flexibility to both the bureaucratic principal and bureaucratic agent with respect to 
the adjustments of their contractual obligations to the changing landscape of the 
European banking sector. Too many soft obligations, in turn, may hinder effective 
control by the bureaucratic principal in the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, 
especially where different (possibly even equally plausible) interpretations of the 
supervisory expectations formulated by the ECB supervisory apparatus are allowed. 
The asymmetry between staffing of the ECB supervisory function, responsible for the 
NCA oversight (the bureaucratic principal), and the number of NCA supervisors to 
be monitored (the bureaucratic agent) further complicates the observance of the 
“soft” contractual commitments by the latter.  
In this respect, it needs to be highlighted that the absence of binding benchmarks 
has already affected the functioning of the Central Notification Point, which is the 
primary mechanism of the ex-ante control within the subsystem of SSM Indirect 
Supervision. Since the NCAs retain discretion in qualifying their draft supervisory 
decisions and procedures as having, or not having, “material” effects on individual 
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less significant supervised institutions, it therefore follows that the ECB may receive 
a distorted view on NCA supervisory activities. Such incomplete insights make it 
more difficult for the ECB to aggregate and compare all supervisory decisions issued 
by the NCAs.1089 Further oversight difficulties stem from the lack of a harmonized 
methodology to carry out the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) on 
LSIs, which impedes consistent implementation of the same SREP criteria (such as a 
uniform capital requirement definition) across the NCAs.1090 
Legal constraints imposed upon the operational design of the common procedures 
regime may also affect the ex-ante capacity for control within the subsystem of SSM 
Indirect Supervision. In particular, tight legal deadlines set for the ECB by the SSM 
Framework Regulation on whether to oppose or not to oppose the NCAs draft 
licensing decisions may affect the ECB supervisory apparatus’ ability to evaluate 
carefully the proposals submitted by the NCA supervisory apparatus. Ensuring the 
proper functioning of the operational framework governing the common procedures 
regime is instrumental, especially in the view of the upcoming Brexit. The “hard” 
version of Brexit may force many UK-based banking groups to apply for a license in 
the Banking Union at very short notice in order not to lose the access to the Single 
Market. It is therefore of utmost importance that the NCAs supervisors develop 
incentives to engage their ECB counterparts in their work at the earlier stages and 
agree on the kind of UK-originating banking “refugees”, they are willing to accept 
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under jurisdictions, so that the ECB is able to activate respective ex-ante controls in 
advance.  
The ex-post dimension of the internal control mechanism within the subsystem of 
SSM Indirect Supervision is centered on the NCAs’ ex post reporting obligations laid 
down in the SSM Framework Regulation. By employing this type of backward-
looking controls, the ECB may track NCA supervisory activities on LSIs, which were 
conducted in the last supervisory cycle. Yet, early evidence suggests that reports 
submitted by the NCAs needs to be handled with care due to the fact that different 
national supervisory traditions may to certain extent distort the comparability of 
information submitted by the NCAs. Importantly, some NCAs impose capital and 
liquidity demands (Pillar 2 measures) in a form of formal supervisory decisions, 
whereas other NCAs communicate them as a part of a supervisory dialogue without 
resorting to a formal administrative act.1091 In this specific context, lower numbers of 
formal supervisory decisions do not necessarily imply a possibly more lenient 
national supervision, but rather a specific supervisory approach based more on 
informal supervisory dialogue rather than the tradition of bureaucratic oversight.  
In addition, there exist a number of constraints which may possibly undermine the 
ECB’s capacity to use other identified ex-post controls. As staff issues remain within 
the NCAs’ exclusive competence and there exists a link of subordination, disciplinary 
power and confidentiality obligations between national supervisors and their NCAs, 
it is highly problematic that the NCAs would authorize the ECB to take unilateral 
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decisions on the involvement of supervisory staff of one NCA in the work of 
supervisory staff of other NCAs. Such a possibility would require delegation by the 
NCAs of their exclusive power to instruct their staff in all matters, which may not be 
possible under certain Member State jurisdictions. Therefore, the currently 
applicable national data protection, employment and civil service frameworks seem 
to impede the effective use of this indirect ex-post control mechanism (“fire-alarm”) 
by the ECB supervisory apparatus.  
Finally, the activation of another one of the identified ex-post controls - the takeover 
of LSI supervision - remains a politically sensitive issue. To the present day, the ECB 
has yet to decide to assume direct supervision of one or more LSIs from any of the 
NCAs. Since such an ECB decision might entail reputational and domestic policy 
consequences for an NCA concerned, it seems to be highly unlikely that the ECB 
would ever on its own initiative activate this procedure, unless that NCA explicitly 
requested the ECB to do so. However, political constraints regarding an actual 
activation of the takeover procedure does not automatically render this ex-post 
control effective. Under certain circumstances the simple threat to activate it may be 
equally, or even more, influential than its effective use by the ECB supervisory 
apparatus.  
354 
 
8.3 The capacity for compliance within the SSM under the 
Management approach 
According to the “Management” hypothesis, the formal compliance expectation of 
the NCAs (supervisory apparatus) with the preferences and objectives of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) in a multilevel SSM supervisory subsystem can be 
understood in the following way. The managerial strategy assumes that the expected 
compliance is likely to achieve higher levels where there exists credible cooperation 
capacity between both actors that allows for the clarification of obligations and 
reduction of uncertainty accompanying their essentially (incomplete) agency 
contract. This capacity should ideally be backed by the strong shadow of the ECB 
(supervisory apparatus) hierarchy within that (sub)system. These assumptions with 
respect to the subsystems of SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision were tested in two 
phases. Firstly, chapter five of this dissertation analyzed the specific organisational 
design of both subsystems in order to ascertain whether the ECB (supervisory 
apparatus) casts a long shadow of hierarchy therein. It was assumed that the length 
of its shadow of hierarchy is correlated to the strength of its systemic position 
therein. Secondly, chapter six investigated the specific operational design of both 
systems in order to assess the capacity for cooperation between the ECB and NCA 
supervisory apparatuses therein. The observations are the following.  
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8.1.1. Formal top-bottom compliance expectation within the system of SSM Direct 
Supervision 
Insights provided by the management school of compliance suggest that the 
existence of a long institutional “shadow of hierarchy” facilitates the establishment 
of routine, non-confrontational and informal processes by the bureaucratic principal 
to engage in cooperation with its bureaucratic agents. In particular, a long “shadow 
of hierarchy” allows the former to take recourse to available enforcement 
mechanisms to transmit its preferences where informal cooperation (“carrots”) 
fails.1092 The analysis of the organisational design of the SSM demonstrates that the 
ECB enjoys strong systemic position within the subsystem of SSM Direct 
Supervision. Therefore, it is legitimate to assume that the ECB also has an 
institutional capacity to cast a long “shadow of hierarchy” vis-à-vis the NCAs therein. 
Within this long shadow of the ECB’s hierarchy, there exists a well-established formal 
cooperation capacity between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses in the 
subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision. This capacity is primarily reflected in a 
number of informal supervisory networks operating under the managerial authority 
of the ECB, which bring together the ECB and NCA experts specialized in different 
areas of supervision. The foundations for informal cooperation between the ECB and 
NCAs were already established by their joint efforts in the Preparatory Task Force on 
Supervision that carried out SSM technical preparatory work in 2012-3. These 
supervisory networks, although very heterogeneous in nature, have developed a 
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number of joint policy stances which contributed to the reduction of ambiguities 
governing the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, and to clarification of 
supervisory expectations of the ECB supervisory apparatus in relation to the 
JST/NCA supervisory apparatus.  
The most crucial outcome of ECB-NCA informal deliberations is the ongoing 
development of the SSM Supervisory Manual. The Manual provides supranational 
and national supervisors with a common set of behavioural and technical rules of 
practice, which they are expected to apply in their supervisory activities.1093 In 
addition, ECB and NCA supervisors developed jointly a non-binding Guide: on the 
exercise of “case-by-case” options and discretions; on the treatment of non-
performing loans; and on the fit and proper assessments of members of banks’ 
management boards. It was however observed by a number of representatives of the 
NCA supervisory apparatus that the results of deliberations in networks, which are 
shared by a majority of the members, are not always reflected in the final policy 
proposals presented by ECB supervisors.1094  
Furthermore, ECB supervisors are not always willing to discuss thoroughly in the 
networks whose supervisory issues, which may be of possible of interest to the NCA 
supervisory apparatus.1095 It might thus be recommended to increase the role of the 
NCA supervisory apparatus in the agenda-setting stage of these networks, or ideally 
grant the NCAs the power to nominate a co-chair of each network in order to 
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introduce more checks and balances on informal governance within the subsystem 
of SSM Direct Supervision. 
Finally, the credibility of non-binding rules of practice, which the ECB and NCA 
supervisory apparatuses are expected to follow in their day-to-day supervision, could 
be enhanced if the ECB decided to make public the SSM Supervisory Manual in the 
same manner as other elements of its non-binding supervisory rules of practice. In 
particular, this could foster the accountability of the NCA/JST supervisory apparatus 
vis-à-vis external stakeholders (i.e. supervised entities, bank associations, 
ombudsmen, elected policymakers, auditors and the public), and in doing so 
introduce further ex-post decentralized controls (“fire-alarms”) that the ECB as the 
bureaucratic principal could use to monitor the performance of its bureaucratic 
agents - the NCA/JST supervisory apparatus.  
8.1.2. Formal top-bottom compliance expectation within the system of SSM Indirect 
Supervision 
As noted above, the existence of a long institutional “shadow of hierarchy” facilitates 
the establishment of routine, non-confrontational and informal processes by the 
bureaucratic principal to engage in cooperation with its bureaucratic agents. The 
existence of such a “shadow of hierarchy” allows the bureaucratic principal to have 
recourse to available enforcement mechanisms to transmit its preferences where 
informal cooperation (“carrots”) fails.1096 The analysis of the organisational design of 
the SSM demonstrated that the ECB enjoys semi-strong systemic position within the 
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subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. Therefore, it is legitimate to assume that it 
also has an institutional capacity to cast a medium “shadow of hierarchy” vis-à-vis the 
NCAs therein. 
Within this medium shadow of the ECB’s hierarchy, there exists a promising formal 
cooperation capacity between the ECB and NCA supervisory apparatuses in the 
subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. This capacity is mainly constructed on two 
permanent structures for informal cooperation between the ECB and NCA 
supervisory experts operating under the auspices of the ECB: the Senior 
Management Network (SMN) and Working Group on High Supervisory Standards 
(WG-HSS). These platforms serve as sounding boards for deliberations on the 
overarching topics emerging from day-to-day LSI supervision by NCAs,1097 and are 
further supported by the existence of various drafting and project-based teams 
which have been jointly developing best practices and methodologies applicable 
within the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision.  
The most prominent outcome of ECB-NCA informal deliberations in the WG-HSS 
and SSM is the ongoing development of the compendium of Joint Supervisory 
Standards (JSS), which are considered by the ECB to be a key tool for the supervision 
of less significant institutions.1098 These standards set a number of non-binding 
supervisory rules of practice, which NCA supervisors are expected to apply when 
carrying out their supervisory activities on LSIs. Seen from this perspective, the JSS 
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constitute an indispensable element to construct a common supervisory culture 
across the entire SSM, so that the smaller and medium-sized banks can also benefit 
from harmonization in the longer term.1099 It was noted by the members of both the 
WG-HSS and the SMN that these structures generally work well and the input of 
NCA experts is taken on board.1100 This may suggest that the NCA supervisory 
apparatus enjoys there a somewhat stronger influence since the ECB’s “shadow of 
hierarchy” was found to be weaker than in the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision.  
The monitoring of all soft processes and supervisory expectations laid down in the 
JSS may be difficult due to the already mentioned asymmetry between staffing of the 
ECB supervisory function responsible for the NCA oversight (the bureaucratic 
principal) and the number of NCA supervisors to be monitored (the bureaucratic 
agent). Therefore, the credibility of the ECB’s managerial strategies of compliance 
could be reinforced by making the soft obligations imposed upon the NCA 
supervisory apparatus more transparent to different external stakeholders. This 
would indeed provide the ECB supervisory apparatus with further ex-post 
decentralized controls (“fire-alarms”) that could be employed at the domestic level 
to monitor the supervisory performance of its bureaucratic agents (the NCAs) on 
LSIs.  
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8.4. Implications of the study  
The results of testing the “Enforcement” and “Management” hypothesis reveal that 
the formal institutional design of the SSM augments the expectation that the NCA 
supervisory apparatus is likely to comply with the preference and objectives of the 
ECB supervisory apparatus concerning the Union’s policies on prudential supervision 
of credit institutions, and to make all the effort to implement them in their day-to-
day own supervisory activities. The top-down compliance expectation is not the 
same with regard to the whole SSM. The NCA supervisory apparatus is formally 
more induced to display higher levels of compliance within the subsystem of SSM 
Direct Supervision in comparison to the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision. The 
Enforcement approach indicates that the expected higher compliance is due to the 
stronger systemic position of the ECB and its considerable capacity for control 
therein. Similarly, the Management approach demonstrates that where the ECB casts 
longer shadow of hierarchy, the capacity for cooperation can be regarded as better 
established in formal terms.  
In light of these findings, it is legitimate to formulate a general observation that in 
multilevel administrative systems the formal top-down compliance expectation 
ultimately hinges on the power balance between the higher and lower level actors 
pertaining to those systems. Consequently, where the formal institutional design of a 
multilevel regime provides for the weak systemic position of the supranational 
(higher) level, the occurrence of centrifugal challenges and dilemmas at the national 
(lower) level might occur more frequently. As a result, rational choice institutionalist 
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explanations of EU administrative phenomena are still likely to offer greater 
analytical insights than other institutionalist, or constructivist explanations. This 
observation entails major implications to wider issues of compliance within 
supranational and international multi-level regimes. It demonstrates that the Union 
and Member States’ administration formally tend to operate at their very best in a 
multi-level context when supranational centralized decision-making on substantial 
issues is combined with national decentralized operational framework allowing for 
substantive involvement of national administration. This tendency is supported by 
the existence of well-established informal governance arrangements linking together 
different units of administration interacting within a multi-level setting.  
From this perspective, the present study makes significant advances in mapping 
some unique features of the EU administrative system, and better explains the 
peculiarities of the division of tasks and competences between national and 
supranational levels of administration. In this context, it contributes to addressing a 
broader theoretical interest in analyzing the patterns and dynamics of the EU 
administrative system. In particular, it helps to approach “common and 
unchallengeable thread of (European) federalism: striking a fair balance between 
unity and diversity”1101, or to put in differently, in finding “the ways in which unity 
and differentiation may be combined within it”.1102 It offers a meaningful 
                                                          
1101
  See Millet, F. (2014) ‘The respect for national constitutional identity in the European legal space - an 
approach to federalism as constitutionalism’ in Azoulai, L. (Ed.) The question of competence in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press, page 267. 
1102
  See Chiti, E. (2015) ‘In the Aftermath of the Crisis–The EU Administrative System Between Impediments 
and Momentum’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 17(1), page 317. 
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contribution to research on functioning of EU multi-level administration in the post-
decisional phase of European integration, and more broadly it adds an added value 
to literature on administrative compliance within supranational and international 
multi-level regimes.  
8.5. Policy recommendations 
To conclude this study would like to formulate a number of recommendations 
following the Enforcement approach, which is based on the rational choice 
perspective. Accordingly, to improve the functioning of the SSM multilevel system, 
this approach would encourage further systemic consolidation of the ECB’s already 
strong position and its respective capacity for control, both within the subsystem of 
SSM Direct and Indirect Supervision.  
At the general level, such a systemic consolidation could be achieved in at least four 
ways. First, there is a need to establish a formal dispute resolution mechanism which 
could be used to address NCAs’ non-compliance. Second, the position of the ECB 
top-level supervisory apparatus in the Supervisory Board and the Board’s Steering 
Committee could be strengthened by making them competent to adopt certain 
supervisory decisions within the limits of the newly created ECB delegation 
framework. Third, a broader politically sensitive reform of national data protection, 
employment and civil service frameworks would be needed in order to increase the 
ECB “room for maneuver” with regard to the steering of NCA supervisors, both those 
in JSTs and in national supervisory teams. Fourth, national administrative 
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procedures applicable in participating Member States would need to ensure that the 
ECB as a competent authority may enjoy the same legal protection as other units of 
administration under domestic jurisdictions.  
More specifically, at the level of the subsystem of SSM Direct Supervision, the ECB’s 
position and its capacity for control could be reinforced by strengthening the 
presence of the ECB supervisory apparatus in the JST to achieve at least parity in 
aggregate terms of staff composition. It is positively noted that the total ratio of ECB 
staff vis-à-vis NCA staff over has recently increased in steady manner on a year-on-
year basis,1103 and is expected to further increase in next year.1104 Similarly, the 
development of the “internal delegation” framework in other supervisory areas 
should be continued in order to strengthen the influence of the ECB supervisory 
apparatus in supervisory decision-making on significant institutions. At the level of 
the subsystem of SSM Indirect Supervision, it could be contemplated to introduce 
the possibility of administrative review of NCA supervisory decisions adopted in the 
exercise of the ECB’s exclusive competences by the ECB itself. Furthermore, the 
ECB’s position and its capacity for control could be further reinforced by allowing 
the ECB supervisory apparatus to participate in national supervisory teams of high-
priority but less significant institutions, at least in an observer role. 
  
                                                          
1103
 The ECB reported that 160 Additional positions were approved for supervisory-related activities in 2016 and 
141.5 additional positions for 2017, see European Central Bank, ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities: 2016 
(above, n.865), pp. 56-57. 
1104
 See Bloomberg, ECB Plans to Add 170 Supervision Staff as Brexit Boosts Workload, 22 November 2017, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/ecb-plans-to-add-170-supervision-staff-as-brexit-boosts-
workload, accessed 01 December 2017. 
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ANNEX 
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Executive summaries of informal interviews conducted 
Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted A 
Interviewee profile legal 
Date(s): 13 November 2015, 12 January 2016, 15 July 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 45 minutes 
Subject: SSM set-up and the recent developments 
Informal interview with A (executive summary) 
 A is an ECB-based supervisory expert responsible for development of policies for LSI supervision. 
He was involved in the SSM preparatory work (intergovernmental negotiations, ECB SSM internal 
group, SSM Task Force). A was engaged in drafting of the SSM Regulation and the SSM 
Framework Regulation. A has good memories from the period of SSM negotiations in Brussels. 
From A’s perspective negotiations went smoothly, however there was also a number of politically 
salient issues including the scope of ECB instructions vis-à-vis NCAs on LSIs, significance 
threshold and governance of the SSM. 
 A considers ECB-NCA relations concerning LSIs generally good. A does not see any imminent 
challenges to them and is of the opinion that the SSM institutional design is well-structured. 
According to A’s view, common SSM supervisory culture is on the right track to be developed. 
Training and exchange schemes are in the opinion of A important channels to build common 
supervisory culture and understanding of supervisory approaches.  
 A finds supervisory networks between DGMS3 and NCAs (Senior Management Network and 
Working Group on High Supervisory Standards) important tools to ‘take NCAs on board’ and 
engage them in the development of supervisory policies. A welcomed the recent redistribution of 
tasks related to common procedures between “supervisory” DGs of the ECB and the assignment of 
common procedures (licensing, qualifying holdings and license withdrawals) to DG-MS3. He does 
not see risks to the intra DG cooperation in this new environment. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted B 
Interviewee profile Financial  
Date: 09 November 2015, 28 June 2016 
Subject: ECB-NCA relations 
Informal interview with B (executive summary) 
 B is an ECB-based supervisory expert responsible for common procedures desk, LSI reporting. B 
was also involved in number of drafting teams on specific joint supervisory standards. Before, B 
worked in private sector.  
 From B experience, development of common supervisory policies is a complicated process. NCAs 
usually want to formulate common standards in such way which does not impose additional 
burden on their work or the position of supervised entities. Not all NCA are interested in 
participating in working groups, as it is not obligatory. Usually a call of interest for participation 
precedes the creation of a working group. 
 B distinguishes between “sensitive” and “technical” policy topics. In order to foster good relations 
with NCAs, the ECB usually does not intend to push for policy work in controversial areas (for 
example takeover procedures). Importantly, in cases in which NCA have already well-developed 
policies, they intend to ‘upload’ their national approaches during the drafting stage. Three NCAs 
can be considered as active and “challenging”: DE, AT and IT. They are also the biggest DG-MS3 
“clients” given the size of their respective LSI sectors. The development of joint standards is the 
easiest in new areas (resulting from enhanced supervisory legislation) like for example the area of 
supervisory planning. In B’s opinion, in this area it was relatively easy to develop common policy 
stance because the NCA did not formulate strong supervisory approaches in this regard. 
Therefore, “carte blanche” on NCA side facilitates reaching the agreement and also enhances the 
leading role of the ECB in working groups. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted C 
Interviewee profile Economist  
Date: 29 January 2016, 21 October 2016 
Subject: Development of common supervisory policies/standards 
Informal interview with C (executive summary) 
 C is an ECB-based supervisory expert and an ECB member of JST of a significant Spanish 
institution. C is involved in daily tasks of JST, including the conduct of the Supervisory Review 
and Examination Process (SREP) which is its core supervisory activity. C considers the role of 
ECB-based part of her JST crucial for the proper functioning of ECB direct supervision. In C’s 
opinion, ECB-based supervisors are doing the supervisory legwork and are in the lead of the 
process. In the C’s JST, NCA-based supervisors have limited influence and their work is steered 
from the ECB. For instance, SREP is carried out centrally and its different components (Risk 
Assessment System, governance, ICAAP, ILAAP) are examined by the ECB supervisors. 
 As such, C did not observe any conflicts regarding such distribution of tasks within its JST. NCA-
based supervisors do not seem to have objections as for their limited influence. There have been 
no issues between JST coordinator (ECB based) and national sub coordinator (NCA based) 
concerning their competence and position in the JST. However, C heard that not all JSTs work in 
the same way as her. In some of them, especially responsible for global significant institutions, 
the role of NCAs is more prominent given international and multi-jurisdictional scope of their 
activities. Also, conflicts between JST coordinator and NCA sub coordinators occur more 
frequently. Based on C’s experience, the ECB could be able to supervise significant institutions 
without NCA assistance.  
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted D 
Interviewee profile Financial 
Date(s): 31 August 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 45 minutes 
Subject: DGMSIV supervisory networks 
Informal interview with D (executive summary) 
 D is an ECB-based supervisory expert working on policy issues. D perceives the SSM as a 
supervisory system governed by multiple networks consisting of the ECB and NCA-based 
supervisors. Network governance forms as a very important part of the SSM since all SSM policies 
are prepared and discussed by networks. It allows integrating NCAs into the functioning of the 
SSM and engaging them into common projects. These channels allow NCAs to provide important 
contribution to the SSM. 
 Two types of supervisory networks can be distinguished within the SSM: Joint Supervisory Teams 
(JSTs) responsible for ECB direct supervision and horizontal policy networks in DGMS4. As such 
each horizontal division has at least one network, for example SSM Risk Analysis has two. In 
total, there are 13 networks. Furthermore, DG-MSIII has two networks for LSI supervision but D is 
not involved in their operations. As such, these networks are not formalized. There is no 
mandate, or legal basis for their functioning. Therefore, they wield no formal supervisory powers. 
Such an arrangement is necessary to avoid treating them as ESCB-committees of ECB monetary 
policy arm, which decisions must be accepted by the Governing Council. 
 The scope of activities of supervisory networks depends on the specificities of individual 
horizontal divisions and personalities of their heads. There exist vibrant networks which meet 
regularly in plenary sessions (like Authorisation Network or Methodology and Standards 
Development Network). On the other hand, there are some networks which function more as 
means to endorse head of division’s priorities and NCA are not necessarily consulted in this 
regard. Some national representatives participate in more than one supervisory network. This 
applies especially to smaller and less staffed NCAs which have to economize their resources. D is 
generally satisfied with the functioning of supervisory networks and finds them as an important 
channel to forge common supervisory culture over time. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted E 
Interviewee profile Legal 
Date(s): 19 October 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 45 minutes 
Subject: AUT network and national divergences in fit and proper 
Informal interview with E (executive summary) 
 E is an ECB-based supervisor working on matters related to authorizations and approvals. 
Regarding the F&P policies, although the ECB formulated various policy stances of different 
aspects of F&P assessments for significant institutions, significant divergences at national level 
remain. There are mainly caused by applicable legal frameworks. 
 There exist jurisdictions, in which ex-ante F&P (BE, FR) assessment is necessary (that is before a 
person assumes its function, conditionality). Other jurisdictions follow ex post assessment (F&P 
can be carried out after the appointment according to applicable deadlines). These two different 
ways of F&P significantly complicate F&P supervision for significant institutions. Furthermore, 
there exist jurisdictions (LT, BE, IE, MT), in which key function holders in addition to board 
members (head of compliance, risk departments) also have to be assessed against F&P 
requirements. As far as F&P assessment techniques are concerned, in some jurisdictions 
interviews are used (NL, BE, IE, ES) whereas some jurisdictions do not require this step. 
 With regard to ECB-NCA relations, the cooperation according to E is well structured. In this 
supervisory field, mutual trust and informal communication are crucial given tight deadlines for 
common procedures set in the SSMFR. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that NCA notify and 
work together with ECB experts already at the very stage of dossier and do not wait with 
submission until the very last moment. 
 National supervisors are also very important to the ECB from the other reason. NCA authorisation 
experts provide their experience and know-how of F&P. Example: through Authorisation network 
NCA experts took active participation in development of common policy stances for SIs. To sum 
up, according to E there are three key values which should always guide ECB-NCA relation with 
regard to F&P: transparency of decision-making, communication and information sharing. 
  
402 
 
Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted F 
Interviewee profile Statistics 
Date(s): 25 October 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 30 minutes 
Subject: JST functioning 
Informal interview with F (executive summary) 
 F is an ECB-based supervisor working in a JST responsible for the supervision of a medium-sized 
SI. Before joining the SSM, F worked in other ECB business line (statistics). F perceives the SSM 
as a great step forward in building an impartial supervisory approach. In JSTs (at least the one of 
F), there is no distinction between EU and national officials – all work hand in hand while 
supervising banks. For instance, he covers one on risks in SREP assessment. Another of F’s 
colleagues, based in BaFiN, covers other risk. Later on, their assessment was compiled and feed 
into the final SREP decision. There is no double checking of work done by NCA colleagues.  
 However, smooth ECB-NCA cooperation is not always the case. In other JSTs problems 
sometimes occur. Much of this is connected to the stance of senior national officials who are not 
willing to change their supervisory/managerial approaches. It is hard for some of them to accept 
authority of JST coordinator, especially when he is younger and spent fewer years in banking 
supervision industry. 
 In this context, JST institutional design is somewhat suboptimal. JST coordinators can appraise 
neither national sub coordinators nor national supervisors forming JSTs. Although they form 
significant part of a JST, their reporting lines are national. This complicates the work in case 
differences of opinion occur. The JST coordinator has weak formal instruments to enforce its 
supervisory stance on sub-coordinators. Although there is recourse to instructions, they are not a 
preferred solution given institutional and personal sensitivities. Instead, informal ways of 
persuasion are used more often; however they may involve escalation of an issue and involving 
more actors so that the matter in the end becomes political. 
 Therefore, F sees a great potential in network interaction and is of the opinion that the SSM 
needs more time to development common supervisory culture. For this reason, younger 
generation of supervisors should be hired which is not affected by national particularities. This 
however does not always happen in the SSM and national key in appointments/promotions 
continues to plat significant role. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted G 
Interviewee profile Economist 
Date(s): 10 March 2017 
Duration (total) ca. 45 minutes 
Subject: ECB-DNB relations 
Informal interview with G (executive summary) 
Supervision of significant institutions 
 G is a high-level supervisor at DNB. G is of the opinion that it may take years to ensure efficiency 
of JSTs’ functioning. At the moment, there is still a room for improvement to make them truly 
multinational teams. First of all the decision-making in the JSTs is too remote and centralized. 
The coordinator always resides in Frankfurt, when if the JST team is small and originating from 
one NCA only. The second issue concerns the loyalty in the JSTs. There is a problem with 
adequate incentives for both national and supranational supervisors. This is related to promotion 
opportunities, which are either purely national or supranational. Above all, being a supervisor 
pertaining to a JST means that you will work at least 5 years in the same place. More staff 
exchanges and intra SSM mobility could address the issue, but in fact there is a number of 
obstacles including legal constraints related to taxation of seconded staff. In G’s opinion, the ECB 
is already doing much in this regard, but still there is a need for more opportunities and mobility. 
Split between SI and LSI supervision 
 Essentially, it does not constitute a problem however there is a problem with the use of the 
proportionality concepts (i.a. proportional application of SSM supervisory standards to LSIs) 
which sometimes is used in order to shield national particularities. One of such field in the 
conduct of SREP on smaller banks. There has been reluctance from some NCAs to require a fully-
fledged SREP for small banks. In this regard, the need for a proportional approach was highly 
advocated due to possible costs which this incurs. In fact, application of full SREP (4 pillars) could 
indeed reveal that some domestic LSI banking sectors are not as healthy as it is claimed. So far, 
the fully fledged SREP is required only vis-à-vis high priority LSI. DNB, on the contrary, conducts 
SREP on all LSIs. 
Supervision of less significant institutions 
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 When answering to the question whether there is more enforcement or managerialism with 
regard to ECB’s oversight regime, G considers that the compliance is promoted by managerialism 
done under shadow of hierarchy. G mentions the possibility of taking over the LSI supervision as 
the main ‘stick’ mechanism (nuclear option) which motivates the NCAs to comply with the ECB’s 
preferences. When discussing whether the SMN and WG-HSS are fora, on which G would directly 
share his day-to-day supervisory issues, G said that we are not there yet. He also notes however 
that these fora have considerably evolved, and now there is much more active participation and 
exchange of views among the NCAs. The main obstacle for SMN/WG-HSS to becoming a truly 
active communication platform are language issues however political salience of banking 
supervision also plays role. G considers the development of JSS by DG-MSIII as a step towards a 
good direction, however agreeing only on ‘common denominator’ is not enough. G thinks that 
the ECB should develop its policies in a bigger isolation from NCAs so they are not allowed the 
possibility to water the product down already in the preparatory stage. Another issue is 
demanding ECB’s reporting requirements. For instance, DNB has to dedicate 2 FTEs to meet the 
ECB’s requests in this regard. Also discrepancies in definitional issues across the NCAs, and 
between the ECB and NCAs make reporting more complicated. The main DNB contribution to 
SSM is: pragmatism and supervisory practices related to RAS/ICAAP and Pillar 2 Capital 
requirements. 
Other/general issues 
 G sees creation of on-site inspection function, reporting and Supervisory Manual as the main 
lessons learnt from DNB participation in the SSM. Interestingly, DNB applies Supervisory Manual 
also (directly) to the LSI supervision. Furthermore, the Manual constitutes a helpful educational 
tool especially for DNB newcomers. In particular, it gives to DNB know-how of methodologies 
and procedures. G describes the SSM supervisory approach as legalistic and still judgment-based. 
Indeed, there is a lot of room for maneuver regarding individual decisions on SIs which shall 
follow “holistic perspective”. This gives to JSTs a lot of possibilities for adjustment. On policy 
work, G notes that there should be less drafting teams consisting of NCA experts and more ECB 
direct involvement. Ideally, if there is also an equivalent of SMN for SIs. G says that all 
supervisory issues shall not be escalated to the SB. Also DG-MSIV could work better and the 
ECB’s intra-DG cooperation and information flows. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted H 
Interviewee profile Legal 
Date(s): 10 October 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 30 minutes 
Subject: SSM functioning 
Informal interview with H (executive summary) 
 H is an ECB-based supervisor who worked closely with ECB representatives in the Supervisory 
Board. From H observations, the SB operations represent tensions between achieving common 
supervisory objectives and dealing with national supervisory bias. Yet, the SB is on the good way 
to harmonize supervisory practices and reduce national divergence. The example of this can be 
found in the recent work on options and national discretions (ONDs). At the time of SSM 
creation, ONDs were highly politically salient issues and initially there was reluctance among the 
MS to formulate common supervisory policy on these aspects.  
 However over time (January 2015), national reps of the BU SM have increasingly seen a need to 
have a common supervisory approach on ONDs to banks directly supervised by the ECB. As a 
consequence, high-level group was established and a set of policy proposals covering the vast 
majority of O&Ds available in Union law was formulated. H notes that trust has played a very 
significant role, and that the approach and personality of Mr Ignazio Angeloni who coordinated 
the project helped to get NCAs on board.  
 As for the functioning of the SB, H is aware of current legal and institutional limitations. The SB 
receives a huge number of different requests coming from supervisory DGs and it is very 
important that it is able to prioritize them. Here, the role of SB Secretariat is very helpful which 
shall serve as a filter. 
 However, another aspect which could also improve the smooth functioning of the SB would be to 
divide different supervisory portfolios among the ECB representatives. At the moment, the SB 
seems to be indeed very centralized around the Chair whose management style is more of 
centralizing rather than sharing supervisory dossier. H explains this approach by the fact that Ms 
Nouy is the first chair of the SB and most likely is willing to leave her impact on early functioning 
of the SB. It might be that over time there will be more distribution of portfolios among four ECB 
representatives so that their role is more managerial than advisory.  
  
406 
 
Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted I 
Interviewee profile Financial 
Duration 30 minutes 
Date: 13 August, 21 October 2016 
Subject: Development of O&D policies for SIs and LSIs 
Informal interview with I (executive summary) 
 I is an ECB-based supervisory expert who worked on the harmonisation of CRR/CRDIV options 
and national discretions. I participated in many policy-related work of the ECB, including 
development of common policy stances on different options and national discretions available in 
Union law. Regarding OND harmonisation project for SIs, I observed active participation of 
national representatives in a specifically created high level group. The creation of the HLG was 
endorsed by the Supervisory Board in May 2015. All NCAs delegated their representatives to this 
group. The NCA representatives were supervisory experts specialized in CRR/CRDIV topics. That 
is why, according to I, a common technical language was found easily between them and there 
has been a productive and fruitful discussion. Yet, according to I, not every NCA took actively 
part in the drafting: some of the NCAs were more vocal (DE, IT, ES) in presenting their stances 
whereas the other (MT, LU, CY, LT, LV, EE) less. 
 I noted that there were many planetary meetings of the HLG. The main concern of NCA 
representatives was not the issue of reducing individual national discretion, but to make sure that 
everybody will follow a common stance (no free-riding).  
 The outcome of the HLG was however not endorsed by the Supervisory Board in its entirety due 
to sensitiveness of some OND. Therefore, the final outcome differed from the original proposal 
and that is why HLG was created. It was also decided that the policy work on OND would be 
proportionally extended to LSIs in the future. 
 Regarding OND harmonisation project for LSI, I noted that it was an ongoing project and public 
consultation regarding LSI policy package were about to be launched. In this case, no HLG was 
created and the policy work was conducted by Senior Management Network consisting of NCA 
representatives not necessarily specialized in the OND topics. This is due to the fact that the 
majority of technical issues were addressed at the HLG dedicated to SIs. However, as I stated, still 
some NCAs sent their comments also regarding OND policies on LSIs (DE, IT).  
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted J 
Interviewee profile Economist 
Date(s): 09 November 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 90 minutes 
Subject: EBA policy work 
Informal interview with J (executive summary) 
 J is an EBA-based policy expert. Prior to 2011 J worked for CEBS. J noted that the EBA is only 
supervisory authority in the EU which was assigned EU-wide supervisory convergence mandate. 
EBA’s primary tools to drive supervisory convergence rely on peer reviews, trainings and comply-
or-explain mechanism. Recently, an additional instrument has been developed – that is bilateral 
EBA staff visits to CAs. 
 As noted by J, EBA Review Panel is the main internal body responsible for EBA convergence 
related activities. Under Review Panel’s coordination, EBA experts have developed various 
benchmarks and indicators to access progress in implementation and compliance of CAs with 
EBA policy products, notably Guidelines. As regards the process of policies drafting, two ways can 
be distinguished: ‘Push-model’ and ‘Pull-model’ 
 The Push model resembles top-down approach. In this model, the EBA is in the lead whereas 
competent authorities are more like ‘clients’ of EBA’s products. Notably, policies on supervisory 
colleges, Pillar 2, Stress Tests were developed in this way. On the opposite, there is also ‘pull-
model’, in which these are CAs provide more expertise and resources to common work. In this 
model, policies related to investment firms are developed. 
 As such, there is no standard way how the drafting teams for development of supervisory policies 
are set-up, also in terms of composition. It is rather done on case-by-case basis. However, for the 
reasons of efficiency J highlighted that it is better to have smaller groups consisting of reps from a 
subset CAs rather than from all of them. On the other hand, there is an issue whether non-
participating CAs have capacities to implement the policy products developed. That is why J sees 
the EBA’s role also in capacity-building at national level. Regarding the organization of policy 
work at the EBA, there exist permanent Standing Committee on Oversight and Practices (SCOP) 
which advises the Board of Supervisors (BSR) on convergence agenda. For the development of 
specific policies, usually ad-hoc drafting teams or task forces are created under auspices of SCOP.  
 For the policy work on Stress Test GLs, there is a drafting team consisting of 15 national reps and 
the ECB. It is currently working on the amendment of ST GLs and is expected to deliver them in 
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Q22017. Within the team, there are more and less active national reps (big CAs, like DE, IT, FR, 
NL however active participation also depends on size, personality and expertise in field). The 
majority of them have economic background. The work has been divided in clusters and each 
national rep (group of national reps) are working on specific aspect of GLs. However, the key 
work takes place during plenary meeting, either at the EBA HQs or CAs. 
 Regarding the policy work on supervisory colleges, there was a special work stream established 
called ‘Home-Host working group’. It was responsible for developing RTS concerning the 
functioning of colleges as well as for specific policy stances. It was also taking care of Colleges 
Action Plans. It consisted of national reps originating from 24 CAs. To assess the implementation 
of College Action Plans and national compliance, the EBA experts developed internal criteria for 
the assessment of college functioning. 
 J was not able to comment on Fit and Proper policies since was not involved in their drafting. 
However, J forwarded the names of EBA experts involved and recommended to get in touch with 
them. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted K 
Interviewee profile Supervision 
Date(s): 17 January 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 30 minutes 
Subject: SSM functioning from an NCA perspective 
Informal interview with K (executive summary) 
 K is a supervisor responsible for less significant banks based at Banca d’Italia. From K 
perspective, the creation of the SSM was a huge game-changer for Banca d’Italia, also in 
terms of workload.  
 The First Comprehensive Assessment exercise was very resource-consuming since the 
requests coming from the ECB were very demanding. Also, the issue was new 
methodologies used by the ECB, for instance for NPL classification. Sometimes there 
differed a lot from the ones used formerly by Banca D’Italia according to its Bolletino di 
Vigilanza (national supervisory manual). Therefore, the specificities of NPEs could not 
also be properly captured given tighter ECB requirement. That is why IT banks were not 
among top ones in Comprehensive Assessment results.  
 Another issue coming from the SSM creation is unequal split of supervisory work at BdI. 
Notably, supervisors working in JSTs have noticed that their workload has increased 
whereas for supervisors who working in LSI supervision it remained the same. The 
increase in work for NCA supervisors working in JSTs comes from the ECB’s more 
intrusive approach and various data requests, not always necessary. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee – encrypted L 
Interviewee profile Economist 
Date(s): 14 November 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 30 minutes 
Subject: SSM functioning from an NCA perspective 
Informal interview with L (executive summary) 
 L is a supervisor working in the SSM Coordination of ACPR. Before joining ACPR’s 
banking branch, he worked for ACPR’s insurance supervision unit. From L early 
experience, the SSM has positive impact on ACPR and the ECB contributes a lot to the 
quality of banking supervision in the Euro Area. ACPR does not treat the ECB as a 
competitor. L notes that on my occasions the ECB decisions on French banks have been 
adjusted to include ACPR comments (but it is not always the case). 
 The L’s division works closely with the SB Secretariat from which it gets all supervisory 
dossiers which are subsequently forwarded to competent business lines. Also L’s division 
interacts with SSM coordination divisions from other NCAs. For this purpose, a network 
of experts has been created and is informally chaired by high-level reps of the SB 
Secretariat.  
 L is content with the current information-sharing arrangements in the SSM, however L 
would also welcome more transitional interactions and staff exchanges. L considers 
supervisory knowledge transfer and learning as crucial to build a common supervisory 
culture. 
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee – encrypted M 
Interviewee profile Economist 
Date(s): 8 November 2016 
Duration (total) ca. 20 minutes 
Subject: Single Market from a non-participating NCA perspective 
Informal interview with M (executive summary) 
 M is a policy expert based at the Bank of England (BoE). Before M worked for the EBA. 
According to M, the EBA does not have much to offer to BoE since it has well-developed 
supervisory policy-making capacities and well-defined supervisory by the PRA. Some of 
EBA products were however welcome by BoE which includes EBA guidelines on 
Supervisory Evaluation and Review Process (SREP). M participated in drafting team. 
From M’s observations, the first stage of GLs drafting went slow due to weak 
chairmanship of one of NCA resp. However, they EBA high level officials took after the 
lead, the works on SREP GLs accelerated. The drafting was coordinated by SCOP (EBA 
Standing Committee on Oversight and Policies) Notably, DE and AT were very much 
involved in ICAAP rules.  
 Another field of EBA’s work which was of interest to BoE was standards on recovery 
planning (BRRD). This product was heavily based on BoE approach. All in all, M notes 
some convergence pressured coming to the EBA but in a rather informal way. Since 
British banking sectors is not very exposed to continental Europe, neither is the BoE the 
primary recipient of EBA’s work on the functioning of supervisory colleges in the EU. As 
for BoE-SSM relations, M notes that national interest of EA MS now play lesser role than 
before. However, for M, the overall SSM structure is too legal and bureaucratic.  
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Interviewer Jakub Gren, PhD student, University of Luxembourg 
Interviewee - encrypted N 
Interviewee profile Legal 
Date(s): 03 March 2017 
Duration (total) ca. 90 minutes 
Subject: ECB-NBB relations 
Informal interview with N (executive summary) 
 N is a policy expert working in NBB. N is of the opinion that my perspective on the SSM 
distinguishing enforcement (legally binding) and management (non-binding) is indeed 
an interesting one. However he wonders why I did not cover the Supervisory Board as a 
platform of Principal-Agent cooperation. I explained that it is a formal rather than 
informal body, and thus does not likely to fit well into managerialism and N understood. 
 On the enforcement argument, N highlights the importance of the Framework 
Regulation which fills-in the agency contract. In particular, N lists the concept of Joint 
Supervisory Teams which was not foreseen by the Council’s SSM Regulation, but was a 
choice of the ECB and NCAs picked from other (less integrative) alternatives. N also 
recommends distinguishing between the less intrusive (operational) powers of 
instruction assigned to JST Coordinator, and formal ECB instructions to NCAs. 
 As for JSTs, N agrees that they may be treated as national actors because of their 
predominantly NCA-based composition. However, N also notes that in the case of larger 
banks (ex. BNP Paribas Fortis) national supervisors are more likely to embrace a 
supranational perspective since NCA sub-coordinators are often assigned responsibilities 
thematically, and not according to national jurisdictions (i.a. a sub coordinator from one 
NCAs may be in charge of assesing a specific risk for the whole banking group). N notes 
that there were (and sometimes still) are some conflicts between the JST coordinator and 
sub coordinators. N was aware of one ECB instruction to NBB in this regard. However, 
the conflicts in general tend to appear more between the ECB and NCA senior 
management to whom the coordinator and sub-coordinator respectively report. 
 N mentions SSM-wide assessment of JST performance. JST staff feedback on their 
coordinators did not deviate much from the coordinators’ self-assessment and was 
positive on aggregated SSM wide basis. Interestingly, JST coordinators scores lower notes 
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in the assessment conducted by their respective ECB managers (heads of divisions/DGs). 
As N also notes, there exists many challenges in ensuring the consistency across JSTs on 
the ECB side. Often even JST coordinators are confused as to the benchmarking carried 
out by the DG-MSIV which has a lot of flexibility in this regard. For instance, there will 
be a new updated SREP methodology. 
 Later on this year, the ECB will issue an act further delegating operational tasks to JSTs. 
This means that the decision-making will be less centralized and not each supervisory 
issues will be escalated to the Supervisory Board. In this context, JSTs will (and indirectly 
NCAs) become even more powerful with regard to day-to-day supervision. In particular, 
when it comes to preparatory work. However, there will be mechanisms established to 
carry out random checks. In this context, ECB specialized horizontal services will play 
more prominent roles, particular Supervisory Quality Assurance Division. There is also a 
need to better use NCA horizontal functions, informal networks is too little. 
Importantly, networks do not report to the Supervisory Board but only to the head of 
respective horizontal division. 
 N considers templates provided in the annex to the Supervisory Manual an important ex 
ante mechanisms. However he also notes that the ECB reluctantly shares the templates 
with non-JST business lines. As a non-JST supervisor, N would prefer to have access to 
them but understands that the ECB prefers to maintain flexibility in this regard and 
avoid that the NCAs use these templates “against the ECB in the future”. 
 While discussing the benefits of the SSM, N points out the reduction of the possibility of 
supervisory capture and more necessary playing field. However in the end, there is a 
trade-off between one-size-fits-all approach and flexibility. 
 Another benefit: increasing staff at NCA level. The SSM gives to NCAs argument to 
request more funding. In this context, N notes that for the ECB Banking Supervision 
costs do not matter (there is no limit) – see the contacts the consultancies get as 
subcontractors (comprehensive assessment or upcoming internal models review). NBB 
was always more cautious with the costs.  
 For N, the capital requirements to banks should be governed by a harmonized approach. 
He notes that BE traditionally imposed high capital requirements on its banks and as the 
result of the SSM the requirement has been decreased. Also, the new ECB’s Pillar 2 add-
ons approach, consisting of Pillar 2 Requirements (binding) and Pillar 2 Guidance (non-
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binding) is considered as further relaxation of capital requirements to SSM banks. N 
considers NBB tough approach to capital requirements being the main NBB’s 
contribution to the SSM. 
 Other areas of one-size-fits all: O&Ds, however there is a problem with O&S assigned to 
legislator. The NBB could not follow the ECB requirements to go further in this regard, 
since it is also accountable to the parliament and it is its competent to exercise 
‘regulatory O&Ds’. 
 More flexibility: macro-prudential tools. In many respects the ECB micro powers 
overlaps with the NCA macro competences. NBB active participation in networks: 
cannot equally actively participate in all work streams. Focus: SREP, O&Ds, Fit and 
Proper policies (strong involvement in various drafting teams). Well-functioning 
networks: SMN, COI. Room for improvement: MSD, especially when it comes to 
cooperation on the Supervisory Manual amendments. 
 N also notes that from time to time the policy products developed by networks were not 
endorsed further due to different opinion of DG-MSIV top management and also the 
Chair/Vice chair. Thus, they are not always final.  Necessary requirements to foster SSM 
supervisory culture: more information exchange, transparency and streamlining of 
processes. 
 The EBA –NBB relations were not covered since they are out of N’s assigned tasks. 
However, he was of the opinion that it is a good choice not to cover the EBA in my study 
due to its uncertain future and the fact that it is not a direct supervisor. 
